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Abstract
This thesis studies the role of global risk within the context of international
finance. In total, the thesis is composed of three essays. In Chapter 2, I investi-
gate the impact of global risk on the cross-border flows of funding between banks.
Specifically, I decompose gross cross-border bank-to-bank funding between arms-
length (interbank) and related (intragroup) funding, and show that while interbank
funding is withdrawn when global risk is high, intragroup funding remains stable
during these periods, despite being more volatile on average. The results are in
contradiction with theoretical predictions for the behavior of cross-border banking
flows, and help explain why certain banking systems lost more cross-border bank-
to-bank funding than others during the global financial crisis of 2008. In Chapter 3,
I turn my attention to the currency market and show that global imbalances are a
fundamental economic determinant of currency risk premia. I propose a factor that
captures exposure to countries’ external imbalances – termed the global imbalance
risk factor – and show that it explains most of the cross-sectional variation in cur-
rency excess returns. The economic intuition of this factor is simple: net foreign
debtor countries offer a currency risk premium to compensate carry trade investors
willing to finance negative external imbalances.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I focus again on the currency market by investigat-
ing the fundamental source of variation in currency betas. Theoretical models of
currency premia offer precise explanations for why currencies exhibit heterogeneous
exposure (betas) to risk. Characteristic factors, constructed to reflect these ‘beta
predictions’ of leading models of currency premia would, therefore, also be expected
to explain the cross-section of currency portfolio returns. I find, however, that none
of the factors can explain any of the cross-sectional spread in returns. Yet alterna-
tive non-theoretical characteristic factors, based on macroeconomic, financial and
political risk, perform almost universally well in cross-sectional tests. But these fac-
tors can also be dismissed as explanations for heterogeneous currency betas, with a
simple secondary test. The findings imply a need for a stricter empirical benchmark
for assessing all theoretical models of currency premia. Moreover, by investigating
currency betas, I show that standard empirical asset pricing techniques can filter
out around 99% of spurious currency risk factors.
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“Our knowledge can only be finite, while our ignorance
must necessarily be infinite”
Karl Popper
Chapter 1
Introduction
“War is the only proper school for a surgeon”
Hippocrates, c.460 – 370 BC
1.1 The Benefits of a Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis, which began in the middle of 2007 and reached its apex in
the winter of 2008, following the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers,
marks a defining point in the history of finance. It serves as a reminder that our
ability to tame markets and perfectly share risk is still a distant prospect, only alive
today in the theoretical domain. The once cherished belief among academics and
policy makers that we were living the good life, in the world of a ‘great moderation’,
belongs to a distant and seemingly naive past. But for all the pain and anguish that
arises from a crisis, from the mass unemployment and sharp fall in output, to the
loss of public provisions, one group arises from the rubble with an apparent treasure
trove – the economists. The plethora of new and interesting observations which
arise from a crisis provide the impetus for an explosion in research and new ways
of thinking, as the process of ‘creative destruction’, usually synonymous with the
grubby practicalities of capitalism, works itself into the ivory towers of academia.
That is not to say, however, that a financial or economic crisis is inherently
‘good’ for an economist, since it only acts as a reminder that we, as a group, are
fallible and possess a still inadequate grasp of the economic machine. Yet, the
machine is complex and dynamic and in a constant state of flux. Its evolution
over time, combined with an inexhaustible array of feedback mechanisms, makes
the modeling of its core functions and empirical identification of stable relationships
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a challenge of the highest magnitude, but one worth undertaking for the potential
payoffs to science and human welfare. And here a crisis can, paradoxically, be
helpful. In the same way that the tragedies of war have also provided the catalyst
for improvements in medical knowledge, a financial crisis highlights the weaknesses
within the economic system. By exploring what went wrong and, more importantly,
what can go wrong – we may not gain control of the system, but we can garner a
greater understanding of its inner workings and prevent, or at least mitigate against,
future episodes of crisis.
This thesis brings together three essays which have at their root a story of
global risk and crisis. In fact, in all three essays the global financial crisis provides
the backdrop to the questions which I seek to address. The concepts of risk and
crisis are inherently linked. If a crisis is the realization of the ‘bad state’ of the world,
then a rise in global risk implies a greater probability of us finding ourselves in that
‘bad state’. It therefore follows that by studying risk, one may help to contribute to
our knowledge of weakness in the economic system and in some part mitigate the
possibility that the ‘bad state’ of the world, manifesting itself as a crisis, is realized.
In each essay, the theme of ‘global’ risk is studied within the overarching
framework of ‘international’ finance. To this author, the use of the term ‘interna-
tional finance’ is something of an historical oddity. Today it seems cliche´ to describe
the financial community as being interconnected or ‘global’. The world is not defined
by countries living isolated lives of autarky – an economic shock in one country is
frequently transmitted to that of another, whether through the channel of financial
contagion or economic interdependence. It seems therefore apparent that all finance
is international by nature.
But the academic finance and economic communities are no less slaves to
their historical legacy than other cultures. The U.S. centric approach to finance ebbs
but remains strong. In the future the term ‘international finance’ will, no doubt,
be a defunct term and quaint reminder of the discipline’s origins. Yet, despite this
short aside, my usage of the term ‘international finance’ is, throughout this thesis,
in accord with the strictest common parlance. Each essay, to a greater or lesser
degree, focusses on the cross-border flows of finance between countries and on the
currencies one uses to transact overseas.
1.2 Background and Thesis Outline
During the recent crisis, banks around the world engaged in a wide-scale retrench-
ment in their lending to other banks. Fears and uncertainty over the health of
borrowing banks’ balance sheets often meant that the reward-to-risk ratio from
2
lending overseas became too low to be tenable. This sudden stop in cross-border
lending came at the end of a prolonged build up in bank-to-bank funding across
borders, making the negative knock-on consequences for domestic credit expansion
especially pronounced.
In fact, recent history shows that the growth in cross-border capital flows
has been so rapid that the total value of flows far exceeds the value of countries’
exports and imports. This growth in cross-border finance has called into question
the traditional view of analyzing mismatches in trade and investment as a measure
of a country’s underlying riskiness. Highlighting this view, Maurice Obstfeld, in
his keynote address at the American Economic Association annual meeting in 2012,
titled his talk “Does the Current Account Still Matter?” and emphasized the need
to look to the balance sheet mismatches of leveraged financial entities as a means
to assess potential instability within a country’s financial system.
Heading this message, Bruno and Shin (2014) have recently developed a
model of cross-border funding between banks, which has at its core the leverage
ratio of global banks. Periods of heightened global risk have been shown to lead to
a reduction in global bank leverage, as banks actively manage their balance sheets,
often in compliance with internal Value-at-Risk (VaR) targets (Adrian and Shin,
2010). The model of Bruno and Shin (2014) captures this mechanism by predicting
that cross-border funding between banks will fall when global risk rises.
In Chapter 2, I challenge this theory, by arguing that cross-border funding
between banks needs to be put under the microscope, since the aggregate interna-
tional flow of funding between banks can be disaggregated into two distinct funding
types. First, banks can lend overseas to ‘arms-length’ counterparties with whom
the bank has no direct relations. Alternatively, a bank can lend to a related bank,
within a banking group’s ‘internal capital market’. I refer to these two forms of
funding as interbank and intragroup. Using a large panel of data on 25 banking
systems from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), I disaggregate cross-
border funding between interbank and intragroup flows and show that the split has
statistical, economic and theoretical importance.
When global risk is high or rising, interbank funding falls as predicted by
the model of Bruno and Shin (2014), particularly to banks resident in emerging
economies. On the other hand, intragroup funding, which accounts for almost half of
all cross-border funding between banks, is found to be more volatile than interbank
funding, but displays the opposite behavior in response to fluctuations in global risk.
When global risk rises, intragroup funding expands and, when global risk is at an
elevated level, intragroup funding remains stable.
These results have economic importance. Banking systems with a large share
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of interbank relative to intragroup funding experienced the largest withdrawals of
funding by overseas banks during the global financial crisis. Even the United States,
at the epicenter of the global financial crisis, experienced a relatively modest five
percent withdrawal in funding by overseas banks, which can be largely explained
by its heavy reliance on intragroup bank funding. In fact, by considering only the
ratio of interbank to intragroup funding, I find that up to 45 percent of the change
in cross-border funding between banks, during the global financial crisis, can be
explained at country level.
To better understand the behavior of intragroup funding in response to global
risk, I further disaggregate intragroup funding between flows to parent and foreign
affiliate banks. I find that the increase in intragroup funding is principally to parent
banks resident in advanced market economies, which use their foreign affiliates as
a buffer against liquidity shocks during a period of heightened risk. Nonetheless, I
find no robust evidence that foreign affiliates of global banks experience a reduction
in funding from their parent bank during these periods. Moreover, foreign affiliates
resident in emerging economies are shown to receive an inflow of intragroup funding
when the average profitability of banks in their local economy is low, implying that
emerging economies can benefit from a stabilizing foreign bank presence in the local
economy. The results suggest a need for policy makers to monitor disaggregated
funding, split between interbank and intragroup. Focussing on the aggregate figure,
while implicitly assuming that both forms of funding will behave symmetrically
following a rise in global risk, could lead to a misleading interpretation of the banking
system’s underlying vulnerability to funding withdrawals.
In addition to demonstrating a theoretical link between global risk and cross-
border funding between banks, Bruno and Shin (2014) demonstrate a causal link
between currency market movements and international banking flows. An appreci-
ation of the local currency is shown theoretically to increase funding from overseas
banks to banks resident in the local economy. In Chapter 2, I show the relation-
ship between the currency market and banking flows holds across both interbank
and intragroup funding, while in Chapter 3, I explore more deeply the relationship
between aggregate international capital flows, of which international banking flows
are a sub-component, and the currency market. In doing so, I try to understand the
fundamental macroeconomic rationale, which lies behind currency risk premia and
the empirical failure of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP).
One of the key debates in international finance relates to why the UIP con-
dition fails to hold. Expressed simply, UIP states that the exchange rate between
two countries should appreciate by the exact difference in the risk-free interest rates
offered in those countries. For example, if the one-year interest rate is ten percent
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in Australia and one percent in Japan, then over the course of the following year
UIP states that one would expect the Japanese yen to appreciate by nine percent
against the Australian dollar. By doing so, an investor who decided to undertake a
‘carry strategy’, of borrowing in the low interest currency and lending in the high
interest currency, would on average do no better than break even. Yet consistently
the carry-trade investor has been shown empirically to profit from this apparently
na¨ıve strategy, raising one of the major puzzles in international finance commonly
referred to as the ‘forward premium puzzle’.
Whenever a theory is shown to consistently be at odds with reality, the
first course of action is to investigate the assumptions which generated the model’s
predictions. In the case of UIP, two strong assertions lie at the heart of the theory.
First, investors are assumed to have ‘rational expectations’, such that the way they
form their expectations is consistent with the underlying data generating process.
Second, investors are assumed to be ‘risk neutral’ and hence, do not require any
compensation above the risk-free rate for holding risky securities. Any test of UIP
is, in effect, a joint test of the hypotheses that investors are rational and risk neutral.
Froot and Frankel (1989) provide an early example of an attempt to decompose
deviations from UIP between forecast errors and compensation for risk. Their study
and subsequent work (Chinn and Frankel, 2002; Cavaglia, Verschoor, and Wolff,
1994; Bacchetta, Mertens, and Van Wincoop, 2008) fail to show either a time-
varying risk premium, or that errors in investor expectations are the only reason for
the empirical failure of UIP.
Perhaps the most pragmatic view is one which accepts that both elements
are likely important contributors; however, this in itself raises questions. First, why
do investors systematically form biased forecasts of the future exchange rate? And
second, what exactly is the time-varying source of risk compensation for? The first
question remains open with multiple contending theories, including: learning (Lewis,
1989a,b), peso-problems (Evans and Lewis, 1995; Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchel-
ski, and Rebelo, 2011a), and slow reactions to news caused by ambiguity aversion
(Ilut, 2012) or rational inattention (Bacchetta and Van Wincoop, 2010b). In Chap-
ter 3, I delve into the second question and investigate the underlying macroeconomic
explanation for why time-varying risk exists within the currency market and why
carry trade investors find themselves exposed to this risk.
Recent evidence from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011), suggests
that a ‘global’ risk factor can explain the cross-section of currency excess returns.
In other words, currencies seem to be exposed to a single source of time-varying
risk. The approach adopted by Lustig et al. (2011) involves sorting currencies into
portfolios based on their interest rate and follows a long tradition of sorting assets
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into portfolios, with Fama and French (1993) providing the seminal study for the
equity market. The returns to these portfolios are then explained, or ‘priced’, using
standard empirical asset pricing techniques, including the approach of Fama and
MacBeth (1973) as well as the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique
of Hansen (1982). Yet, despite the encouraging evidence that a single source of
time-varying risk may be responsible for explaining excess currency returns, the
fundamental explanations for what the risk is, and why some currencies are more
exposed to that risk are not provided.
To understand why, it is important to outline how Lustig et al. (2011) discover
the ‘global’ risk factor. Specifically, the authors perform a statistical decomposition
of currency portfolio returns, to reveal that two underlying principal components
(PCs) can explain the majority of variation in returns. The first PC is a ‘level’ fac-
tor which all currencies are equally (approximately) exposed to. Since Lustig et al.
(2011) perform their analysis with respect to the U.S. dollar (USD), the PC im-
plies that all currencies tend to move up-or-down against the dollar simultaneously.
The second PC is a ‘slope’ factor which currencies are heterogeneously exposed to.
High-interest-rate currencies ‘load’ positively on the factor while low-interest-rate
currencies ‘load’ negatively. This second principal component is of particular inter-
est since it provides evidence that a unique ‘factor’, in the spirit of the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976), can be used to model currency returns by
considering their exposure to this factor.
Of course, a fundamental concern with this type of work is that it relies
principally on statistical methods without intrinsically offering a strong economic
insight. Lustig et al. (2011) attempt to overcome this critique by forming return-
based factors which capture the underlying PCs. To capture the first principal
component, the authors take an equally weighted average of all five currency port-
folio returns each month, a factor which they term Dollar risk (DOL). This factor
has a correlation of over 99 percent with the first PC. To capture the second PC, the
authors take the difference in returns between the highest- and lowest-interest-rate-
sorted portfolios each month. This second factor is termed Slope risk (HMLFX)
and correlates almost perfectly with the second PC.
The Slope factor, the difference in returns between high and low-interest-
rate currencies, is effectively a carry strategy. In essence, the factor constructed by
Lustig et al. (2011) tells us that when returns to the carry trade are low, global
risk must be high and vice versa. But the fundamental questions surrounding the
nature of risk and the macroeconomic rationale for why currencies are more or less
exposed to that risk, remain open. To provide more clarity to the issue, in Chapters
3 and 4, I investigate the fundamental source of risk and exposure that carry-trade
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investors face.
To do so, in Chapter 3, I build on the recent theoretical developments of
Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Gourinchas (2008) and Gabaix and Maggiori (2014),
who demonstrate a link between countries’ external accounts and currency market
returns. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) show that a country’s net foreign asset (NFA)
position today – the difference between the total value of its foreign assets and
liabilities – can be used to forecast future exchange rate movements. The finding
implies that the NFA position of a country is a candidate ‘state variable’, which
affects the conditional distribution of foreign exchange returns. Net debtor countries
are more likely to experience a future exchange rate depreciation as a means to help
rebalance the external account. In Gourinchas (2008), the finding is developed.
Net debtor countries with a high share of foreign debt issued in foreign currency
– a phenomenon known as ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza,
2002) – require the largest future currency depreciation, since a depreciation of the
local currency increases the value of its foreign debt and hence causes a further
deterioration of the external account. In Gabaix and Maggiori (2014), the authors
develop a model which links currency premia with interest rates and net foreign
assets. Dealers operating in money markets require a premium to compensate for
imbalances in supply and demand within the foreign exchange market. Net debtor
countries with high interest rates offer the highest expected return to incentivize
a currency dealer to take on funding liquidity risk, by holding a position in those
particular currencies.
To capture the predictions of these models, I construct a currency factor
based on NFAs, which replaces Slope risk in the model of Lustig et al. (2011). The
factor is easily constructed: first, I sort currencies into portfolios based on their NFA
position in combination with the proportion of foreign debt held in foreign currency.
Next, I take the difference in returns on the extreme portfolios each month. In one
extreme are net debtors with the majority of foreign debt issued in foreign currency.
This portfolio is considered the ‘riskiest’. In the other extreme are net creditors
with the majority of foreign debt issued in domestic currency. This portfolio is
considered the ‘safest’. The difference in returns between these portfolios forms the
‘global-imbalance risk factor’, which I denote HMLNA.
I find that the global imbalance risk factor can explain (or ‘price’) currency
portfolio returns, hence offering a candidate macroeconomic explanation for the
source of risk driving currency premia. The finding provides support to the view
that carry-trade investors receive compensation for holding the currencies of debtor
nations, which are expected to require a future currency depreciation to help stabilize
their external account, following an external shock. The finding is not mechanically
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driven, and I show that the net foreign asset position of a country provides more
information than interest rates regarding future exchange rate returns.
The findings are also shown to have practical implications. From a trad-
ing perspective, the factor provides an alternative method for constructing a risky
currency portfolio, which has a similar Sharpe ratio to the carry trade but with
lower overall volatility. Moreover, the strategy requires little modification, hence
when rebalancing at yearly intervals, it provides a Sharpe ratio twice the size of the
currency carry trade. The factor also helps make sense of recent currency market
activity. Following the Federal Reserve Announcement in May 2013 that it would
taper its bond buying programme, currencies with almost identical interest rates
suffered asymmetric depreciations, yet the depreciations were consistent with the
relative debtor status of the underlying countries.
Since the identification of the Slope factor by Lustig et al. (2011), a number
of other alternative factors have been proposed, which help to provide greater insight
into the mechanics behind this ‘global’ risk factor. These alternatives range from
volatility, skewness and correlation risk (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf,
2012; Rafferty, 2012; Mueller, Stathopoulos, and Vedolin, 2013) to ‘downside’ market
risk (Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber, 2013). Yet one underlying issue with these
alternative factors, at least to this author, is the lack of strong economic content,
combined with an inability to explain why some currencies are more exposed to risk
than others – currency betas remain a mystery. Empirically it may be the case,
for example, that in months when volatility, skewness or correlations rise, the carry
trade suffers. But that does not provide an explanation for why high-interest-rate
currencies should be the most affected by those distributional changes.
The global imbalances factor, proposed in Chapter 3, offers one possible solu-
tion to this critique – risky currencies are those issued by countries with vulnerable
external accounts. Yet other candidate explanations could also allow for the con-
struction of a ‘characteristic factor’, whereby currencies are sorted into portfolios
based on the characteristic which is conjectured to explain currency betas. These
factors could perform equally well in explaining currency portfolio returns. More-
over, a recent line of literature has critiqued traditional empirical asset pricing by
showing it fails to eliminate most candidate risk factors.
Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010), for example, present compelling evi-
dence that explaining portfolio returns can be a relatively low hurdle, if the returns
are characterized by a strong factor structure. This type of factor structure is present
when currencies are sorted into portfolios by interest rates and, in every paper in
which a new currency factor is proposed, this group of currency portfolios is in-
variable used. While we know that the second principal component (approximately
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Slope risk) is, effectively, the ‘true’ global risk factor, Lewellen et al. (2010) demon-
strate that it is possible for a factor with almost zero correlation with Slope risk
to still have strong pricing power. In fact, Daniel and Titman (2012) find evidence
that, for the more mature equity market literature, many leading factors which
claim to price the 25 size-and-book-to-market portfolios (another set of portfolios
with a strong factor structure) have approximately zero correlation with one another
and hence, with the true factor. One possible concern, therefore, is that we could
conceivably witness a similar factor proliferation in the currency market, whereby
factors with seemingly no relationship with one another all claim encouraging levels
of success.
I attempt to address these concerns in Chapter 4 and, in doing so, build on
the findings of Chapter 3. To do so, I turn to recent consumption-based models of
currency premia, which have shown great promise in providing theoretical explana-
tions to various puzzles in international finance. But one feature of these models,
which is widely overlooked, is the theoretical prediction each one makes relating
to the fundamental drivers of currency betas. If we want to understand why high-
interest-rate currencies are the riskiest, it seems appropriate to turn to the leading
theoretical models of currency premia for potential answers, thus avoiding criticisms
of ‘data snooping’ for factors which may show promise in explaining currency re-
turns but, in light of the findings of Lewellen et al. (2010), demonstrate nothing
more than a spurious relationship.
I focus on the external-habit model of Verdelhan (2010), the long-run risks
model of Colacito and Croce (2013) and the variable rare disasters model of Farhi
and Gabaix (2013). The three models cover the main branches, or variations, of
the consumption-based model and provide a panorama of the leading theoretical
models of currency premia in use today. Each of the models investigated in Chapter
4 provides a precise prediction as to why currencies have heterogeneous exposure
to risk, by linking currency betas with a macroeconomic state variable. In the
external habit model of Verdelhan (2010), countries whose representative agent is
closest to their ‘habit’ (subsistence) level of consumption are the most risk averse,
and therefore investors in those countries require the highest return from lending
internationally. In the long-run risks model of Colacito and Croce (2013), countries
with the largest share of world consumption are the riskiest because they are less
able to share consumption risks with other countries. Finally, in the variable rare
disasters model of Farhi and Gabaix (2013), countries most exposed to a global
disaster – through experiencing the largest productivity fall following the shock –
are the riskiest.
To capture the predictions of these models regarding currency betas, I con-
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struct ‘characteristic factors’ by sorting currencies into portfolios on the basis of the
macroeconomic ‘characteristic’ which explains why certain currencies are more (or
less) exposed to risk. These factors are then used to explain the cross-section of
currency portfolio returns. If the models provide a robust explanation for currency
betas, then the factors should perform comparably well to the Slope factor of Lustig
et al. (2011) when pricing interest-rate-sorted currency portfolios. High-interest-rate
currencies should ‘load’ positively on the factor, while low-interest-rate currencies
should ‘load’ negatively.
Using a standard two-pass empirical asset pricing test, I find, however, that
none of the factors can explain any of the cross-sectional spread in returns. In fact,
the factors generate negative cross-sectional R2 statistics, large pricing errors, large
root-mean squared errors and exhibit low or negative correlations with Slope risk.
The finding is made especially puzzling by the fact that the test assets exhibit a
strong factor structure, which, as already noted, increases the likelihood that the
factor performs well in empirical tests.
The finding raises questions over whether any fundamentally based variable
can explain the variation in betas across currencies. To address this question, I
perform a ‘fishing’ exercise whereby I arbitrarily construct 25 new non-theoretical
characteristic factors using country-level data on macroeconomic, financial and po-
litical risks. Unlike the theoretical factors, these alternatives factors perform well
in cross-sectional asset pricing tests. In particular, all macroeconomic factors are
statistically ‘priced’ with a t-statistic in excess of 3.0, with associated cross-sectional
R2 between 60 and 80 percent. In total, 20 of the 25 factors are ‘priced’ and only a
handful of political risk factors show weak pricing performance comparable to the
theoretically grounded factors.
While none of the theoretically motivated factors were capable of explaining
currency portfolio returns, a concern now arises that, even if they had been suc-
cessful, pricing interest-rate-sorted portfolios is not a sufficiently high benchmark
for assessing the performance of a new factor. I perform two exercises to address
this concern. First, I change the set of test assets that the non-theoretical factors
are asked to price. Specifically, if a factor really does capture a currency’s exposure
to risk (its beta), then it should also explain portfolios sorted by the characteristic
itself. Next, I simulate ‘useless’ risk factors which contain no economic content, by
randomly sorting currencies into portfolios. I test these ‘useless’ factors’ ability to
explain interest-rate-sorted portfolios and randomly generated currency portfolios,
from which they were constructed.
I find that none of the 25 non-theoretical factors are priced when explaining
currency portfolios sorted by the same characteristic as the factor itself. Moreover,
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I find that only 1.5 percent of all ‘useless’ factors can price both interest-rate-sorted
portfolios and portfolios sorted by the same characteristic as the factor. I find,
however, that the global imbalances factor, constructed in Chapter 3, is capable of
passing both tests – strengthening the overall findings of Chapter 3.
Overall, the findings imply a need for a stricter benchmark for judging all
new theoretical models of currency premia. Theoretical models should provide a
precise prediction for the fundamental drivers of currency betas, which naturally
lend themselves to the construction of a characteristic factor that should be capa-
ble of pricing both interest-rate-sorted and characteristic-sorted currency portfolios.
Moreover, the findings offer support that, despite the recent series of critiques of
empirical asset pricing, standard techniques can filter out around 99 percent of all
spurious currency factors when currency betas are the primary focus of the study.
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Chapter 2
The Two Faces of Cross-Border
Banking Flows
2.1 Introduction
Cross-border funding between banks is a volatile and economically important source
of cross-border finance (Gabriele, Boratav, and Parikh, 2000; Milesi-Ferretti and
Tille, 2011).1 During the global financial crisis this funding was quickly withdrawn
at the aggregate level, leading policy makers and academics to focus their attention
on cross-border banking flows, as well as the operations of global banks which play
a key role in channeling this funding around the globe (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010;
Shin, 2012; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012a,b; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012, 2013;
Cerutti and Claessens, 2013; Ongena, Peydro´, and Van Horen, 2013).2
Investigating disaggregated cross-border bank-to-bank funding could, how-
ever, provide richer insights, since the aggregate flow is the sum of two distinctive
forms of funding, with potentially disparate behavior. First, there is arms-length
(interbank) funding, that takes place between unrelated banks, and second, there
is related (intragroup) funding that takes place between global banks and their for-
eign affiliates within an internal capital market. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) have
documented that both forms of funding could be equally vulnerable to withdrawal
1In recent years efforts have been made at policy level to both understand and regulate these
flows (see Hoggarth, Mahadeva, and Martin, 2010; Committee on International Economic Policy
and Reform, 2012).
2Recent policy debate has centered on the ‘Balkanization’ of cross-border banking, including
proposals to make affiliates of foreign-owned banks safer through holding more capital – potentially
limiting the parent bank’s ability to shift internal funding from one part of the group to another.
See Goldberg and Gupta (2013) and Carney (2013) for recent discussions; see Federal Reserve Board
(2014) for a description of the recently finalized rules that require large foreign affiliates operating
in the U.S. to adhere to U.S. capital and liquidity rules.
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following an international funding shock, or a period of elevated global risk.
Yet the two forms of funding have key differences. In particular, within an in-
ternal capital market, global parent banks have the power to shift liquidity from one
corner of the banking group to another. Additionally, when lending internationally,
banks have more information about their counterparties’ overall riskiness, relative to
banks lending at arms-length. The differences could influence the way the two flows
behave in response to fluctuations in global risk. It is therefore possible that some
countries’ banking systems could be more insulated from heightened global risk than
others, depending on (i) their mix of arms-length and related funding and (ii) the
share of related funding held by global parent banks relative to foreign affiliates.
In this essay I make two broad contributions. First, I build on the cross-
border banking literature by empirically studying the behavior of disaggregated
cross-border bank-to-bank funding over time and across a large panel of countries.
Next, focussing on global risk allows me to test precisely the theoretical predictions
made by Bruno and Shin (2014), whose recent contribution has made significant
strides towards building a framework for understanding cross-border bank-to-bank
flows. In the empirical analysis, I sequentially decompose aggregate cross-border
funding between banks, across 25 advanced and emerging market economies, us-
ing the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) International Banking Statistics
database. First, I split funding to banks in a particular country between interbank
and intragroup and then, to paint a more detailed picture, I further disaggregate
intragroup funding between flows to parent and foreign affiliate banks.3,4
At the first level of disaggregation between interbank and intragroup funding,
I find that the split has statistical, theoretical and economic importance. A period
of high and rising global risk aversion, such as that witnessed following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, results in markedly different behavior in ensuing interbank and
intragroup flows. Specifically, intragroup funding, which makes up around half of all
cross-border funding between banks, rises when global risk increases and is invariant
to periods of high global risk. Interbank funding displays the opposite behavior and
is withdrawn during periods of elevated global risk, with emerging economies being
particularly vulnerable.
These findings, in part, contradict the recent theoretical predictions made
3Throughout this essay the term ‘intragroup funding’ refers to gross cross-border bank-to-bank
funding within an internal capital market of a banking group, and the term ‘interbank funding’
refers to gross cross-border bank-to-bank funding conducted at arms-length.
4While the BIS database has been used extensively by researchers in this literature, the approach
to decompose aggregate cross-border bank flows is unconventional. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011),
for example, is a related paper which adopts the more common approach of examining aggregate,
bilateral flows, within the BIS database.
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by Bruno and Shin (2014). Building on the Merton (1974) and Vasicek (2002)
models of credit risk, the authors deduce that changes in global risk should drive all
cross-border funding between banks.5 When global risk is high, the model predicts
that the leverage of global banks will fall, global liquidity will dissipate, and both
interbank and intragroup funding will contract. However, my results indicate a
need for policymakers to monitor disaggregated international funding between banks.
Assuming that both forms of funding respond identically to fluctuations in global risk
could result in a misleading assessment of a country’s underlying financial stability.
In fact, I find that considering each country’s mix of interbank and intragroup
funding alone can explain up to 45 percent of the change in cross-border bank-to-
bank funding across countries during the global financial crisis.
At the second level of disaggregation, I show that increased intragroup fund-
ing during episodes of heightened risk is principally driven by global banks, head-
quartered in advanced economies, receiving funding from their foreign affiliates. In
fact, I find that banking systems with a large share of global banks were relatively
well insulated against funding withdrawals during the global financial crisis. The
result supports the view expressed by Kohn (2008), that global banks may respond
to an economic shock by using foreign affiliates as a source of liquidity, limiting liq-
uidity pressures at home. In a related study, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b) analyze
U.S. global banks, and find that during the global financial crisis, foreign affiliates
resident in traditional funding locations were harvested for liquidity.6 I find the
result extends across advanced economies as well as periods outside the financial
crisis. However, I do not find evidence of significantly reduced intragroup funding
to foreign affiliates in either advanced or emerging economies during periods of high
global risk.7 In fact, I find that foreign affiliates resident in emerging economies ex-
perience an increase in intragroup funding, when the average profitability of banks
in the local economy is low.
Additionally, by testing the predictions of Bruno and Shin (2014), I am
able to provide a more nuanced examination of the relationship between cross-
border banking flows and other financial and economic variables, which have been
deduced theoretically to drive this funding. In particular, I show that liquidity
5At a more general level, it is well documented that capital flows are theoretically and empiri-
cally related to fluctuations in global risk (see e.g. Adrian and Shin, 2010; Bacchetta and Van Win-
coop, 2010a; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan, 2013;
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).
6Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a) demonstrate that within internal capital markets, funds are
reallocated from foreign affiliates to U.S. parent banks, as a way for the parent bank to insulate
itself against contractionary monetary policy in the United States.
7Likewise, Schnabl (2012) finds global banks maintained intragroup funding to their foreign
affiliates resident in Peru in the year following the Russian financial crisis.
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management within an internal capital market has links with both financial market
prices and monetary policy. A depreciating currency for example, has been shown
by Bruno and Shin (2014) to be theoretically linked to a reduction in subsequent
cross-border bank-to-bank flows. I show the relationship holds across both interbank
and intragroup funding. Moreover, I find evidence that global banks take advantage
of higher interest rates in emerging economies by increasing intragroup funding to
foreign affiliates resident in those economies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 I briefly
review the literature on how interbank and intragroup funding could behave in
response to fluctuations in global risk. In Section 2.3 I describe the theoretical
framework which anchors the empirical analysis. In Section 2.4 I describe the data.
I present empirical results in Section 2.5 and robustness analysis in Section 2.6.
Finally, I conclude in Section 2.7. In Appendix A, I provide further robustness tests
and additional supporting analyses.
2.2 Related Literature: Global Risk and Cross-Border
Bank Flows
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) acknowledge that both interbank and intragroup
funding could collapse in the event of bad economic news, while the model of Bruno
and Shin (2014) predicts that both forms of funding will be withdrawn when global
risk is high or rising. Exactly how the two flows behave in relation to different levels
of global risk is, ultimately, an empirical question which I aim to shed light on in the
empirical investigation. But first, I briefly review the literature on interbank and
intragroup funding to describe the contrasting perspectives on how the two flows
could react when global risk is high.
Interbank funding has been shown to act as a beneficial source of bank moni-
toring (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Calomiris, 1999) and to alleviate liquidity shocks
caused by unexpected retail depositor withdrawals (Goodfriend and King, 1988).
Given the increased ‘sophistication’ of interbank lenders relative to retail depos-
itors, this funding could therefore remain stable when global risk is high, as the
lending bank is unlikely to withdraw funding from healthy banks.
Yet, interbank flows may have a darker side. Indeed, Song and Thakor
(2007) and Huang and Ratnovski (2011) document the high withdrawal risk of
interbank funding. In fact, these authors argue that interbank funding could be
inefficiently withdrawn when global risk is high, as a result of lending banks not
having perfect information regarding the balance sheets of the banks they funded.
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Moreover, Brunnermeier (2009) finds banks, worried about their own capital buffers,
withdrew interbank funding during the financial crisis as insurance against future
balance sheet shocks, irrespective of the counterparty’s balance sheet.
Turning to intragroup funding, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) find parent
banks are likely to trade-off lending across countries to support their weakest sub-
sidiaries, while Schnabl (2012) shows foreign affiliates in Peru continued to receive
intragroup funding when global risk spiked following the Russian financial crisis.
On the other hand, Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2011) find net intragroup funding
of subsidiaries and branches in the U.S. falls when economic output in the United
States is low, while Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a,b) find that U.S. parent banks
smooth economic shocks at home by channeling funding from their foreign affili-
ates. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) also find evidence that, unlike previous
crises, parent banks were unable to support their foreign affiliates during the recent
global financial crisis.
Intragroup funding has also gained attention recently, following evidence that
European foreign affiliates operating in the United States, borrowed in local money-
markets to fund their parent bank headquartered in Europe (Bank for International
Settlements, 2010). This particular funding stream was severely impacted by the
global financial crisis (McGuire and Von Peter, 2009), implying that intragroup fund-
ing could be significantly affected by fluctuations in global risk, with both foreign
affiliates and global parent banks vulnerable to potential funding withdrawals.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
I structure the empirical analysis using the theoretical framework developed by
Bruno and Shin (2014). The authors model the total cross-border bank-to-bank
funding that takes place between regional and global banks and provide a strong
theoretically grounded rationale for why a link between global risk and cross-border
bank-to-bank flows exists for both interbank and intragroup funding. It also supplies
me with additional theoretically-grounded control variables, which should explain
changes in cross-border bank-to-bank funding. In this section I briefly outline the
model’s key features and predictions.
2.3.1 The Model
In the model of Bruno and Shin (2014), total cross-border funding of regional banks
by global banks is given by
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L =
EG + ER.
1+l
1+b .δG.δR
1− 1+l1+b .δG.δR
, (2.1)
where EG and ER are the book value of global and regional bank equity,
1+l
1+b is the
ratio of the lending rate regional banks require from domestic borrowers (l), to the
borrowing rate paid by global banks to borrow in global money markets (b), while
δG and δR are the notional debt ratios of global and regional banks, measured as
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
A rise in the debt ratio, by definition, decreases a firm’s equity, hence the
debt ratios can be viewed as measures of leverage. Specifically, the debt ratios of
global and regional banks are given by (1+b)M(1+f)L and
(1+f)L
(1+l)C , where f is the funding
rate charged by the global bank to the regional bank, and M and L represent the
book value of global and regional bank liabilities, respectively.
I derive an approximation for the change in cross-border funding between
banks, taking a first-order approximation of equation 2.1 with respect to changes in
global bank leverage and the return on domestic bank book equity:
∆L ≈ ∂L
∂ER
∆ER +
∂L
∂δG
∆δG, (2.2)
= γ (δG∆ER + C∆δG) (2.3)
where in equation 2.3, γ is equal to
1+l
1+b
δR
1− 1+l
1+b
δRδG
and C represents the total credit
provided by regional banks, which is shown in the model to be equal to EG+ER
1− 1+l
1+b
.δG.δR
.
The equation applies equally to both interbank and intragroup funding.
2.3.2 Hypotheses
Equation 2.3 provides the framework for the empirical analysis. The main hypothe-
ses that I derive from the model and investigate in the formal regression analysis
are outlined below.
Fluctuations in Global Risk
According to equation 2.3, cross-border interbank and intragroup funding should be
positively related to the level and change in global bank leverage δG. Bruno and
Shin (2014) and Adrian and Shin (2010) show that the VIX index – a measure of
global risk – can be substituted in place of global bank leverage because changes in
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global risk drive global bank leverage. Hence, when global risk is high and global
bank leverage is low, both interbank and intragroup funding are predicted to contract.
The rationale for this relationship is intuitive, and reflects the marking-to-
market of assets by global banks. A rise in the value of bank assets, for example,
corresponds to a fall in bank leverage.8 I should therefore observe a negative em-
pirical relationship between asset and leverage growth. But Adrian and Shin (2010)
show the opposite to be true. This finding implies that global bank’s actively man-
age their leverage, in response to fluctuations in asset prices. Indeed, Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2006) and Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012) have
shown that lower volatility is associated with a rise in risky asset prices, and so
it follows that global banks borrow more when risk aversion falls, and invest the
proceeds in other financial securities – including increased cross-border funding of
other banks. In fact, Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that the active management is
likely driven by value-at-risk (VaR) considerations, in which a decrease in volatility
reduces a bank’s VaR and incentivizes an expansion of the balance sheet.
Furthermore, in their empirical analysis, Bruno and Shin (2014) confirm the
main predictions of their model using data on aggregate international bank-to-bank
funding, replacing global bank leverage with the VIX index. The authors argue for
the suitability of the VIX index as a proxy for global bank leverage based on two
findings. First, in a bivariate regression, the lagged VIX index can explain a large
portion of the variation in U.S. broker dealer leverage. Second, the residuals from
the regression have no statistical significance in explaining international lending
between banks. Moreover, focussing on the VIX – and global risk – is useful from
a policy perspective, as a critical concern among policy makers is how capital flows
react during periods of economic stress.
Theoretically Motivated Control Variables
Regional bank equity. The return on domestic bank book equity ER, is predicted
to be positively related to global funding between banks. A rise in the value of a
regional bank’s book equity reduces the probability of the bank defaulting (the
regional bank’s leverage is lower). The reduction in default probability enables the
regional bank to expand its borrowing capacity and hence absorb additional funding
from global banks.
8As an example, if the starting balance sheet is split: Assets ($100), Liabilities ($90), Equity
($10), then the leverage ratio is equal to $100/$10 = 10. A $10 rise in the value of assets, when
marked to market, reduces the leverage ratio to $110/$20 = 5.5.
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Interest-rate differentials. A rise in 1+l1+b , the ratio between individual country
interest rates and global money market rates is predicted to be positively related to
cross-border bank-to-bank funding. The intuition is that an increase in a country’s
interest rate increases its income from lending, which in turn shifts the bank away
from its default boundary, freeing up capacity to take on additional funding from
global banks.
Exchange rates. Fluctuations in the foreign exchange market enter the model
indirectly. Nonetheless, the model provides a key insight into the relationship be-
tween the currency market and global liquidity. Specifically, the relationship between
foreign exchange returns and cross-border lending between banks is predicted to be
negative (assuming foreign exchange rates are measured as the number of local cur-
rency units per U.S. dollar). A local currency appreciation reduces the value of U.S.
dollar denominated liabilities of domestic corporations and increases the likelihood
that they will be able to repay loans to regional banks. That reduces the probability
of regional banks defaulting and expands their borrowing capacity.9
2.4 Data and Summary Analysis
2.4.1 Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Banking flows data. I collect data on cross-border bank-to-bank funding for
advanced and emerging market economies from the Bank for International Settle-
ments’s (BIS) International Banking Statistics database. In total I consider 25 bank-
ing systems that report both interbank and intragroup cross-border banking flow
data, consisting of 19 advanced market economies and 6 emerging market economies
as classified by the BIS. The banking systems include (emerging economies in bold):
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany,
France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
and the United States. All cross-border bank-to-bank flow data are adjusted for the
effects of exchange rate movements and I exclude data on offshore banking centers.10
Within the International Banking Statistics database, I make use of Lo-
cational Statistics by Nationality (IBLN). Funding is split between the flows to
(i) ‘related foreign offices’, which I categorize as intragroup flows, and (ii) ‘other
9The strength of this channel depends on the degree of currency mismatches on the corporate
sector’s balance sheet as an appreciation also reduces the value of dollar denominated assets.
10I exclude from the sample any country which does not report both interbank and intragroup
flow data. I also exclude Finland as it only reports intragroup flows from 2010Q2 onwards.
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banks’, which I categorize as interbank flows. I calculate the percentage change
in cross-border interbank and intragroup funding for each quarter between 1998Q1
and 2011Q4 for all 25 banking systems in the study.11 For example, for the United
States, I calculate cross-border intragroup funding as the summation of all intra-
group inflows to banks resident in the United States from related banks elsewhere
in the world and divide by the previous quarter stock of intragroup funding held by
all banks (parents and foreign affiliates) resident in the United States.
Using information on the nationality of the parent bank (as contained in
IBLN), I am able to disaggregate intragroup funding further, between funding to
domestically owned parent banks, and funding to foreign affiliate banks. For exam-
ple, in the case of the U.S., intragroup funding can be split between (i) cross-border
flows to U.S. owned banks operating in the United States, which I classify as a flow
to a parent bank headquartered in the U.S. and (ii) cross-border flows to non-U.S.
owned banks (foreign affiliates) operating in the United States.12
As indicated, for the purposes of the empirical work I normalize quarterly
interbank and intragroup flows by the previous quarter stock of interbank and in-
tragroup funding, such that
∆Lji,t =
N∑
k=1
F ji,k,t
N∑
k=1
Sji,k,t−1
× 100, (2.4)
where ∆L is the normalized quarterly exchange rate adjusted change in either inter-
bank or intragroup funding. F denotes the flow of interbank or intragroup funding,
reported by the BIS, while S relates to the stock of interbank or intragroup fund-
ing. The subscript i denotes whether the funding is interbank or intragroup, while
j = 1, 2, .., 25, denotes the 25 BIS reporting countries who provide the BIS with both
interbank and intragroup data on their resident banks, and k = 1, 2, ..., N , refers to
the N countries of ultimate bank origin which have banking operations in country
j. That is, I sum all the cross-border funding which flows into a country j across
11While the BIS makes some international banking data publicly available, due to confidentiality,
the split between interbank and intragroup funding forms part of a restricted dataset not available
to the public.
12The BIS does not currently report locational data on a bilateral basis. The BIS’s bilateral
data is only available for aggregate (interbank plus intragroup) funding. So it is not known, for
example, if the British or German bank located in the U.S. is borrowing from its headquarters,
or from another foreign affiliate elsewhere in the world. In fact, the BIS is currently expanding
its dataset to include bilateral interbank and intragroup flows but at present insufficient data is
available for the purposes of this study. I begin the sample in 1998, as key determinants of banking
flows such as local equity growth are not available prior to this date. The data are reported on (i)
an amount outstanding basis (the stock) and (ii) an exchange rate adjusted change basis (the flow).
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all banks (local and foreign) resident in that country.
The overall result is a panel of normalized interbank and intragroup flows
between 1998Q1 and 2011Q4. Note that the countries k = 26, 27, ..., N , do not
report banking statistics to the BIS but do have global banks with operations abroad,
significant examples include China and Russia.
The split of intragroup funding between parent and foreign affiliate banks is
then given by,
∆LPj,t =
F jt
Sjt−1
× 100, ∆LFAj,t =
N∑
k=1,k 6=j
F jk,t
N∑
k=1,k 6=j
Sjt−1
× 100 (2.5)
where ∆LPj,t and ∆L
FA
j,t are the percentage changes in intragroup funding to parent
and foreign affiliate banks, resident in country j at time t. In the case of parent
banks I record the flow F , when k = j. That is, the bank resident in country j is also
headquartered in country j. I normalize the change in funding by dividing by the
previous quarter stock of intragroup funding held by parent banks headquartered in
country j. In the case of foreign affiliates, I sum across all banks with operations in
country j that are owned by a bank outside country j.
Economic and financial data. I proxy for global risk using the VIX index from
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The VIX index is a measure of
U.S. stock market volatility, compiled from the prices of short-dated options on
the S&P 500 index, and is often considered in academic and policy circles as an
empirical proxy for global risk aversion.13 In the robustness analysis I consider
alternative measures of global risk. The return on resident banks’ book equity (ROE)
is measured as the median return on book equity (Net Income/Total Equity) across
all banks resident in a particular economy, collected from the database compiled by
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2000, 2009). The authors calculate the median
bank book equity based on all foreign and domestic banks in an economy using data
from Bankscope.14
Nominal foreign exchange rates against the U.S. dollar (USD) as well as
money market rate data are collected at a quarterly frequency from the IMF’s In-
13Recent papers which use the VIX index as a measure of global risk include, inter alia, Longstaff,
Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2013), Forbes and Warnock
(2012), and Fratzscher (2012).
14While Bankscope data is comprehensive, it does not have a 100 percent coverage of banks
within an economy. The return on equity data, for example, does not take into consideration the
return on equity of foreign branches since they are not required to hold any equity.
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ternational Financial Statistics database. Other macroeconomic control data is
collected from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and includes the infla-
tion rate, GDP growth rate and the change in the ratio of public debt to GDP. I also
include annual domestic stock market volatility from the World Bank’s Global Fi-
nancial Development database. The dependent variables, ∆Li,j,t, ∆L
P
j,t and ∆L
FA
j,t ,
as well as all country-specific independent variables are winsorized at 2.5 percent to
limit the impact of outliers.15
2.4.2 Summary Statistics
In Table 2.1 I provide summary statistics for the period 1998Q1 to 2011Q4. The
average quarterly percent change in interbank funding is 2.1 percent compared to
4.3 percent for intragroup funding. Intragroup funding to parents and foreign affili-
ates both grew at similar quarterly rates (5.2 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively).
Perhaps surprising is the finding that the growth in intragroup funding is more
volatile than interbank funding, indicating that global banks often make large shifts
in internal funding with foreign affiliates. In Appendix Table A.3, I present corre-
lations of macroeconomic and financial variables. I find the quarterly correlation
between changes in the growth of interbank and intragroup funding is negative and
statistically different from zero (≈ −7%). All other correlations are low, mitigating
concerns over multicollinearity.
In Table 2.2 I present statistics on the breakdown of cross-border bank-to-
bank funding. In advanced economies, intragroup funding accounts, on average, for
42% of all cross-border bank funding. Around half (57%) of all intragroup funding
is held by parent banks. In emerging economies the split between interbank and
intragroup funding is tilted more towards interbank funding. On average, almost
three-quarters of all cross-border borrowing by emerging economy resident banks
is interbank. However for emerging economies, cross-border banking is relatively
small, with total cross-border funding being on average only 7% of GDP, compared
to over 100% for advanced economies.
In Figure 2.1, I present a breakdown of the average proportion of intragroup
funding relative to total cross-border bank-to-bank funding between 1998 and 2011
for different BIS reporters. Due to data confidentiality I am unable to report specific
country details on intragroup funding and hence, for the purposes of the figure, I
anonymize countries. The funding models adopted across banking systems vary
markedly. In a few banking systems, intragroup funding accounted, on average, for
15Winsorizing data involves setting all values at the extremes of the observed distribution equal
to a pre-specified percentile. A 2.5 percent winsorization means all data below the 2.5th percentile
are set equal to the 2.5th percentile and all data above the 97.5th percentile are set equal to the
97.5th percentile.
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Variable Description Source Mean Std.dev. Min Max Obs.
Cross-Border Bank-to-Bank Flows
Interbank Funding Estimated exchange rate adjusted flow in cross-
border interbank funding scaled by the stock of
interbank funding (%).
BIS International Banking Statis-
tics by Nationality (IBLN).
2.06 11.37 -23.03 33.35 1,178
Intragroup Funding Estimated exchange rate adjusted flow in cross-
border intragroup funding scaled by the stock of
intragroup funding (%).
BIS International Banking Statis-
tics by Nationality (IBLN).
4.20 16.88 -30.95 58.27 1,178
Intragroup Funding:
Parent banks
Estimated exchange rate adjusted flow in par-
ent cross-border intragroup funding scaled by the
stock of parent intragroup funding (%).
BIS International Banking Statis-
tics by Nationality (IBLN).
5.18 23.59 -40.73 100.0 964
Intragroup Funding:
Foreign Affiliates
Estimated exchange rate adjusted flow in affili-
ate cross-border intragroup funding scaled by the
stock of affiliate intragroup funding (%).
BIS International Banking Statis-
tics by Nationality (IBLN).
4.00 19.43 -41.67 72.50 975
Global Risk Appetite
VIX Implied one-month volatility on the S&P 500 in-
dex. Monthly average of the log index value.
Bloomberg, authors’ own calcula-
tions.
3.06 0.34 2.40 4.07 1,400
∆VIX Change in the average log index value. Bloomberg, authors’ own calcula-
tions.
0.00 0.22 -0.33 0.85 1,400
Theoretically Motivated Controls
ROE Average Return on Equity (Net Income/Total Eq-
uity).
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine
(2000)
9.45 11.62 -35.01 27.55 1,392
FX Return % Change in log end-of-period nominal exchange
rate. U.S. dollar nume´raire.
International Financial Statistics
Database (IMF)
0.00 0.06 -0.21 0.62 1,400
∆IR Spread Change in the difference between domestic and the
average of U.S. and U.K. money market rates.
International Financial Statistics
Database (IMF)
0.00 0.68 -2.35 1.78 1,346
Other Macroeconomic and Financial Controls
Inflation Annual inflation rate (%). World Economic Outlook (IMF) 2.93 2.67 -0.33 13.24 1,400
GDP Growth Quarterly GDP growth (%). World Economic Outlook (IMF) 2.63 5.46 -11.74 19.45 1,398
∆Public Debt Ratio to GDP (Annual, %). World Economic Outlook (IMF) 0.09 1.17 -1.74 3.58 1,323
Stock Volatility 360-day standard deviation of returns on the na-
tional stock market index (Annual).
Global Financial Development
Database (World Bank)
26.24 11.36 12.39 59.62 1,332
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Banking, Macroeconomic and Financial Data.
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Variable Mean Std.dev. Min Max Obs.
Full sample
Total external bank funding/total bank assets (%) 22.6 11.8 5.2 73.5 555
Total external bank funding/GDP (%) 89.2 192.6 1.1 1,132.8 1,186
Intragroup funding/total funding (%) 42.2 25.2 0.1 97.4 1,186
Intragroup funding of parents/intragroup funding (%) 56.8 30.2 0.0 100.0 1,004
Advanced Economies
Total external bank funding/total bank assets (%) 22.6 11.8 5.2 73.5 555
Total external bank funding/GDP (%) 104.7 206.3 6.5 1,132.8 998
Intragroup funding/total funding (%) 45.6 25.2 0.1 97.4 998
Intragroup funding of parents/intragroup funding (%) 57.4 30.4 0.0 100.0 861
Emerging Market Economies
Total external bank funding/GDP (%) 7.0 5.7 1.1 24.6 188
Intragroup funding/total funding (%) 24.3 16.9 0.1 66.0 188
Intragroup funding of parents/intragroup funding (%) 52.9 28.6 0.0 93.8 143
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Disaggregated Cross-Border Funding.
over 80 percent of all cross-border bank-to-bank funding. In contrast, others have
funded themselves almost entirely using the wholesale interbank market. Of the
countries in the sample, around half receive the majority of funding in the form of
intragroup flows, when borrowing internationally from other banks.
In addition, I explore the structure of intragroup funding in greater detail
in Figure 2.1 by also displaying the average share of intragroup funding held by
domestically-owned parent banks between 1998 and 2011. Again, a large disparity
emerges across countries. For the countries with a high share of intragroup funding,
I find this could be held primarily by parents (e.g. country 3) or by foreign affiliates
(e.g. country 1). Overall, the figure provides an early indication of the importance
of both interbank and intragroup funding across banking system business models,
and suggests a need to understand if the intragroup funding of parent and foreign
affiliate banks behaves differently in the face of fluctuating global risk.
2.4.3 A First Look at the Data
Before commencing the formal empirical analysis, I begin with a preliminary ex-
amination of the data on cross-border bank-to-bank funding. First, I examine the
economic importance of these flows at the aggregate level.
The economic importance of cross-border banking. In Figure 2.2 I present
cross-country changes in global bank-to-bank funding following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. In Figure 2.2a the change is shown as a percentage of the country’s
stock of cross-border bank funding at 2008Q3, while in Figure 2.2b it is shown
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Figure 2.1: Intragroup Funding Across Countries. The figure presents the average share of intragroup funding as a percentage of total cross-border bank-to-bank
funding, between 1998 and 2011, for the 25 banking systems within the sample. Also included is the average share of intragroup funding held by domestically-owned
parent banks, also averaged between 1998 and 2011. Country specific data are confidential and hence anonymized. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank
for International Settlements’s International Banking Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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Figure 2.2: Cross-Border Funding Following the Collapse of Lehman Brothers. Figure (a) presents the cumulative change in cross-border interbank and
intragroup funding following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008Q3. The change is measured as the sum of exchange-rate-adjusted flows between 2008Q4 and
2009Q2 relative to the stock of cross-border funding in 2008Q3. In Figure (b) the change is measured relative to GDP at 2008Q3. Data on banking flows are collected
from the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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relative to the country’s size (GDP). Only a handful of countries experienced an
inflow of bank-to-bank funding in the immediate aftermath of Lehman’s collapse
(Japan, Australia, Italy, Canada, Spain and Norway). Most countries witnessed a
large fall in their aggregate cross-border bank funding. Even if the fall was mild rel-
ative to total cross-border bank-to-bank funding, it could still generate an economy-
wide shock due to the size of a banking system relative to the underlying economy.
Ireland, for example, witnessed a comparatively small drop in funding from banks
abroad, relative to its stock of cross-border bank funding. But the drop translated
into a much larger, 15 percent fall, relative to GDP.
The Irish case provides an illustration of the economic importance of in-
ternational banking flows, which I document further in Figure 2.3. In 2011Q4,
cross-border bank-to-bank funding accounted for over 40 percent of total resident
banking system assets in the Netherlands and Ireland, and over 20 percent in the
United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Sweden (see Figure 2.3a).16 As a share of GDP
the numbers are even more pronounced (see Figure 2.3b), accounting for over 100
percent of GDP in five banking systems: Luxembourg (654 percent), Cyprus (167
percent), Ireland (150 percent), United Kingdom (128 percent) and the Netherlands
(124 percent). Even in emerging market economies, where proportions were lower,
contractions in funding could still impact the expansion of domestic credit due to
relatively smaller banking systems, and a heavy reliance on foreign bank affiliates
to expand domestic credit, as demonstrated by Schnabl (2012) in the case of Peru.
Interbank and intragroup funding. In Figure 2.4a I disaggregate cross-border
funding between banks into two baskets - arms-length interbank flows, and related
intragroup flows - and find that interbank funding fell on average across the sam-
ple of BIS reporters by almost 30 percent between September 2008 and the end of
2009. Yet, in contrast, intragroup funding increased in the immediate aftermath of
Lehman Brothers collapse and was stable for the remainder of the crisis period.17
Contrasting behavior in interbank and intragroup flows is not limited, however, to
the recent global financial crisis. To see this, in Figure 2.4b I present the distri-
butional relationship across time between cross-border bank-to-bank funding and
the VIX index. I find that on average, between 1998 and 2011, interbank funding
contracted by two percent during quarters when the VIX index was at an elevated
level (upper-25th percentile), while during the same quarters intragroup funding ex-
16The data for total banking system assets are collected from the IMF’s Global Financial Stability
Report and are available for 15 countries in the sample.
17The numbers reflect the median change in interbank and intragroup funding across all 25
banking systems in the study. To calculate the change, I sum over flows (adjusted for exchange
rate fluctuations) and divide by the stock at the start of the crisis.
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Figure 2.3: The Economic Importance of Cross-Border Bank-to-Bank Funding. Panel (a) presents the ratio of cross-border bank-to-bank funding to the total
assets of resident commercial banks (including foreign subsidiaries) in 2011Q4. Data on total resident bank assets are taken from the IMF’s Global Financial Stability
Report. Panel (b) shows the ratio of cross-border bank-to-bank funding relative to GDP in 2011Q4. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International
Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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Figure 2.4: A First Look at Interbank and Intragroup Funding. Figure (a) presents the cumulative median change in aggregate cross-border interbank and
intragroup funding, across 25 advanced and emerging market banking systems, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The change is measured
relative to the stock of cross-border funding in 2008Q2. In Figure (b) quarterly funding is split into four groups, conditional on the average level of the VIX index in
each quarter between 1998 and 2011. Each bar represents the median quarterly percentage change in interbank or intragroup funding if the VIX index is low (below
the 20th percentile), at a medium level (between the 20th and 50th percentiles), at an elevated level (between the 50th and 80th percentiles) or at a high level (above the
80th percentile). Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is
from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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panded by over two percent. In the quarters when the VIX index was particularly
low (lower-25th percentile), both intragroup and interbank funding expanded by
approximately four percent.
Intragroup funding to parents and foreign affiliates. In Figure 2.5 I plot
median cumulative changes in aggregate (interbank plus intragroup) cross-border
bank-to-bank funding following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, conditional on
(i) the banking system’s share of intragroup funding and (ii) the proportion of
intragroup funding held by resident parent banks.
First, I split countries into two baskets based on their share of intragroup
funding at 2008Q2. I find countries with a high share of intragroup funding expe-
rienced a much smaller loss of cross-border bank financing following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. By the end of 2009, banking systems funded with a relatively
high share of arms-length interbank funding had experienced, on average, a 20 per-
cent drop in funding, while the fall in funding was less than eight percent for banking
systems with a high share of intragroup funding.
Next, I split the basket of high intragroup funded countries based on the mix
of intragroup funding held by parents and foreign affiliates. Banking systems with a
high share of intragroup funding held predominately by parent banks, experienced
almost no loss in cross-border bank-to-bank funding during the global financial crisis
– amplifying the contrasting behavior in interbank and intragroup funding in relation
to fluctuations in global risk. Next, I explore these relationships in greater depth in
the formal empirical investigation.
2.5 Empirical Methods and Results
In this section, I outline the empirical methodology used in this study and present
the findings. I first describe results for the disaggregation of cross-border bank-
to-bank funding between interbank and intragroup flows, and explore whether the
findings are mirrored across advanced and emerging market economies. Next, I turn
the attention exclusively to intragroup flows, examining the split in funding between
parent and foreign affiliate banks.
2.5.1 Empirical Methods
I begin by examining the relationship between interbank and intragroup funding and
fluctuations in global risk, which I proxy using the VIX index. To do so, I estimate
a fixed-effects panel regression, based on equation 2.3, which takes the form
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Figure 2.5: Intragroup Funding and Parent Banks. The figure presents the cross-country median,
exchange rate adjusted change of total (interbank plus intragroup) cross-border bank funding between 2008Q3
and 2009Q4. The values are scaled by the stock of funding at 2008Q2. Countries are classified as having
a high share of intragroup funding if their 2008Q2 share of intragroup funding, as a proportion of total
cross-border bank-to-bank funding, exceeds the cross-country median. Within the group of countries with
a high share of intragroup funding, I further classify them as having intragroup funding ‘mainly held by
parents’, if the share of intragroup funding held by parents, as a proportion of total intragroup funding,
exceeds the cross-country median. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International
Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
∆Lji,t = βi,0 + βi,1 · V IXt−1 + βi,2 ·∆V IXt
+
(
3∑
l=1
βi,l+2 · TCVj,t−1
)
+ αj + Controls+ i,t (2.6)
where ∆Lji,t is the quarterly percent change in either interbank or intragroup funding
(see equation 2.4 for details).18 V IX is the average level of the VIX index (in
logs) during the quarter and proxies for the level of global risk, while ∆V IX is
the quarterly change in the average level of the VIX index (in logs) and proxies
for the change in global risk. The three theoretically-motivated control variables
(return on domestic bank book equity, foreign exchange returns and interest rate
differentials) are denoted TCV . Control variables sampled at a quarterly frequency
18The framework for the empirical analysis is outlined fully in Section 2.3. I estimate a Hausman
test and find the null hypothesis (the random-effects estimator is consistent) is strongly rejected,
indicating the need to estimate a fixed-effects rather than random-effects model.
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are lagged by one quarter, while those sampled at yearly frequency are lagged by
four quarters. Both theoretically determined and other macroeconomic and financial
control variables are discussed in Section 2.4. I include country level fixed effects αj ,
in an attempt to capture any other time invariant country level effects not picked-
up by the set of control variables. I calculate robust standard errors, clustered at
country level.
2.5.2 Baseline Regression
In Table 2.3, I present the baseline results. In columns one and two I consider
changes in interbank funding while in columns three and four, I investigate intra-
group funding. In the first and third columns I only include theoretically motivated
control variables. The coefficients on interbank funding support the theoretical hy-
potheses outlined in Section 2.3. Interbank funding contracts when the VIX is high
or rising during a quarter. In contrast, and counter to theoretical prediction, in-
tragroup funding shows no relationship with the level of the VIX and expands in
quarters when the VIX rises. I also find the return on domestic bank book eq-
uity displays, as predicted, a statistically significant and positive relationship with
subsequent interbank and intragroup funding. Currency market movements are
also shown to drive both interbank and intragroup funding. The FX return variable
enters the model with the correct sign. A lower return (appreciation of the local cur-
rency) generates an inflow of funding to the local economy banking system. Finally,
in this baseline regression, I find no evidence of a relationship between bank-to-bank
funding and interest rate differentials.
The results from the full specification, including all control variables, are
shown in the second and fourth columns. Two of the controls variables, domestic
GDP growth and the change in public debt (as a proportion of GDP), are found
to be statistically significant drivers of arms-length interbank funding. However, I
find none of the control variables are significant in determining intragroup funding,
suggesting that interbank flows are more responsive to local economic and financial
factors. One potential reason why intragroup funding is less affected by the control
variables is offered by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012b). Examining internal capi-
tal markets, the authors find that the funding of foreign affiliates by U.S. parent
banks is, in part, determined by factors detached from short-term macroeconomic
fluctuations. For example, the location of the affiliate bank as a source of fund-
ing or destination for foreign investment, and its distance from the headquarters of
the parent bank, could both be more important determinants of funding than local
economic or financial conditions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interbank Intragroup
VIX -5.22*** -5.20*** 0.32 0.97
(1.18) (1.09) (1.29) (1.47)
∆ VIX -3.94* -4.04* 5.32** 4.09*
(1.97) (2.03) (2.21) (2.39)
ROE 0.13*** 0.08** 0.18*** 0.14**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
FX Return -12.15** -12.98*** -24.02** -24.70**
(5.16) (3.98) (8.71) (9.37)
∆ IR Spread 1.09 0.93 -0.26 -0.98
(0.66) (0.70) (1.18) (1.25)
Inflation -0.10 -0.74
(0.32) (0.58)
GDP Growth 0.15*** -0.08
(0.05) (0.09)
∆ Public Debt -0.73** -0.13
(0.32) (0.51)
Stock Volatility 0.02 -0.08
(0.04) (0.08)
Constant 16.53*** 15.86*** 1.84 4.25
(3.72) (3.65) (4.03) (4.64)
Observations 1,142 1,088 1,142 1,088
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05
Countries 25 25 25 25
Table 2.3: Baseline Results. The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed-effects panel
regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in either interbank or intragroup
funding. In columns (1) and (2) I report results for interbank funding, while in columns (3) and (4)
I do the same for intragroup funding. VIX is the quarterly average of the log VIX index, while ∆VIX
is the quarterly change in the average level of the log VIX index. All control variables are discussed in
Section 2.4.1 with summary statistics provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered at country level, are
reported in brackets. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Data on
banking flows are collected from the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics
database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
Economic Significance
In this subsection, I examine the relative economic significance of the estimated
coefficients in the baseline regression. I do so by studying a stylized scenario analysis
that reflects events following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. I consider three
hypothetical banking systems (A, B, and C). The banking systems have different
business models in terms of their mix of arms-length and related funding. Banking
System A is financed 20 percent with intragroup funding and 80 percent in the
interbank market (the Netherlands has similar proportions). Banking System B
is equally funded with intragroup and interbank funding (similar to the German
banking system), while Banking System C obtains 80 percent of overseas bank-to-
bank funding in internal capital markets (similar to the United States). I consider a
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scenario in which the VIX index rises from an average of 25 during the first quarter
to an average of 45 in the subsequent quarter. The VIX then remains at an average
of 45 for two quarters.19
First, the statistically significant coefficients on the VIX and ∆VIX, esti-
mated in the baseline regression (Table 2.3), are used to estimate the change in
cross-border bank-to-bank funding when the VIX rises by 20 points.20 Banking
System A, with the lowest share of intragroup funding, experiences a 17 percent
drop in funding. Funding to Banking System B falls by ten percent, while Banking
System C maintains a roughly stable level of funding. The stability of funding to
Banking System C is a consequence of intragroup inflows offsetting interbank out-
flows. Since intragroup flows remain stable during periods of high global risk, flows
over the following two quarters – when the VIX remains at 45 – are only due to out-
flows in interbank funding. Accounting for these flows results in Banking System A
losing almost 40 percent of cross-border bank funding over the entire three quarter
period. However, Banking System C, with the largest share of intragroup funding,
experiences a relatively modest eight percent drop in funding. Banking System B,
as expected, falls in between, with a 23 percent drop in funding.
Comparing the scenario with the actual outcomes for the countries listed
above (Netherlands, Germany and the United States) results in a similarly large
and economically important difference across countries. The Dutch banking system
experienced over a 30 percent drop in cross-border bank-to-bank funding following
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The German banking system faced a smaller
drop in funding, of approximately ten percent, while the United States, at the
epicenter of the financial crisis, but holding the largest relative share of intragroup
funding, experienced only a five percent withdrawal of total cross-border bank-to-
bank funding.
Advanced and Emerging Market Economies
I augment the baseline regression to include an emerging-market dummy variable,
which is equal to 1 when the funding is to an emerging economy (as classified by
the BIS, see Section 2.4 for sample information), and zero otherwise. The dummy
variable is interacted with the VIX and the other theoretically motivated control
variables. In Table 2.4, I report parameter estimates for interbank funding in column
one and for intragroup funding in column two. Once again, I find the coefficient on
19The average level of the VIX in 2008Q3 was 25 and increased to an average of 45 between
2008Q4 and 2009Q2.
20The coefficients are: V IX (interbank: −5.20) and ∆V IX (interbank: −4.04; intragroup:
4.09). I provide details of these calculations in Appendix Table A.6.
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(1) (2)
Interbank Intragroup
VIX -4.14*** 1.18
(1.22) (1.31)
VIX*EME -7.40** -1.31
(2.77) (5.97)
VIX+VIX*EME -11.54*** -0.14
p-value 0.0001 0.9823
∆VIX -3.37 5.23***
(2.26) (1.78)
∆VIX*EME -4.66 -9.06
(4.22) (8.87)
∆VIX+∆VIX*EME -8.03** -3.83
p-value 0.0346 0.6648
ROE 0.10*** 0.18***
(0.03) (0.04)
ROE*EME -0.16 -0.90***
(0.15) (0.31)
ROE+ROE*EME -0.06 -0.72**
p-value 0.6975 0.0275
FX Return -8.62** -13.17
(3.85) (8.32)
FX Return*EME -11.74 -63.19**
(10.25) (24.16)
FX Return+FX Return*EME -20.36** -76.36***
p-value 0.0389 0.0020
∆IR Spread 1.96** -2.40*
(0.91) (1.16)
∆IR Spread*EME -1.50 3.27*
(1.16) (1.70)
∆IR Spread+∆IR Spread*EME 0.46 0.87
p-value 0.5631 0.5040
Controls Y Y
Observations 1,088 1,088
R-squared 0.09 0.07
Countries 25 25
Table 2.4: Advanced and Emerging Economy Banking Systems. The table presents the estimated
parameter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage
change in either interbank or intragroup funding. In column (1) I report results for interbank funding,
while in column (2) I do the same for intragroup funding. EME is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the
banking system is in an emerging market economy and zero otherwise. VIX is the quarterly average of the
log VIX index, while ∆VIX is the quarterly change in the average level of the log VIX index. The control
variables are discussed in Section 2.4.1 with summary statistics provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors,
clustered at country level, are reported in brackets. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level
and * at the 10% level. I include F-tests to determine if the effect of a variable on emerging economies is
significant. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International Settlements’s International
Financial Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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the VIX is negative and statistically significant for interbank funding. However, the
effect is almost three times larger for banks resident in emerging market economies.
In the third row, I run an F-test to investigate if the sum of coefficients
on the VIX index is statistically significant, with the p-value reported below. The
equivalent F-test is also run and reported for ∆VIX and all other theoretically
motivated control variables. The F-test for both the VIX and ∆VIX yields a negative
and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that banks resident in emerging
economies observe an outflow of interbank funding when the VIX index is high
or rising during a quarter. The coefficient on the ∆VIX alone, is not, however,
statistically different from zero. This finding provides evidence that an increase in
global risk over one quarter does indeed impact interbank funding, but only to those
banks resident in emerging economies.
The split between advanced and emerging economies also impacts intragroup
funding. The ∆VIX coefficient is positive and highly significant, in keeping with
the earlier baseline regression. However, the F-test for ∆VIX implies only advanced
economy resident banks experience an inflow of intragroup funding when global risk
rises. Moreover, I find contrasting implications for the return on equity. Mirroring
the earlier result and prediction from theory, the ROE coefficient is positive across
both interbank and intragroup funding – better domestic conditions increase the ca-
pacity to borrow. Yet the F-test on ROE for intragroup funding, yields a negative
and statistically significant value. This finding implies that emerging market bank-
ing systems receive funding when their average profitability is low. I find a similar
asymmetric result on the FX return variable. Currency market activity is partic-
ularly relevant for emerging economies, which lose both interbank and intragroup
funding following a depreciation of the local currency.
Funding During the Financial Crisis
I examine the extent to which information on a country’s mix of interbank and intra-
group funding could explain cross-border bank-to-bank flows following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers. To do so, I estimate a cross-sectional regression which takes
the form
∆Lj = β0 + β1 · IntraSharej + j , (2.7)
where IntraSharej is the amount of intragroup funding held by country j as a
percentage of its total (interbank plus intragroup) cross-border funding from banks,
measured at 2008Q3. ∆L is the percent change in total funding (interbank plus
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(1) (2) (3)
All countries AEs with systemic AEs without systemic
banking crisis banking crisis
Share of intragroup funding 0.21** 0.34** 0.04
(0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
Constant -20.10*** -31.61*** -2.00
(4.64) (6.99) (6.23)
Observations 23 10 8
R-squared 0.12 0.45 0.00
Table 2.5: Explaining Funding During the Global Financial Crisis. The table presents the estimated
parameter values from cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the change in total (interbank
plus intragroup) cross-border bank-to-bank funding to countries between 2008Q4 and 2009Q2. The right-
hand-side variable is the share of intragroup funding as a percentage of total (interbank plus intragroup)
cross-border bank-to-bank funding, measured at 2008Q3. In column (1) all 25 countries are included in the
regression. In column (2) only the ten countries having experienced a systemic banking crisis as classified by
Laeven and Valencia (2013) are included. Finally, in column (3) I only include advanced market economies
not classified as having experienced a systemic banking crisis. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the
5% level and * at the 10% level. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International
Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database.
intragroup) between 2008Q4 and 2009Q2, relative to the stock at 2008Q3.
In Table 2.5, I present the results from the bivariate regression. In column
one, I show the result for all banking systems in the sample. The fit across the
25 countries can explain around 12 percent of the total variation in funding loss
during the crisis. The coefficient on intragroup funding is positive and statistically
significant. I then investigate if the share of intragroup funding was particularly
important for countries having suffered from a systemic banking crisis following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. To do so, I classify countries as having suffered a
systemic banking crisis or not, using the database compiled by Laeven and Valencia
(2013).21 None of the emerging economies in the sample were classified as having
experienced a systemic banking crisis during 2008-09, while ten advanced economies
banking systems were found to have experienced such a crisis.
When I limit the regression to the ten banking systems having experienced
a systemic banking crisis (column two), the simple bivariate regression explains
45 percent of the variation in funding loss across countries. The coefficient on
intragroup funding is now larger than in the first specification and remains highly
significant. A country which experienced a systemic banking crisis and held no
intragroup funding could expect to witness a loss of funding exceeding 30 percent.
If, however, the banking system relied fully on intragroup funding when borrowing
21Laeven and Valencia (2013) define a borderline set of countries, not found to have experienced
a systemic banking crisis, but whose banking systems were affected by the crisis. These countries
include Sweden, Italy, France and Switzerland. I choose to classify these countries as not having
experienced a systemic banking crisis.
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from banks overseas, the country would be expected to see a small inflow of funding.
To contrast with this finding, I run a third specification (column three) including
advanced economy countries which did not experience a systemic crisis. This time
I do not find any clear relationship between the use of intragroup funding and the
amount of funding withdrawn. In addition, the constant in the regression becomes
insignificantly different from zero, indicating that these countries did not, on average,
lose any cross-border bank-to-bank funding during the crisis.
The results from the bivariate regression point to a selective withdrawal
of bank-to-bank funding. Banking systems not directly connected with the 2008-
09 global financial crisis, including Norway, Australia, Japan, Italy and Canada,
experienced limited cross-border bank-to-bank outflows. Furthermore, as suggested
by the scenario analysis, countries with high shares of intragroup funding – even if
suffering a systemic banking crisis – were less likely to experience a large outflow of
funding, while emerging market economies (with relatively low shares of intragroup
funding) faced some of the largest outflows, despite not having experienced systemic
banking crises.
As a follow-up exercise, I investigate how much of the loss in total (interbank
plus intragroup) funding could have been predicted from the prior regression on
advanced and emerging economies. Specifically, I focus on advanced economies,
split between those having experienced a systemic banking crisis and those which
did not, and use the regression coefficients estimated on the VIX and ∆VIX only.
In Figure 2.6, I plot the actual and predicted loss in total funding based on each
country’s mix of interbank and intragroup funding between 2008Q3 and 2009Q2 (as
a percentage of the 2008Q3 stock), combined with the coefficients on the VIX and
∆VIX reported in Table 2.4. I find that over 20 percent of the total fall in funding
could be explained for banking systems which experienced a systemic banking crisis.
To put the result in context, had the split between interbank and intragroup funding
not been made, then none of the cross-sectional spread could have been explained.22
2.5.3 Parent and Foreign Affiliate Banks
The second part of the sequential disaggregation of cross-border banking flows in-
volves splitting intragroup funding between parent and foreign affiliate banks. In
doing so, I tease out more detail on the behavior of intragroup funding than could
22Using aggregate information, in which interbank and intragroup flows are predicted to behave
symmetrically, results in a predicted loss of around 15 percent in funding for every banking system
(see Figure 2.6). The results from the regression on aggregate flows are provided in Appendix Table
A.1.
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Figure 2.6: Funding Loss During the Global Financial Crisis. The figure presents the predicted
loss or gain in total cross-border bank-to-bank funding between 2008Q4 and 2009Q2 using the actual data
on the VIX between 2008Q4 and 2009Q2, in combination with the statistically significant coefficients es-
timated for the V IX and ∆V IX, reported in Table 2.4. I also split the advanced market economies
between those which experienced a systemic banking crisis during the global financial crisis and those
which did not. The classification as to whether a country experienced a systemic banking crisis or not
is based on the database of Laeven and Valencia (2013). Following the BIS country classification sys-
tem: AT=Austria, AU=Australia, BE=Belgium, BR=Brazil, CA=Canada, CH=Switzerland, CL=Chile,
DE=Germany, DK=Denmark, ES=Spain, FR=France, GB=United Kingdom, IE=Ireland, IN=India,
IT=Italy, JP=Japan, KR=South Korea, LU=Luxembourg, NL=Netherlands, NO=Norway, SE=Sweden,
TR=Turkey, US=United States. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International
Settlements’s International Banking Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
be achieved at the first level of disaggregation.23
I run the augmented baseline regression, including an emerging market dummy
variable in which the left-hand-side variables are the quarterly percentage change in
intragroup flows to parent and foreign affiliate banks (see equation 2.5 for details).
Results are reported in Table 2.6. In columns one and two, I present results for
domestically headquartered parent banks, and do the same for foreign affiliates in
columns three and four. Parent banks resident in advanced economies are found to
have a robust positive relationship with the VIX and ∆VIX, while foreign affiliates
do not. The finding indicates that advanced economy parent banks receive funding
from their foreign affiliates during periods of heightened global risk. The result sup-
ports a recent finding by Hoggarth, Hooley, and Korniyenko (2013), who show that
23In Appendix Table A.2, I report the analogous results for interbank flows.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents Foreign Affiliates
VIX 3.90* 4.69** -1.81 -0.76
(2.25) (2.20) (1.36) (1.48)
VIX*EME -8.86* -6.84
(4.99) (5.47)
VIX+VIX*EME -4.17 -7.60
p-value 0.3808 0.1545
∆VIX 4.66 7.97* 2.52 1.92
(4.17) (4.05) (2.83) (3.08)
∆VIX*EME -27.12*** 1.18
(8.12) (3.79)
∆VIX+∆VIX*EME -19.15*** 3.10
p-value 0.0092 0.2346
ROE 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.09 0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
ROE*EME -0.15 -1.06***
(0.49) (0.31)
ROE+ROE*EME 0.11 -0.94***
p-value 0.8265 0.0065
FX Return -35.09** -38.36** -8.44 -2.46
(15.58) (16.21) (13.97) (6.50)
FX Return*EME 24.96 -32.41
(50.45) (67.72)
FX Return+FX Return*EME -13.40 -34.87
p-value 0.7848 0.6067
∆IR Spread -1.40 0.23 0.84 -2.34
(1.89) (1.50) (1.21) (1.83)
∆IR Spread*EME -2.22 5.67**
(3.36) (1.99)
∆IR Spread+∆IR Spread*EME -1.99 3.33***
p-value 0.5255 0.0000
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 919 919 922 922
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06
Countries 20 20 20 20
Table 2.6: Intragroup Funding: Flows to Parent and Foreign Affiliate Banks. The table presents
the estimated parameter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly
percentage change in intragroup funding of either parent or foreign affiliate banks. In columns (1) and
(2) I report results for parents banks, while in columns (3) and (4) I do the same for foreign affiliates.
EME is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the banking system is in an emerging market economy and
zero otherwise. VIX is the quarterly average of the log VIX index, while ∆VIX is the quarterly change in
the average level of the log VIX index. The control variables are discussed in Section 2.4.1 with summary
statistics presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered at country level, are reported in brackets. ***
is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. I include F-tests to determine
if the effect of a variable on emerging economies is significant. Data on banking flows are collected from
the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is
from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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gross intragroup lending by foreign affiliates resident in the U.K. increased strongly
following the run on the British bank, Northern Rock.24
Parent banks in emerging economies are more exposed to global shocks, echo-
ing the earlier finding. Possibly due to limited banking presence overseas, these
parent banks observe a large fall in intragroup funding when global risk rises. The
evidence is mixed, however, on their ability to withstand periods when the VIX is
elevated, with the F-test showing a negative, albeit insignificant, point estimate. I
find a similar result for foreign affiliates resident in emerging economies, although
overall I find no robust evidence that foreign affiliates, in either advanced or emerg-
ing economies, lose funding when global risk is high.
Earlier, I noted that intragroup funding to emerging economies appears to
increase when the average return on equity in those banking systems is low. Com-
paring columns two and four, I see that the result was driven by increased funding to
foreign affiliate banks rather than to parent banks. The finding provides support to
the view that negative local economic shocks in emerging economies, give rise to an
increase in parent funding to their foreign affiliates resident in those economies. In
an additional test, I find that including a three-way interaction between the return
on equity, the emerging market dummy variable and a time dummy variable for the
post-Lehman episode, yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient, indi-
cating that parent banks increased support to their weakest subsidiaries in emerging
economies even during the financial crisis.
Furthermore, I find that higher interest rates in emerging economies lead to
an increase in intragroup funding, as parent banks fund foreign affiliates resident in
those economies. But this finding also implies that emerging economies can expect
resident foreign banks to lose intragroup funding whenever expansionary monetary
policy is implemented.
2.6 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I examine the robustness of the results under alternative specifica-
tions. First, I investigate if any one country materially drives the results. Next, I
use alternative measures of global risk in place of the VIX index, and finally I test if
the results are robust to the exclusion of the global financial crisis and the European
sovereign-debt crisis.
24Notably, the result is driven by the intragroup lending of foreign branches. The gross lending
by foreign subsidiaries remained unchanged.
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2.6.1 Excluding Individual Countries
I examine the impact individual countries have on the results, by augmenting the
baseline model with a country-specific dummy variable C,
∆Lji,t = βi,0 + βi,1 · V IXt−1 + βi,2 · (V IXt−1 · Cj)
+ βi,3 ·∆V IXt +
(
3∑
l=1
βi,l+3 · TCVj,t−1
)
+ αj + Controls+ i,t.
(2.8)
In Panel A of Table 2.7, I report the range of coefficient estimates for βi,1, which
I estimate by sequentially adding and removing each country from the analysis by
setting Cj = 1, ∀ j = 1, 2, ...25. The interbank coefficient on the VIX is always
statistically different from zero at the one percent level. The coefficient is never
greater than −4.75 and reaches a low of −5.48. Consistent with the earlier baseline
results, the intragroup coefficient on the VIX is always positive, ranging between
0.61 and 1.52.
In Panel B, I report individual country estimates of the βi,2 coefficient – the
interaction term between the V IX and country dummy variable. I also run an F-
test to determine if the sum of coefficients βi,1 + βi,2, is statistically different from
zero. I find the sum on interbank flows is negative and statistically significant for
17 of the 25 countries in the study. In fact, all emerging economy banking systems
in the sample witness an outflow of interbank funding when global risk is high.
The finding confirms the earlier result that emerging market banking systems are
particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in global risk. In Brazil and India, the loss
of interbank funding is particularly pronounced, and highly significant at the one
percent level. Only two countries (Cyprus and Denmark) experience an increase in
interbank inflows when global risk is high. The sum of coefficients on intragroup
flows is either statistically insignificant (consistent with the earlier result) or positive,
for 21 out of 25 countries.
2.6.2 Alternative Measures of Global Risk
I replace the VIX as the measure of global risk with five alternative measures: (i) the
VXO provided by the CBOE, the predecessor to the VIX index and an alternative
measure of global risk used in a related study by Forbes and Warnock (2012), (ii) the
Credit Suisse Global Risk Appetite Index, a measure of risk calculated using asset
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Panel A: Range of coefficients βi,j,1
VIX Interbank: -5.48***/ Intragroup: 0.61/
-4.75*** 1.52
Panel B: Individual country interaction coefficients (βi,j,2)
Interbank Intragroup Interbank Intragroup
βi,j,1 + βi,j,2 = 0 βi,j,1 + βi,j,2 = 0 βi,j,1 + βi,j,2 = 0 βi,j,1 + βi,j,2 = 0
VIX*Austria 2.21* -3.08*** -12.77*** -11.25*** VIX*Switzerland -2.95*** -8.00*** -3.32*** -2.18*
(1.12) (1.14) (0.94) (1.09)
VIX*Belgium 0.48 -4.74*** -2.08* -1.01 VIX*UK 0.37 -4.85*** -1.60 -0.56
(0.92) (1.17) (0.91) (1.11)
VIX*Cyprus 10.78*** 5.39*** 15.58*** 16.27*** VIX*Australia 4.60*** -0.74 4.54*** 5.37***
(1.75) (2.48) (0.94) (1.40)
VIX*France -4.75*** -9.69*** 3.70*** 4.46*** VIX*Canada -1.24 -6.37*** -1.65 -0.59
(0.86) (1.01) (0.96) (1.07)
VIX*Germany 3.46*** -1.91*** 2.07* 2.94** VIX*Japan 2.30* -3.01*** 7.18*** 7.79***
(0.90) (1.02) (1.14) (1.43)
VIX*Ireland 5.19*** -0.15 -0.63 0.36 VIX*US -7.67*** -12.42*** -2.12* -1.03
(1.12) (2.06) (0.77) (1.15)
VIX*Italy 2.78*** -2.55*** -4.24*** -3.07** VIX*Brazil -7.79*** -12.71*** 0.66 1.61
(0.93) (1.10) (1.08) (2.03)
VIX*Luxemburg -2.40** -7.49*** -2.07* -1.00 VIX*Chile -3.04 -8.18*** 20.51*** 21.1***
(0.92) (1.16) (2.02) (2.53)
VIX*Netherlands 4.85*** -0.56 3.58** 4.39*** VIX*India -12.36*** -17.24*** -5.03*** -3.93***
(1.01) (1.41) (0.95) (1.39)
VIX*Spain 4.69*** -0.76 -2.58** -1.47 VIX*Turkey -3.24** -8.29*** 4.04** 4.83***
(0.84) (1.08) (1.23) (1.80)
VIX*Denmark 9.15*** 3.67*** 3.77** 4.62*** VIX*South Africa -1.69 -6.89*** 18.82*** 19.78***
(0.94) (1.50) (2.17) (3.32)
VIX*Norway -1.83 -6.96*** -1.35 -0.33 VIX*Korea -3.30*** -8.39*** -3.92*** -2.83
(1.21) (1.51) (1.09) (1.32)
VIX*Sweden 0.76 -4.47*** -3.03** -1.93
(1.10) (1.35)
Constant Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 1088 1088 1088 1088
Countries 25 25 25 25
Table 2.7: Excluding Individual Countries. The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the
quarterly percentage change in either interbank or intragroup funding. In columns (1) and (2) I report results for interbank funding, while in columns (3) and (4) I do
the same for intragroup funding. V IX is the quarterly average of the log VIX index. In Panel A I report the range of coefficient estimates on βi,1 from equation (8).
In Panel B I report individual country estimates of the coefficient βi,2 from equation (8). The control variables are discussed in Section 2.4.1 with summary statistics
presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered at country level, are reported in brackets. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
I include F-tests to determine if the effect of the VIX is significant for a country. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International Settlements’s
International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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price data from advanced and emerging markets,25 (iii) the spread between AAA
and BAA rated securities, a measure of corporate bond credit quality provided
by Moody’s Corporation, (iv) the global risk factor from Chapter 3 (Della Corte,
Riddiough, and Sarno, 2014) which reflects a measure of global risk extracted from
fluctuations in the foreign exchange market and (v) the TED spread, a measure of
funding liquidity equal to the difference between the rates on a three-month U.S.
euro deposit contract and the three-month T-bill.
I run the full baseline specification, accounting for heterogeneity across ad-
vanced and emerging market economies, replacing the VIX index with each of the
alternative risk metrics:
∆Lji,t = βi,0 + βi,1 ·RISKt−1 + βi,2 · (RISKt−1 · EME) + βi,3 ·∆RISKt
+ βi,4 · (∆RISKt · EME) +
(
3∑
l=1
βi,l+4 · TCVj,t−1
)
+ αj + Controls+ i,t.
(2.9)
The results are reported in Table 2.8. In columns one to five, I report results
for interbank funding and do the same for intragroup funding in columns six to
ten.26 The alternative measures of global risk lead to noticeably similar results.
Interbank funding has a negative and statistically significant relationship with each
alternative measure of global risk except for the TED spread. An increase in the
TED spread leads, however, to a fall in interbank funding. In fact, a reduction
in funding to emerging economies when global risk is high, is evident across all
alternative measure of risk.
Intragroup funding is not found to have a clear relationship with any measure
of global risk (echoing the earlier baseline estimation) except for the Credit Suisse
risk appetite index, whereby the relationship is, in fact, positive. Intragroup funding
also shows a positive relationship with the change in global risk across all alternative
measures except for the global currency risk factor, although the point estimate on
the factor is positive. Furthermore, the ROE and FX Return variables are shown to
have robust links with global risk, which align correctly with the hypotheses stated
in Section 2.3. In fact, the coefficient estimates for both variables are statistically
25The index is calculated as the coefficient on a cross-sectional linear regression of excess returns
on risk (past price volatility). It is based on 64 indices of bonds and equities in advanced and
emerging markets and is updated daily. Advanced market indexes are denominated in local currency
while U.S. dollar indicies are used for emerging economies.
26In Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5, I provide summary statistics and correlations across the
alternative measure of risk.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Interbank Intragroup
VXO CS Moody’s Glob. Imb. TED VXO CS Moody’s Glob. Imb. TED
Risk -3.50*** -0.45*** -2.61** -0.77** -0.40 0.85 0.35* -0.76 0.95 0.15
(1.14) (0.15) (1.15) (0.35) (0.36) (1.23) (0.17) (1.66) (0.56) (0.55)
Risk*EME -7.05*** -0.66* -9.35*** -2.08** -2.70** 0.94 0.53 3.11 -0.98 2.54
(1.96) (0.32) (1.62) (0.96) (0.97) (4.44) (0.65) (7.32) (1.38) (3.57)
Risk+Risk*EME -10.55*** -1.11*** -11.95*** -2.85*** -3.10*** 1.78 0.88 2.35 -0.04 2.70
p-value 0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 0.0051 0.0029 0.6865 0.1871 0.7364 0.9794 0.4731
∆Risk -2.70 -0.26 -5.42* -0.12 -3.34** 5.45*** 0.38* 6.11** 0.57 4.58**
(2.23) (0.19) (2.78) (0.38) (1.30) (1.77) (0.21) (2.64) (0.53) (1.83)
∆Risk*EME -4.12 -0.02 -5.06 -0.98 4.13 -6.41 0.47 -6.01 0.58 -10.18*
(3.39) (0.41) (3.83) (0.67) (2.85) (8.28) (0.83) (14.87) (1.44) (5.14)
∆Risk+Risk*∆Risk*EME -6.83** -0.28 -10.48*** -1.09* 0.79 -0.96 0.85 0.10 1.15 1.21
p-value 0.0232 0.4499 0.0077 0.0656 0.7848 0.9092 0.3253 0.9948 0.4166 0.2823
ROE 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.15** 0.15*** 0.13** 0.14*** 0.13**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ER Depreciation -11.72*** -13.44*** -9.34* -13.58*** -13.63*** -25.12** -27.03** -28.09*** -21.22** -26.72***
(3.91) (4.25) (4.86) (4.58) (4.46) (9.63) (11.24) (9.53) (9.19) (8.90)
IR Spread Change 1.09 1.30* 1.05 0.96 0.30 -0.95 -1.60 -0.85 -0.74 -0.51
(0.67) (0.73) (0.70) (0.76) (0.65) (1.30) (1.26) (1.39) (1.29) (1.25)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Table 2.8: Alternative Measures of Global Risk. The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is
the quarterly percentage change in either interbank or intragroup funding. In columns (1) to (5) I report results for interbank funding, while in columns (6) to (10) I do
the same for intragroup funding. EME is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the banking system is in an emerging market economy and zero otherwise. I describe the
alternative risk measures in Section 7.2. The control variables are discussed in Section 2.4.1 with summary statistics provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered
at country level, are reported in brackets. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. I include F-tests to determine if the effect of
a variable on emerging economies is significant. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics
database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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significant across all alternative measures of global risk for both interbank and
intragroup funding.
2.6.3 Global Financial Crisis
I test if the earlier parameter estimates remain robust to the exclusion of the global
financial and European sovereign-debt crises. To do so, I estimate the augmented
baseline regression with an emerging market dummy variable, but exclude crisis
periods. First, I exclude the period 2008Q4-2009Q2 and re-estimate the model to
account for the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse. The results
are reported in columns one and two of Table 2.9. Once again, interbank funding
is shown to have a strong negative relationship with global risk, with the effect
amplified for emerging market economies.
The main difference is that the ∆VIX coefficient shows a less robust relation-
ship with interbank funding. The large spike in the VIX during 2008Q4 is responsible
for the negative relationship I documented earlier for emerging economies. Nonethe-
less, I still find a robust positive relationship for intragroup funding with the ∆VIX
coefficient. Moreover, the increase in intragroup funding to emerging economies,
when their host banking system is experiencing low profitability, continues to be
observed.
In the third and fourth columns, I exclude the entire period following 2008Q3
and, in doing so, exclude both the global financial crisis and European sovereign
debt crisis. The results across global risk remain almost unchanged and qualitatively
identical. The main change to the results is before the crisis, emerging economies are
found to have received inflows of intragroup funding when global risk increased. The
finding provides evidence for the European sovereign debt crisis, similar to the results
of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) for the global financial crisis – that European
global banks, affected by the crisis, were unable to maintain lending to their foreign
affiliates abroad and hence, when assessing the international transmission of funding
shocks, one needs to first ascertain the extent to which the underlying global bank
is affected.
2.7 Conclusions
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and the subsequent reduc-
tion in cross-border lending between banks, focussed policy-maker and academic
attention on the behavior and determinants of this economically important form
of cross-border finance. In fact, the Committee on International Economic Policy
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclude Crisis Exclude Crisis and Aftermath
Interbank Intragroup Interbank Intragroup
VIX -4.38*** 1.65 -4.90*** 0.53
(1.52) (1.38) (1.51) (1.19)
VIX*EME -4.31 3.21 -1.67 -0.01
(2.79) (8.37) (2.55) (10.62)
VIX+VIX*EME -8.69*** 4.86 -6.57*** 0.53
p-value 0.0006 0.5770 0.0028 0.9609
∆ VIX 0.36 6.43*** -1.12 4.92**
(2.40) (1.82) (2.94) (2.34)
∆ VIX*EME 0.58 -4.75 -4.15 12.97
(5.96) (5.26) (9.06) (9.65)
∆VIX+∆VIX*EME 0.94 1.68 -5.27 17.89*
p-value 0.8654 0.7346 0.5514 0.0653
ROE 0.06* 0.14*** 0.02 0.11
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
ROE*EME -0.13 -0.73** -0.08 -0.70**
(0.14) (0.33) (0.18) (0.28)
ROE+ROE*EME -0.06 -0.59* -0.05 -0.59**
p-value 0.6519 0.0757 0.7638 0.0369
FX Return -3.77 -11.49 -8.32 -23.09*
(5.35) (9.34) (6.06) (12.00)
FX Return*EME -8.43 -63.85** -21.71 -52.72**
(19.04) (25.07) (16.89) (22.80)
FX Return+FX Return*EME -12.19 -75.34*** -30.03* -75.80***
p-value 0.5048 0.0033 0.0616 0.0011
∆ IR Spread 1.00 -2.80* 0.91 -2.68*
(0.84) (1.46) (0.86) (1.39)
∆ IR Spread*EME -0.22 3.88** -0.89 4.38**
(1.29) (1.71) (1.58) (1.63)
∆IR Spread+∆IR Spread*EME 0.78 1.08 0.02 1.70
p-value 0.4363 0.3163 0.9870 0.1307
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,017 1,017 784 784
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Countries 25 25 23 23
Table 2.9: The Global Financial and European Sovereign-Debt Crises. The table presents the
estimated parameter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly
percentage change in either interbank or intragroup funding. In columns (1) and (2) I exclude the period
2008Q4-2009Q2 from the sample, while in columns (3) and (4) I exclude the entire post-2008Q3 period.
EME is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the banking system is in an emerging market economy and
zero otherwise. V IX is the quarterly average of the log VIX index, while ∆VIX is the quarterly change in
the average level of the log VIX index. The control variables are discussed in Section 2.4.1 with summary
statistics presented in Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered at country level, are reported in brackets. ***
is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. I include F-tests to determine
if the effect of a variable on emerging economies is significant. Data on banking flows are collected from
the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is
from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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and Reform (2012) concluded that “effective regulation of cross-border banking is
essential for domestic and global financial stability.”
In this essay, I ask the question: do interbank and intragroup flows react dif-
ferently to fluctuations in global risk and, if so, is the disaggregation of cross-border
bank-to-bank funding of economic importance to academic and policy makers work-
ing in the area of international capital flows? To answer the question, I disaggregate
cross-border bank-to-bank funding at two levels, first between arms-length interbank
funding and related intragroup funding and then, by splitting intragroup funding
between flows to parent and foreign affiliate banks.
This essay, to my knowledge, is the first to provide systematic cross-country
evidence on the behavior of interbank and intragroup funding in relation to fluc-
tuations in global risk. In the empirical analysis, I adopt the framework of Bruno
and Shin (2014) and find the disaggregation of funding has statistical, theoreti-
cal and economic implications. A period of high and rising global risk results in
markedly different behavior in subsequent interbank and intragroup funding, offer-
ing evidence, contrary to the theoretical predictions made by Bruno and Shin (2014),
that both forms of funding should react symmetrically to movements in global risk.
Intragroup funding is shown to remain stable during periods of heightened risk and
increase when global risk rises. In contrast, interbank funding is withdrawn from
all economies – but especially emerging markets – when global risk is high. I also
reveal additional granularity in the results. For example, the decision to withdraw
interbank funding during the financial crisis is found to have been closely related to
whether a country was experiencing a systemic banking crisis.
Further disaggregation reveals that parent banks in advanced economies re-
ceive funding from their foreign affiliates to smooth liquidity shocks at home. This
behavior explains the increase in intragroup funding when global risk rises. However,
I do not find evidence of significantly reduced intragroup funding to foreign affili-
ates during these periods. In fact, I find that foreign affiliates resident in emerging
economies experience an increase in intragroup funding, when the average profitabil-
ity of banks in the local economy is low. This result is found to hold even during
the financial crisis, and is indicative of the beneficial role financial globalization can
play for emerging economies with resident foreign banks.
Overall, the results call for policy makers and academics to focus attention on
the disaggregation of cross-border bank-to-bank flows, as the contrasting behavior
of interbank and intragroup funding in response to fluctuations in global risk has
implications for a banking system’s underlying financial stability.
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Chapter 3
Currency Premia and Global
Imbalances
3.1 Introduction
Imbalances in trade and capital flows have been the centerpiece of much debate sur-
rounding the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis. It would seem
natural therefore, that given the financial crisis consisted of collapsing asset prices
worldwide, global imbalances may help shed light on our fundamental understanding
of asset price dynamics. The foreign exchange (FX) market provides a logical start-
ing point for testing this hypothesis as exchange rate fluctuations are theoretically
linked to external imbalances (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Gabaix and Maggiori,
2014), and recent events in the FX market provide a reminder of the potential im-
portance of such a link. Following the U.S. Federal Reserve’s announcement on 22
May 2013 that they would taper the size of their bond-buying programme, emerging
market currencies including the Indian rupee, Brazilian real, South African rand and
Turkish lira all sold-off sharply. A common characteristic among these four countries
is that they are some of the world’s largest debtor nations. In fact, in a Financial
Times article on 26 June 2013, Alice Ross attributed the large depreciation of the
Indian rupee (which fell by 22 percent against the U.S. dollar between May and
August 2013) to investors’ concerns over India being “one of the most vulnerable
emerging market currencies due to its current account deficit”.
In this essay, I provide empirical evidence that exposure to countries’ external
imbalances is key to understanding currency risk premia – the average excess return
between baskets of high and low interest rate currencies. I thus support a risk-based
interpretation of the carry trade, a popular strategy that involves an investor bor-
rowing in currencies with low interest rates (funding currencies) and simultaneously
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lending in currencies with high interest rates (investment currencies).1 The exercise
is theoretically motivated by the recent contributions of Gourinchas and Rey (2007),
Gourinchas (2008) and Gabaix and Maggiori (2014). Gourinchas and Rey (2007)
show that a deterioration in the external account of a country is unsustainable over
time unless counterbalanced by future trade surpluses and positive returns on the
net foreign asset position. Currency fluctuations are key to this process of external
adjustment - as a domestic currency depreciation affects the country’s international
competitiveness in goods and services, as well as the value of its foreign-currency
denominated assets relative to the value of its domestic-currency-denominated lia-
bilities. The latter effect, known as the valuation adjustment, relies on a currency
mismatch between foreign assets and liabilities, which is largely true for developed
countries but less so for emerging economies. Gourinchas (2008) demonstrates that
a domestic currency depreciation will be initially destabilizing if a country has pre-
dominately foreign-currency-denominated liabilities. The immediate loss of wealth
resulting from the increased stock of liabilities weakens the net foreign asset posi-
tion and necessitates a large currency depreciation, or ‘crash’, to restore the external
account via future trade balance surpluses. Taken together, these papers suggest
that in bad times international net debtor countries suffer currency depreciations
whereas net creditor economies experience currency appreciations.
Recently, Gabaix and Maggiori (2014) propose a two-country model in which
exchange rates are jointly determined by global imbalances and financiers’ risk-
bearing capacity. In their model, countries run trade imbalances and financiers
absorb the resultant currency risk, i.e., financiers are long the debtor country and
short the creditor country. Financiers, however, are financially constrained and this
affects their ability to take positions. Intuitively, those with little risk-bearing ca-
pacity are unwilling to intermediate currency mismatches regardless of the excess
return on offer, and thus international trade must balance in each period. In con-
trast, when financiers have unlimited risk-bearing capacity they are willing to take
positions in currencies whenever an excess return is available, and hence UIP holds.
An important implication of this model is that a negative shock on the risk-bearing
capacity of financiers causes a currency depreciation for net debtor countries while
the opposite is true for net creditor countries. This happens because financiers de-
mand compensation for the increased level of currency risk, and the magnitude of
the effect depends on the financiers’ risk-bearing capacity.
1The carry strategy builds on the violation of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). See Hansen
and Hodrick (1980); Bilson (1981); Fama (1984); Engel (1996); Lustig and Verdelhan (2007);
Della Corte, Sarno, and Tsiakas (2009); Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011); Burnside, Eichen-
baum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011a); Koijen, Moskowitz, Pedersen, and Vrugt (2013); Menkhoff,
Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012) and Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber (2013).
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Motivated by the insights of these papers, I empirically test whether a risk
factor that captures the combination of spread in external imbalances and a coun-
try’s propensity to issue external liabilities in foreign currency can explain the excess
returns of currency portfolios in a standard asset pricing framework. The central
result of this essay is that the proposed global imbalance risk factor explains over 90
percent of currency excess returns, thus supporting a risk-based view of exchange
rate determination that is based on macroeconomic fundamentals.2 The results hold
both for a broad sample of 55 currencies and for a subsample of the 15 most liquid
currencies over the period from 1983 to 2011.
This essay builds on the growing literature that searches for a risk-based
explanation to currency premia. In one strand of this literature, Lustig, Roussanov,
and Verdelhan (2011) and Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012) have
both found a global risk factor in currency excess returns. However, while these
global risk factors provide valuable information on the properties of currency returns,
the question as to what fundamental economic forces drive the factors and, hence,
currency risk premia, remains unanswered. In a second strand of literature, a ‘crash’
premium has been proposed to explain currency excess returns. This ‘crash’ or
disaster risk has been shown to explain, at least in part, the excess return to the
carry trade.3 While this is a compelling theory, it does not directly connect crash
risk (or the probability of a crash) to underlying economic fundamentals that may
generate the crash. The argument is as follows: (i) High interest rate currencies
require a high expected return. (ii) The higher return is compensation for the risk
of a large and sudden drawdown. (iii) High interest rate currencies experience this
‘crash’ and thus require a higher return because they are the riskiest. The question
as to why high yielding currencies are the riskiest is not resolved. Both strands of
literature, therefore, leave us tantalizingly close to a more complete understanding
of currency premia. This essay tackles exactly this issue by shedding empirical light
on the macroeconomic forces driving currency premia.
In the empirical analysis, I sort currencies into five portfolios according to
their forward premia, as pioneered by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007). This is equiva-
lent to using the interest rate differential relative to the U.S. dollar to rank foreign
2Despite the existence of theoretical models that link exchange rates to external imbalances,
there have hardly been any attempts to relate currency risk premia cross-sectionally to currencies’
sensitivity to external imbalances. When the FX literature has investigated the empirical link
between exchange rates and external imbalances, the analysis was carried out in a time series
setting (e.g. Alquist and Chinn, 2008; Della Corte, Sarno, and Sestieri, 2012). It thus seems quite
natural to employ a cross-sectional perspective on the role of global imbalances to help understand
currency risk premia in general, and carry trades in particular.
3See, for example, Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008), Farhi and Gabaix (2013), Farhi,
Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere, and Verdelhan (2013) and Jurek (2013).
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currencies because no-arbitrage requires that forward premia are equal to interest
rate differentials. The first portfolio contains the funding currencies of a carry trade
strategy (lowest forward premia or interest rate differential), while the last portfolio
contains the investment currencies in a carry trade strategy (highest forward premia
or interest rate differential). I then show that carry trade returns can be understood
as compensation for risk, by relating their cross-section to the global imbalance fac-
tor. This factor is an easily constructed variable. I first split currencies into two
baskets using the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP, and then sort currencies within
each basket based on countries’ percentage share of external liabilities denominated
in domestic currency. The reordered currencies, beginning with creditors whose
external liabilities are primarily denominated in domestic currency (the safest cur-
rencies) and moving to debtors whose external liabilities are primarily denominated
in foreign currency (the riskiest currencies), are grouped into quintiles. These quin-
tiles form the five Net Foreign Asset (NA) portfolios. The global imbalance factor
is simply constructed as the difference between the excess returns on the extreme
portfolios. It is equivalent to a high-minus-low strategy that buys the currencies
of debtor nations with mainly foreign currency denominated external liabilities and
sells the currencies of creditor nations with mainly domestic currency denominated
external liabilities. I refer to the global imbalance risk factor as HMLNA.
The empirical evidence suggests that the global imbalance factor accounts
for most of the cross-sectional dispersion in currency excess returns. This equates to
global imbalances being a plausible macroeconomic candidate for explaining carry
trade returns. The economic intuition of this factor is simple: investors demand a
risk premium to hold the currency of debtor countries funded principally in foreign
currency as a reward for the higher probability of an exchange rate depreciation
following an external shock. High interest rate currencies load positively on the
global imbalance factor, and thus deliver low returns following an external shock,
when the process of international financial adjustment requires their depreciation.
Low interest rate currencies are negatively related to the global imbalance factor, and
thus provide a hedge by yielding positive returns after an external shock. This result
suggests that returns to carry trades are compensation for time-varying fundamental
risk, and thus carry traders can be viewed as taking on global imbalance risk.
It is important to note at the outset that this finding is not mechanical in
the sense that it cannot be attributed simply to feedback effects from interest rates
to net foreign assets. Although feedback effects may exist between interest rates
and net foreign assets whereby higher interest rates attract more capital flows, the
global imbalance risk factor captures fundamental information relevant to currency
risk premia that is not embedded in interest rates. This argument is supported by
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recent theoretical and empirical developments. Gabaix and Maggiori (2014) show
theoretically that currency premia will be required even if both countries have the
same interest rate as long as one is a debtor relative to the other, while in empirical
work Habib and Stracca (2012) show that net foreign assets are more important for
predicting exchange rate returns than interest rate differentials, and I demonstrate
similar evidence in the robustness analysis in Section 3.6.4
I also examine the robustness of the main result in the following specifica-
tions: (i) I run cross-sectional asset pricing tests on yearly rebalanced portfolios,
and find that HMLNA is still priced in the cross-section. (ii) I show that sorting
currencies on their beta with HMLNA yields portfolios with a significant differ-
ence in returns. These portfolios are related, but not identical, to the base test
assets of currency portfolios sorted on forward premia. (iii) I test the pricing power
of the global imbalance risk factor for currency excess returns sorted by real (as
opposed to nominal) interest rate differentials, and find that HMLNA also prices
these portfolios. (iv) I depart from the base scenario of a U.S.-based investor and
run calculations using alternative base currencies, taking the viewpoint of a British,
Japanese, Euro-based and Swiss investor. The results indicate that HMLNA is
priced in each case. (v) I test the HMLNA risk factor on portfolios formed using
only the 20 most liquid currencies, showing that there are no qualitative changes in
the results. (vi) I run a series of panel regressions and determine that net foreign
assets are more important than interest rate differentials for predicting exchange
rate returns. (vii) I calculate the average risk-reversal of net-foreign-asset-sorted
portfolios and find that debtor nations have the highest probability of experiencing
a large depreciation. (viii) I also run cross-sectional asset pricing tests on individual
currencies’ excess returns, and again record that HMLNA is priced. Overall, I find
that the further analysis corroborates the core finding that global imbalance risk is
a key fundamental driver of risk premia in the FX market.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly
describes the theoretical background of the analysis. In Section 3.3, I describe
4In fact, recent anecdotal evidence emphasizes the fundamental importance of net foreign as-
sets over and above interest rates in determining currency premia: the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
announcement in May 2013 that it would scale-back its bond buying programme caused a spike
in risk aversion – the VIX index rose from below 14 to over 20 during the subsequent month. In
currency markets, at the point of the Federal Reserve announcement, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Korea – three of the most volatile currencies in the Asia Pacific region – had almost identical
interest rates (2.50 percent in New Zealand and Korea, 2.75 percent in Australia). Yet, over the
May to September period, the Australian dollar depreciated by 16 percent against the U.S. dollar,
the New Zealand dollar depreciated by 10 percent, while the Korean won fell by only 1 percent.
The contrasting sizes of depreciation reflect the contrast in deficit positions at the end of the first
quarter of 2013, when Australia and New Zealand both had external deficit positions relative to
GDP of over 60 percent, while South Korea had a far more modest 6 percent deficit.
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the data and provide details of how portfolios are constructed. I present a set of
preliminary results in Section 3.4 and cross-sectional asset pricing results in Section
3.5. In Section 3.6, I present a number of robustness exercises before concluding
in Section 3.7. In Appendix B, I provide further robustness tests and additional
supporting analyses.
3.2 Global Imbalances and FX Markets
3.2.1 Theoretical Background
This section summarizes the recent literature theoretically linking exchange rates
and global or external imbalances. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) study the process
of international financial adjustment and show that external deficits imply future
trade surpluses (the trade channel) or excess returns on the foreign asset portfolio
(the valuation channel). Since the future exchange rate determines both future net
exports and future returns on external assets and liabilities, it follows that today’s
imbalances contain valuable information regarding future exchange rate movements.
This mechanism can be understood by defining the budget constraint of an economy
as
NAt = RtNAt−1 +NXt (3.1)
where NAt is the net foreign asset position at the end of period t, NXt is the
balance on goods and services between times t− 1 and t, and Rt is the gross return
on the net foreign asset portfolio between times t− 1 and t.5 Solving this equation
forward under the usual no-Ponzi condition produces the following intertemporal
budget constraint
NAt = −Et
 ∞∑
i=j
Λ−1t+jNXt+j
 (3.2)
where Λt+j =
∏j
s=1Rt+s and Et is the conditional expectation operator.
6 This
equation states, for instance, that a future currency depreciation will help rebalance
the external account of a debtor country via future net exports and positive returns
on the net foreign asset position. From a risk perspective, when expected future
current account surpluses become insufficient to cover external debt, an exchange
5I can also rewrite the budget constraint as NAt = NAt−1 + V At + CAt, where CAt =
NXt + NIt is the current account, V At = [(Rt − 1)NAt−1 − NIt] is the valuation adjustment
(capital gains on the net foreign assets), and NIt is the net investment income (income, dividends,
and earnings distributed).
6The budget constraint is an identity and, hence, the intertemporal relationship must hold both
ex-post and ex-ante.
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rate depreciation works to rebalance the present value equation that satisfies the
sustainability of the external position.
The valuation channel in Gourinchas and Rey (2007) operates through a cur-
rency mismatch between foreign assets denominated in foreign currency and foreign
liabilities issued in domestic currency. Foreign liabilities, however, can be issued pri-
marily in foreign currency as is the case for a number of emerging market economies.
In this case, an exchange rate depreciation results in a foreign portfolio loss. Gourin-
chas (2008) studies this scenario and highlights the dominant role the trade channel
must play over the valuation channel in rebalancing the external account. The read-
justment is achieved via a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency such that it
overshoots its equilibrium value. This prediction can explain the fact that countries
with a high share of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities tend to display a higher
propensity to experience sharp currency depreciations or ‘crashes’.
In a recent paper, Gabaix and Maggiori (2014) consider the interaction be-
tween capital flows and financial intermediaries’ risk-bearing capacity as the key
determinants of exchange rates in a model with imperfect financial markets. In
their model, each country borrows or lends in its own currency and global finan-
cial intermediaries absorb the exchange rate risk arising from imbalanced capital
flows. Since the financial intermediaries demand compensation for holding currency
risk in the form of an expected currency appreciation, exchange rates are jointly
determined by global capital flows and by the intermediaries’ risk-bearing capacity.
When risk-bearing capacity is low, financial intermediaries are unwilling to absorb
any imbalances, regardless of the excess return available, and hence no financial
flows are necessary as trade inflows and outflows will be equal in each period. As
capacity to bear risk increases, excess returns fall but do not entirely disappear -
except when risk-bearing capacity is extremely high, and financial intermediaries
are prepared to absorb any currency imbalance. Gabaix and Maggiori (2014) also
show that during periods of financial distress, risk-bearing capacity declines and
debtor countries suffer a currency depreciation, whereas creditor countries experi-
ence a currency appreciation. The currencies of debtor countries must depreciate
when risk-bearing capacity falls in order to compensate global intermediaries for the
increase in risk.7
These theoretical papers give us reason to consider external imbalances as
a suitable state variable: carry traders require a premium to hold the currency of
debtor nations relative to creditor nations, while debtor countries with a reliance
7A parallel literature has examined the determinants of exchange rates while maintaining the
assumption of complete markets. In particular, Colacito and Croce (2013) show that a country’s
exposure to global risk is a function of its relative consumption of world output.
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on foreign-currency-denominated liabilities have a propensity to offer higher risk
premia in order to attract foreign savings to fund domestic investment.
3.2.2 Related Literature
This essay is closely related to the recent literature seeking to explain currency risk
premia in a cross-sectional asset pricing setting. Lustig et al. (2011) rationalize
returns to the carry trade using two risk factors, following the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory framework of Ross (1976). The authors find that the first two principal
components of currency portfolio returns can explain most of the variation in the
data. The first principal component is proxied using the average excess return on all
currency portfolios, and is denoted as the dollar factor (DOL). The second principal
component is proxied with a long position in the last portfolio funded by a short
position in the first portfolio – essentially the carry trade return. This factor is
constructed in a similar vein to the Fama and French (1993) high-minus-low factor,
and is named the Slope factor (HMLFX). High interest rate currencies are positively
exposed to this risk, while low interest rate currencies are negatively exposed. Since
average excess returns increase monotonically across portfolios and DOL has no
pricing power, HMLFX is the only risk factor that explains the cross-section of
portfolio returns. Empirically HMLFX is shown to correlate almost perfectly with
the second principal component – which can itself be viewed as the statistically ‘true’
underlying risk factor (see Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) for a discussion
of the Fama-French factors being good proxies for the ‘true’ underlying source of
equity market risk). Therefore, while building on the work of Lustig et al. (2011), the
main goal is to identify the macroeconomic determinants underlying HMLFX rather
than to construct an alternative or competing risk factor. I show that HMLNA
and HMLFX are driven by a common component and that sorting currencies into
portfolios on the basis of their exposure to HMLNA is very similar to sorting on
forward premia. I also find evidence that there is no additional pricing information
in HMLFX beyond HMLNA.
Furthermore, Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that average carry trade returns
act as compensation for exposure to global FX volatility risk. In times of high
unexpected volatility, high-interest rate currencies deliver low returns, whereas low-
interest rate currencies perform well. I also show that HMLNA replicates the infor-
mation in global FX volatility risk reasonably well, and that FX volatility risk has
no additional information beyond the global imbalance risk factor for pricing carry
trade returns.8
8Related to this literature, Christiansen, Ranaldo, and So¨derlind (2011) further show that the
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3.3 Data and Currency Portfolios
This section describes the data on exchange rates, external assets and liabilities as
well as the total share of external liabilities denominated in domestic currency, which
is employed in the empirical analysis. I then describe the construction of currency
portfolios and the global imbalance risk factor.
3.3.1 Data Sources and Currency Excess Returns
Data on Spot and Forward Exchange Rates. I collect daily spot and 1-month
forward exchange rates vis-a`-vis the U.S. dollar (USD) from Barclays and Reuters
via Datastream. The empirical analysis uses monthly data obtained by sampling
end-of-month rates from October 1983 to December 2011. The sample comprises
55 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Euro Area, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singa-
pore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. I call this
sample All Countries.
A number of currencies in this sample are pegged or subject to capital re-
strictions. In reality, investors may not easily trade some of these currencies in large
amounts even though quotes on forward contracts (deliverable or non-deliverable)
are available.9 Hence, I also consider a subset of 15 countries which I refer to as
Developed Countries. This sample includes: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Euro Area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. After the introduction of the euro
in January 1999, I remove the Eurozone countries and replace them with the euro.10
As in Lustig et al. (2011), I remove data when I observe large deviations from the
risk exposure of carry trade returns to stock and bond markets depends on the level of FX volatility.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011a) investigate whether carry trade returns
reflect a peso problem, which is a low probability of large negative returns. Although the authors
do not find evidence of peso events in their sample, they argue that investors still attach great
importance to these events and require compensation for them.
9According to the Triennial Survey of the Bank for International Settlements (2013), the top
10 currencies account for 90 percent of the average daily turnover in FX markets.
10The sample of Developed Countries matches both Lustig et al. (2011) and Menkhoff et al.
(2012). The full sample of All Countries, instead, comprises a wider set of countries than previous
studies. I also consider a set of 35 countries as in Lustig et al. (2011), and 48 countries as in
Menkhoff et al. (2012). Qualitatively, the results remain the same.
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covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition.11
Data on External Assets and Liabilities. Turning to macroeconomic data, I
obtain end-of-year series on foreign assets and liabilities, and gross domestic product
(GDP) from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007), kindly provided by Gian Maria
Milesi-Ferretti. Foreign (or external) assets are measured as the dollar value of assets
a country owns abroad, while foreign (or external) liabilities refer to the dollar value
of domestic assets owned by foreigners. The data for all countries included in the
study are collected until the end of 2011. For each country I measure external
imbalances – the indebtedness of a country to foreigners – using the net foreign
asset position (the difference between foreign assets and foreign liabilities) relative
to the size of the economy (GDP). I retrieve monthly observations by keeping end-
of-period data constant until a new observation becomes available.12
I also collect end of year series on the proportion of external liabilities denom-
inated in domestic currency from Lane and Shambaugh (2010), available on Philip
Lane’s website. The data is available from 1990 to 2004. I construct monthly ob-
servations by keeping end-of-period data constant until a new observation becomes
available. Note that I maintain the 1990 proportions back until 1983 and the 2004
proportions through until the end of 2011.13
Currency Excess Returns. I denote time-t spot and forward exchange rates as
St and Ft, respectively. Exchange rates are defined in units of foreign currency per
U.S. dollar such that an increase in St is an appreciation of the dollar. The excess
return on buying a foreign currency in the forward market at time t and then selling
11Specifically, I eliminate the following observations from the sample: Argentina from August
2008 to April 2009; Malaysia from April 1998 to July 1999 and from June 2005 to December
2010; Indonesia from June 1997 to March 1998, from January 2001 to September 2002, and from
November 2008 to February 2009; Italy from August 1992 to September 1992; Japan from May
1998 to July 1998; Kazakhstan from October 2008 to February 2009; Norway from July 1998 to
August 1998; Russia from November 2008 to April 2009; South Africa from July 1985 to August
1985 and from December 2001 to May 2004; Sweden from July 1998 to August 1998; Thailand from
April 1997 to June 1997; and Turkey from January 2001 to November 2001.
12I provide a simple graphical analysis of external imbalances by presenting, in Appendix Figure
B.1, the distribution of the net foreign asset positions relative to GDP as of December 2011.
This illustrates some of the large external imbalances of the current time. Prima facie, I observe
that countries with large external imbalances are associated with some of the classic carry trade
currencies, which I document more rigorously below.
13In Appendix Figure B.2, I present the average share of foreign liabilities issued in domestic
currency for both developed and non-developed countries. I also report 90th and 10th percentile
bands. Since the early 1990s there has been a trend, in both developed and emerging countries, to
issue external liabilities in domestic currency.
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it in the spot market at time t+ 1 is computed as
RXt+1 = (Ft − St+1) /St
which is equivalent to the forward premium minus the spot exchange rate return
RXt+1 = (Ft − St) /St − (St+1 − St) /St. According to the CIP condition, the for-
ward premium approximately equals the interest rate differential (Ft − St) /St '
i∗t − it, where it and i∗t represent the domestic and foreign riskless rates over the
maturity of the forward contract. Since CIP holds closely in the data at daily and
lower frequency (e.g. Akram, Rime, and Sarno, 2008), the currency excess return is
approximately equal to the interest rate differential minus the exchange rate return
RXt+1 ' i∗t − it − (St+1 − St) /St.
I compute currency excess returns adjusted for transaction costs using bid-ask quotes
on spot and forward rates. The net excess return for holding foreign currency for
a month is computed as RX lt+1 ' (F bt − Sat+1)/Sbt , where a indicates the ask price,
b the bid price, and l a long position in the foreign currency. This is equivalent to
selling the dollar at the bid price F bt at time t in the forward market and buying
dollars at the ask price Sat+1 in the spot market at time t+1. This net excess return
reflects the full round-trip transaction cost occurring when the foreign currency is
purchased at time t and sold at time t+ 1. If the investor buys foreign currency at
time t but decides to maintain the position at time t + 1, the net excess return is
computed as RX lt+1 ' (F bt − St+1)/Sbt . Similarly, if the investor closes a position
in foreign currency at time t+ 1 already existing at time t, the net excess return is
defined as RX lt+1 ' (Ft − Sat+1)/St.
The net excess return for holding domestic currency for a month is computed
as RXst+1 ' −
(
F at − Sbt+1
)
Sat , where s denotes a short position on the foreign cur-
rency. This is equivalent to buying dollars at the ask price F at at time t in the forward
market and selling dollars at the bid price Sbt+1 in the spot market at time t+1. If the
domestic currency enters the strategy at time t and the position is rolled over at time
t+1, the net excess return is computed as RXst+1 ' − (F at − St+1) /Sat . Similarly, if
the domestic currency leaves the strategy at time t+ 1 but the position was already
opened at time t, the net excess return is computed as RXst+1 ' −
(
Ft − Sbt+1
)
/St.
In short, excess returns are adjusted for the full round-trip transaction cost in the
first and last month of the sample period.
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3.3.2 Forming Currency Portfolios
Carry Trade Portfolios. I construct five currency portfolios and rebalance them
at the end of each month. I will refer to these portfolios as FX portfolios. At the end
of each period t, I allocate currencies to five portfolios on the basis of their forward
premia (Ft − St) /St. Sorting on forward premia is equivalent to sorting currencies
on the basis of the interest rate differential i∗t − it via the CIP condition. This
exercise implies that currencies with the lowest forward premia (or lowest interest
rate differential relative to the U.S.) are assigned to Portfolio 1, whereas currencies
with the highest forward premia (or highest interest rate differential relative to
the U.S.) are assigned to Portfolio 5. I then compute the excess return for each
portfolio as an equally weighted average of the currency excess returns within that
portfolio. For the purpose of computing portfolio returns net of transaction costs,
I assume that investors go short on foreign currencies in Portfolio 1 and long on
foreign currencies in the remaining portfolios. The total number of currencies in the
portfolios changes over time. I only include currencies for which I have bid and ask
quotes on forward and spot exchange rates in the current and subsequent period.
The group of all countries starts with 8 countries at the beginning of the sample
in 1983, and ends with 45 countries at the end of the sample in 2011. The set of
developed countries starts with 6 countries in 1983, and ends with 10 countries in
2011. The maximum number of currencies managed during the sample is 50 in the
All sample and 14 in the Developed sample.
Lustig et al. (2011) study these currency portfolio returns using the first two
principal components. The first principal component is proxied using an equally
weighted strategy across all portfolios. This average return is simply the outcome
of a strategy that borrows in the U.S. money market and invests in foreign money
markets. This zero-cost portfolio is called the dollar risk factor, abbreviated to
DOL. The second principal component is proxied with a long position in Portfolio
5 and a short position in Portfolio 1. This is equivalent to a carry trade strategy
that borrows in the money markets of low yielding currencies and invests in the
money markets of high yielding currencies. This high-minus-low portfolio is called
the slope factor, and is denoted as HMLFX . I construct DOL and HMLFX as in
Lustig et al. (2011).
External Imbalances Portfolios. Motivated by the model of international fi-
nancial adjustment by Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Gourinchas (2008), I con-
struct the global imbalance risk factor as follows. At the end of each period t, I
first group currencies into two baskets using the net foreign asset position relative
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to GDP, then reorder currencies within each basket using the percentage share of
external liabilities denominated in foreign currency. Hence, I allocate this set of
currencies to five portfolios. Portfolio 1 corresponds to creditor countries whose
external liabilities are primarily denominated in domestic currency (safest curren-
cies) whereas Portfolio 5 comprises debtor countries whose external liabilities are
primarily denominated in foreign currency (riskiest currencies). I refer to these five
portfolios as the external imbalances portfolios, abbreviated to NA. I then compute
the excess return for each portfolio as an equally weighted average of individual cur-
rency excess returns within the portfolio. For the purpose of computing portfolio
returns net of transaction costs, I assume that investors go short foreign currencies
in Portfolio 1 and long foreign currencies in the remaining portfolios. I construct
the global imbalance risk factor as the difference between Portfolio 5 and Portfolio
1. This is equivalent to a high-minus-low strategy that buys the currencies of debtor
countries with mainly foreign currency denominated external liabilities and sells the
currencies of creditor nations with mainly domestic currency denominated external
liabilities. I refer to the global imbalance risk factor as HMLNA.
3.4 Preliminary Analysis
This section presents a preliminary analysis of the relationship between currency
excess returns and the global imbalance risk factor, before I turn to the more formal
cross-sectional asset pricing tests in the next section.
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the five FX portfolios, the DOL and
HMLFX portfolios. Monthly rebalanced portfolios are displayed in Panel A whereas
yearly rebalanced portfolios are presented in Panel B. I report results for the full
sample of countries and the subset of developed countries. DOL denotes the average
return on the five currency portfolios while HML denotes a long-short strategy that
is long in Portfolio 5 (the investment currencies in the carry trade) and short in
Portfolio 1 (the funding currencies in the carry trade). In the final two columns, I
report DOL and HML adjusted for transaction costs (τ). For HML, excess returns
to Portfolio 1 are adjusted for transactions costs occurring in a short position and
excess returns to Portfolio 5 are adjusted for transaction costs occurring in a long
position. All excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum.
Average excess returns to monthly rebalanced portfolios display an increas-
ing pattern when moving from Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 5 for both samples. The
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Panel A: Monthly Rebalancing Panel B: Yearly Rebalancing
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ
All Countries All Countries
Mean −1.79 −0.69 2.66 2.37 6.53 1.82 8.32 0.61 5.44 −1.26 0.69 0.56 2.76 3.83 1.32 5.09 0.99 4.22
Med −1.02 1.99 3.27 4.02 9.30 3.46 11.51 2.28 8.42 1.57 1.71 2.10 1.91 9.51 2.68 8.86 2.45 8.00
Sdev 7.86 7.93 8.19 8.92 9.76 7.41 8.88 7.41 8.86 9.98 8.60 11.39 10.19 19.23 10.12 17.20 10.10 16.96
Skew −0.07 −0.62 −0.44 −0.90 −0.79 −0.57 −1.02 −0.58 −1.06 −0.35 −0.42 −0.89 0.01 −1.52 −0.74 −0.55 −0.74 −0.59
Kurt 4.17 5.26 4.44 6.30 5.66 4.45 5.25 4.45 5.20 2.57 2.45 3.44 1.80 5.30 3.17 2.71 3.16 2.73
AC1 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.05 −0.04 0.07 0.20 −0.04 0.37 −0.04 0.36
SR −0.23 −0.09 0.32 0.27 0.67 0.24 0.94 0.08 0.61 −0.13 0.08 0.05 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.30 0.10 0.25
MDD −38.9 −38.0 −32.9 −33.1 −33.1 −25.3 −27.1 −30.2 −31.4 −37.1 −32.5 −50.4 −33.4 −61.7 −27.9 −50.8 −29.4 −51.7
Freq 18.9 28.6 31.6 32.6 16.7 25.7 35.6 25.7 35.6 27.5 52.8 54.8 51.5 28.0 42.9 55.5 42.9 55.5
Developed Countries Developed Countries
Mean −1.46 0.76 1.66 2.33 5.61 1.78 7.08 0.97 5.25 0.24 0.80 2.07 1.60 3.04 1.55 2.80 1.39 2.42
Med −2.18 2.96 4.25 3.89 6.94 3.20 11.12 2.61 8.62 2.17 3.52 1.90 2.72 2.37 1.24 3.23 1.09 2.99
Sdev 10.10 9.82 9.42 9.78 11.41 8.82 11.04 8.82 11.04 12.27 11.67 9.80 12.96 13.01 10.42 13.81 10.41 13.87
Skew 0.16 −0.21 −0.35 −0.75 −0.51 −0.33 −1.13 −0.34 −1.14 −0.41 −0.21 −0.02 −0.79 −0.06 −0.15 −0.72 −0.16 −0.71
Kurt 3.52 3.70 4.41 5.74 4.82 3.79 6.07 3.78 6.09 2.14 1.82 2.19 3.41 2.79 2.11 4.09 2.11 4.05
AC1 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.06 −0.02 0.03 0.06 −0.05 0.06 −0.05
SR −0.15 0.08 0.18 0.24 0.49 0.20 0.64 0.11 0.48 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.17
MDD −46.8 −45.9 −38.0 −32.4 −35.7 −36.9 −38.9 −39.9 −40.2 −44.9 −46.0 −30.3 −33.1 −34.1 −33.9 −37.0 −34.5 −37.3
Freq 11.7 26.0 31.1 25.0 13.9 21.6 25.6 21.6 25.6 11.1 52.6 66.9 50.6 34.0 43.0 45.1 43.0 45.1
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: Carry Trade (FX) Portfolios. The table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on time t − 1 forward
premia (or interest rate differential relative to the U.S. dollar). Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the top 20% of all currencies with the lowest forward premia whereas Portfolio
5 (P5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with the highest forward premia. DOL denotes the average return of the five currency portfolios. HML denotes the
slope factor and is equivalent to a long-short strategy that buys P5 and sells P1. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum, and τ denotes excess returns
adjusted for transaction costs. The table also reports the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC1), the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR), the maximum drawdown in
percent (MDD), and the frequency of portfolio switches (Freq) in percent. Panel A (Panel B) presents portfolios rebalanced at the end of each month (year) using
one-month (one-year) forward premia. The sample runs from October 1983 to December 2011, and comprises 338 (28) observations for the monthly (yearly) exercise.
Exchange rates are from Datastream.
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annualized average excess return on Portfolio 1 is about −1.79 percent per annum
for all countries and −1.46 percent per annum for developed countries. Portfolio
5 exhibits an annualized average excess return of 6.53 percent per annum for all
countries and 5.61 percent per annum for developed countries. The average excess
return from holding an equally weighted portfolio of foreign currencies (i.e., the
DOL portfolio) is 1.82 (0.61) percent per annum before (after) transaction costs
for all countries, and 1.78 (0.97) percent per annum before (after) transaction costs
for developed countries. These figures, taken together, suggest that a U.S. investor
would demand a small but positive risk premium for holding foreign currency while
borrowing in the U.S. money market. The average excess return from a long-short
strategy that borrows in low-interest rate currencies and invests in high-interest
rate currencies (essentially the HMLFX portfolio) is 8.32 (5.44) percent per annum
before (after) transaction costs for all countries, and 7.08 (5.25) percent per annum
before (after) transaction costs for developed countries. A similar pattern emerges
for the yearly rebalanced average returns. Likewise, both the median and kurtosis
display a spread across the five portfolios, while standard deviations fail to show any
systematic pattern. At a monthly rebalancing frequency I find almost no skewness
in Portfolio 1 but this becomes increasingly negative as I move towards Portfolio
5, consistent with the findings of Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) who
suggest that investment currencies (or high yielding currencies) may be subject to
‘crash’ risk.
I also report the realized Sharpe ratio (SR), the maximum drawdown (MDD),
and the frequency of currency portfolio switches (Freq). The SR, computed as the
average excess return of a portfolio divided by its standard deviation, increases sys-
tematically when moving from Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 5 in the monthly rebalancing
setting. For instance, the annualized SR ranges from −0.23 (Portfolio 1) to 0.67
(Portfolio 5) for all countries, and from −0.15 (Portfolio 1) to 0.49 (Portfolio 5)
for developed countries. The MDD, defined as the maximum cumulative loss from
the strategy’s peak to the following trough, is large in both samples, reflecting the
large-scale unwinding of carry trade positions following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. Freq is computed as the ratio between the number of
portfolio switches and the total number of currencies at each date. Overall, there is
little variation in the composition of these portfolios, which is not surprising given
that interest rates are very persistent. For yearly rebalanced portfolios, I find largely
comparable results.
In Table 3.2 I present the same summary statistics for the five NA portfolios,
as well as the DOL and HMLNA strategies. When rebalancing monthly, the average
excess return is monotonically increasing from Portfolio 1 (−0.03 percent per annum)
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Panel A: Monthly Rebalancing Panel B: Yearly Rebalancing
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ
All Countries All Countries
Mean −0.16 1.79 0.76 2.23 4.54 1.83 4.70 0.70 2.31 −0.51 1.18 2.07 0.84 3.87 1.49 4.38 1.15 3.64
Med 0.76 1.35 2.59 4.88 6.09 3.45 6.02 2.54 4.24 0.67 0.97 1.75 1.86 6.63 3.03 3.81 2.68 3.15
Sdev. 7.81 9.19 6.82 8.62 9.70 7.39 6.25 7.39 6.25 10.11 10.32 8.42 11.92 13.87 9.73 7.97 9.69 7.81
Skew −0.32 −0.43 −1.23 −1.16 −0.55 −0.58 −0.23 −0.59 −0.37 −0.75 0.03 −0.69 −1.19 −0.50 −0.59 −0.46 −0.58 −0.53
Kurt 3.74 4.54 9.07 8.15 4.86 4.44 6.59 4.44 6.59 2.86 2.51 3.76 4.54 2.46 2.65 3.26 2.64 3.26
AC1 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.02 −0.01 −0.14 0.08 −0.05 −0.04 0.19 −0.04 0.20
SR −0.02 0.19 0.11 0.26 0.47 0.25 0.75 0.09 0.37 −0.05 0.11 0.25 0.07 0.28 0.15 0.55 0.12 0.47
MDD −49.4 −31.8 −35.0 −31.4 −29.3 −24.7 −19.0 −29.5 −23.4 −40.9 −32.4 −21.7 −39.1 −34.5 −28.4 −16.4 −29.9 −17.1
Freq 2.2 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.8 4.5 2.8 4.5 13.9 27.4 22.2 20.8 20.8 21.0 34.6 21.0 34.6
Developed Countries Developed Countries
Mean −0.03 0.89 2.05 2.38 4.02 1.86 4.05 1.10 2.61 −0.34 0.86 1.54 2.08 3.67 1.56 4.01 1.40 3.71
Med 1.20 1.34 3.06 4.26 5.87 3.33 5.99 2.75 4.53 0.51 0.98 2.44 3.88 2.86 1.21 3.30 1.07 3.04
Sdev. 10.08 10.76 9.14 9.49 10.03 8.92 6.51 8.92 6.51 12.62 11.07 10.77 11.22 11.41 10.50 8.02 10.49 8.02
Skew −0.15 −0.33 −0.44 −0.63 −0.49 −0.35 −0.82 −0.35 −0.81 −0.31 −0.10 −0.13 −0.52 −0.19 −0.15 −0.24 −0.15 −0.25
Kurt 3.40 3.90 4.56 7.14 4.21 3.74 5.88 3.74 5.90 1.93 2.43 2.13 3.01 2.12 2.00 3.39 1.99 3.38
AC1 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.09 −0.03 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.07 −0.03 0.07 −0.02
SR 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.25 0.40 0.21 0.62 0.12 0.40 −0.03 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.32 0.15 0.50 0.13 0.46
MDD −58.2 −39.9 −36.9 −38.1 −27.1 −37.2 −26.0 −39.9 −27.4 −49.2 −31.9 −39.3 −35.9 −23.0 −36.2 −17.4 −36.7 −17.9
Freq 1.5 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.6 2.5 4.1 2.5 4.1 17.3 27.5 20.6 29.4 24.7 23.9 42.0 23.9 42.0
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: External Imbalances (NA) Portfolios. The table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on time t − 1
external imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the top 20% of all currencies
with positive external imbalances (creditor nations) and the highest share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency whereas Portfolio 5 (P5) contains the top 20% of
all currencies with negative external imbalances (debtor nations) and the lowest share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. DOL denotes the average return of
the five currency portfolios. HML denotes the global imbalance factor and is equivalent to a long-short strategy that buys P5 and sells P1. Excess returns are expressed
in percentage per annum, and τ denotes excess returns adjusted for transaction costs. The table also reports the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC1), the
annualized Sharpe ratio (SR), the maximum drawdown in percent (MDD), and the frequency of portfolio switches (Freq) in percent. Panel A (Panel B) presents
portfolios rebalanced at the end of each month (year). The sample runs from October 1983 to December 2011, and comprises 338 (28) observations for the monthly
(yearly) exercise. Exchange rates are from Datastream. Yearly data on GDP, foreign assets and liabilities are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) whereas yearly
data on the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency are from Lane and Shambaugh (2010). Monthly observations are retrieved by keeping end-of-period data
constant until a new observation becomes available.
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to Portfolio 5 (4.02 percent per annum) in developed countries, and upward sloping
(albeit non-monotonically) for all countries. The patterns in skewness and kurtosis
are similar to FX portfolios, albeit with higher absolute statistics on Portfolio 4
rather than Portfolio 5. When I compare SRs, I observe that HMLFX has a higher
risk-adjusted return than HMLNA for all countries: 0.94 compared to 0.75 before
transaction costs, and 0.61 compared to 0.37 after transaction costs. For developed
countries, the difference is virtually eliminated with the SR equal to 0.64 (0.48) for
HMLFX , and 0.62(0.48) for HMLNA before (after) transaction costs.
Strategies based on forward premia, however, are not immediately compara-
ble to strategies based on external imbalances when monthly rebalanced portfolios
are taken into consideration. This is because forward premia are observed every
month, whereas new information on countries’ external imbalances only arrives at
the end of each year. This is confirmed by the frequency of currency portfolio
switches (Freq), which displays far less variation in the portfolio compositions of
the NA portfolios compared to the FX portfolios. The comparison between FX
and NA portfolios becomes, to some extent, unfair for excess returns net of trans-
action costs. Monthly rebalanced NA portfolios are subject to monthly transaction
costs even though there is no turnover in the portfolio composition as the investor
has to roll-over the one-month forward contract. Therefore, I also consider yearly
rebalanced strategies.
When I rebalance currencies at the end of each year, the difference between
HMLFX and HMLNA is flipped around. HMLNA now displays a Sharpe ratio
of 0.55 (0.47) compared to 0.30 (0.25) for HMLFX before (after) transaction costs
for all countries. Similarly for developed countries, the Sharpe ratio for HMLNA
is 0.50 (0.46) but only 0.20 (0.17) for HMLFX before (after) transaction costs.
In sum, the two sets of summary statistics line up well with one another. There
are some differences but this is not overly surprising given the two-speed nature of
the variables. Given NA information arrives with annual frequency, it is perhaps
surprising that the risk-adjusted NA strategy performs almost as well as the carry
strategy when rebalancing at a monthly frequency.
3.4.2 Carry Trade Returns and Global Imbalance Risk
In Figure 3.1 I present preliminary evidence on the relation between carry trade
returns and global imbalance risk by grouping carry trade returns into four baskets
conditional on the distribution of HMLNA. The first group comprises the 25 percent
of months with the lowest realizations of the global imbalance risk factor whereas
the last group contains the 25 percent of months with the highest realizations of the
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Figure 3.1: Currency Excess Returns and External Imbalances. The figure presents average excess
returns for carry trade portfolios conditional on the global imbalance risk factor being within the lowest to
highest quartile of its sample distribution. The bars show average excess returns for being long in Portfolio
5 (largest forward premia) and short in Portfolio 1 (lowest forward premia). Excess returns are expressed
in percentage per month. The sample runs from October 1983 to December 2011.
global imbalance risk factor. I then compute for each group the average carry trade
return. Figure 3.1 shows that average excess returns for the carry trade strategy
increase monotonically when moving from low to high global imbalance risk. The
carry trade has its best overall performance when global imbalance risk is high
and vice versa, suggesting a relation between currency excess returns and global
imbalance risk.
In Figure 3.2 I present further graphical evidence on the relationship between
HML risk factors by showing the one-year rolling Sharpe ratios for HMLFX and
HMLNA. This is a simple exercise to visualize the similarity between a long/short
strategy on forward premia and a long/short strategy on external imbalances. The
top panel refers to all countries, while the bottom panel to developed countries.
The two series show a high degree of correlation, and since the mid 1990s the
general pattern of peaks and troughs in HMLFX has been exactly replicated by
HMLNA. This result is particularly promising if one considers that forward premia
are observed at monthly intervals while net foreign assets are only recorded at the
end of each calendar year.14 This preliminary evidence suggests that HMLNA and
HMLFX move closely together and reflect very similar portfolios. I now turn to a
more rigorous investigation of this similarity using formal asset pricing tests.
14Throughout the sample I observe a few deviations between HMLFX and HMLNA, which
are easily identifiable as they generally tend to be episodes of major central bank interventions or
other global shocks, such as the coordinated intervention operations of 1985 and 1987, the currency
crises of the early 1990s that led Italy and the U.K. to defend their currencies in the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism via higher interest rates, the Mexican crisis in 1994, the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and more recently the European sovereign crisis.
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Figure 3.2: Rolling Sharpe Ratios. The figure presents the one-year rolling Sharpe ratios for the global imbalance risk factor HMLNA (solid line) and the slope
factor HMLFX (dashed line). The Shaded areas are the NBER recession periods for the United States. The strategies are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to
December 2011.
67
3.5 Asset Pricing Tests
This section presents cross-sectional asset pricing tests for the five FX portfolios
and the global imbalance factor, and empirically documents that carry trade returns
can be thought of as compensation for time-varying global imbalance risk.
3.5.1 Empirical Methods
I closely follow the cross-sectional asset pricing methodology described in Cochrane
(2005) and used, among others, by Lustig et al. (2011) and Menkhoff et al. (2012).
I denote the discrete excess returns on portfolio j in period t as RXjt . To avoid the
assumption of joint log-normality of returns and the pricing kernel, I run all asset
pricing tests on discrete excess returns, not log excess returns.15 In the absence of
arbitrage opportunities, risk-adjusted excess returns have a price of zero and satisfy
the following Euler equation:
Et[Mt+1RX
j
t+1] = 0 (3.3)
with a Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF), Mt+1 linear in the pricing factors ft+1,
given by
Mt+1 = 1− b′ (ft+1 − µ) (3.4)
where b is the vector of factor loadings, and µ denotes the factor means. This spec-
ification implies a beta pricing model where the expected excess return on portfolio
j is equal to the factor risk price λ times the risk quantities βj . The beta pricing
model is defined as
E[RXj ] = λ′βj (3.5)
where the market price of risk λ = Σfb can be obtained via the factor loadings b.
Σf = E
[
(ft − µ) (ft − µ)′
]
, is the variance-covariance matrix of the risk factors,
and βj are the regression coefficients of each portfolio’s excess return RXjt+1 on the
risk factors ft+1.
The factor loadings b entering equation (4.1) are estimated via the General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982). To implement GMM , I use
the pricing errors as a set of moments and a prespecified weighting matrix. Since
the objective is to test whether the model can explain the cross-section of expected
currency excess returns, I only rely on unconditional moments and do not employ
15Note that Lustig et al. (2011) and Menkhoff et al. (2012) also use discrete returns for asset
pricing tests, although they take logs in the main text for expositional simplicity. Here, I use
discrete returns throughout the chapter.
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instruments other than a constant and a vector of ones. The first-stage estima-
tion (GMM1) employs an identity weighting matrix. The weighting matrix tells us
how much attention to pay to each moment condition. With an identity matrix,
GMM attempts to price all currency portfolios equally well. The second-stage es-
timation (GMM2) uses an optimal weighting matrix based on a heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimate of the long-run covariance matrix
of the moment conditions. In this case, since currency portfolio returns have dif-
ferent variances and may be correlated, the optimal weighting matrix will attach
more weight to linear combinations of moments about which the data are more in-
formative (Cochrane, 2005). The tables report estimates of b and implied λ, and
standard errors based on Newey and West (1987) with optimal lag length selection
according to Andrews (1991).16 The model’s performance is then evaluated using
the cross-sectional R2, the square-root of mean-squared errors RMSE, the χ2 test
statistics, and the HJ distance measure of Hansen and Jagannathan (1997). The
χ2 test statistic evaluates the null hypothesis that all cross-sectional pricing errors
(i.e., the difference between actual and predicted excess returns) are jointly equal
to zero. I report asymptotic p-values for the χ2 test statistics. The HJ distance
quantifies the mean-squared distance between the SDF of a proposed model and the
set of admissible SDFs. To test whether the HJ distance is equal to zero, I simulate
p-values using a weighted sum of χ21-distributed random variables as in Jagannathan
and Wang (1996).
The estimation of the portfolio betas βj and factor risk price λ in equation
(4.3) is also undertaken using a two-pass ordinary least squares regression following
Fama and MacBeth (FMB, 1973). In the first step, I run time-series regressions of
portfolio excess returns against a constant and the risk factors, and estimate the
betas βj . In the second step, I run cross-sectional regressions of portfolio returns
on the betas, and estimate the factor risk prices λ as averages of all these slope
coefficients. Note that in the second stage of FMB regressions I do not add any
constant to capture the common over- or under-pricing in the cross section of returns.
The results, however, remain virtually identical when I replace the DOL factor with
a constant in the second stage regression. This is because the DOL factor has no
cross-sectional relation with currency returns, and it works as a constant that allows
for a common mispricing.17 I report Newey and West (1987) and Shanken (1992)
16I estimate µ and Σf using the sample average and the sample covariance matrix of the risk
factors, respectively (e.g. Lustig et al., 2011). I also implement a first-stage GMM where µ and Σf
are jointly estimated with the factor loadings b. In doing so, I account for estimation uncertainty
associated with the fact that factor means and the factor covariance matrix have to be estimated
(Burnside, 2011; Menkhoff et al., 2012). The results remain qualitatively the same.
17See Burnside (2011) and Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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standard errors with optimal lag length selection according to Andrews (1991).
Risk Factors. The most recent literature on cross-sectional asset pricing in cur-
rency markets has considered a two-factor pricing kernel. The first risk factor is
typically the expected market excess return, approximated by the average excess re-
turn on a portfolio strategy that is long in all foreign currencies with equal weights
and short in the domestic currency – essentially the DOL factor. For the second
risk factor, the literature has employed several return-based factors such as the
slope factor HMLFX of Lustig et al. (2011) or the global volatility factor V OLFX
of Menkhoff et al. (2012). Regardless of its parsimony and the likely omission of
other potential factors, this simple empirical model has delivered important insights
on the relation between global risk and expected currency returns. However, the
risk factors used by the literature to date are built on financial variables that are
themselves endogenously determined, which begs the question of what the funda-
mental economic forces that drive global risk factors are. Following this literature,
I employ a two-factor SDF with DOL as the first factor. For the second risk factor,
I use global imbalance risk in an attempt to assess the validity of the theoretical
prediction that exchange rates are linked to external imbalances, and that currencies
more exposed to global imbalance risk offer a risk premium related to interest rate
differentials.
3.5.2 Results
Cross-Sectional Regressions. Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the cross-sectional
asset pricing results with monthly rebalanced portfolios. The excess returns to
currency portfolios RXjFX , for j = 1, . . . , 5, serve as test assets whereas the dollar
factor DOL and the global imbalance factor HMLNA enter as risk factors. Both
test assets and risk factors are adjusted for transactions costs. The SDF is defined
as
Mt+1 = 1− bDOL (DOLt+1 − µDOL)− bNA (HMLNA,t+1 − µNA)
where µDOL and µNA denote the factor means. Panel A reports estimates of factor
loadings b, the market prices of risk λ, the cross-sectional R2, the square-root of
mean-squared errors RMSE, the χ2 test statistics, and the HJ distance. Newey
and West (1987) corrected standard errors with lag length determined according
to Andrews (1991) are reported in parentheses, while Shanken corrected standard
errors are in brackets. The p-values of the χ2 test statistics and HJ distance mea-
sure are also reported in brackets. The results are reported for all countries (left
panel) and developed countries (right panel) using GMM1, GMM2, and the FMB
approach.
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
All Countries Developed Countries
GMM1 −0.22 1.61 0.01 0.07 0.84 1.87 4.46 0.15 0.07 0.95 0.01 0.05 0.93 1.02 0.84 0.06
(0.31) (0.61) (0.02) (0.02) [0.22] [0.21] (0.23) (0.52) (0.02) (0.02) [0.84] [0.86]
GMM2 −0.17 1.63 0.01 0.06 0.83 1.97 4.43 0.09 1.04 0.01 0.05 0.93 1.02 0.80
(0.30) (0.61) (0.02) (0.02) [0.22] (0.22) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) [0.85]
FMB −0.22 1.60 0.01 0.07 0.84 1.87 4.47 0.07 0.95 0.01 0.05 0.93 1.02 0.84
(0.26) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) [0.22] (0.20) (0.41) (0.02) (0.02) [0.84]
[0.24] [0.49] [0.01] [0.02] [0.18] [0.39] [0.02] [0.02]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2 α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 −0.01 0.98 −0.32 0.78 −0.01 0.95 −0.51 0.75
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07)
P2 −0.02 0.99 −0.21 0.79 −0.01 1.01 −0.18 0.82
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
P3 0.01 1.03 −0.07 0.84 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.86
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
P4 0.01 1.07 0.15 0.84 0.01 1.00 0.16 0.83
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
P5 0.03 0.94 0.45 0.71 0.02 1.05 0.53 0.79
(0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Table 3.3: Asset Pricing: Global Imbalance Risk. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for the linear factor model based on the dollar (DOL)
and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. The test assets are excess returns to five currency (FX) portfolios sorted on the one-month forward premia. Panel A
reports GMM (first and second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB) estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard errors are reported in brackets.
χ2 denotes the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan
(1997) distance (with simulated p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Panel B reports least-squares estimates of time
series regressions with Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum and adjusted for transaction
costs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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I focus attention on the sign and the statistical significance of λNA, the mar-
ket price of risk attached to the global imbalance risk factor. I find a positive and
significant estimate of λNA. The global imbalance risk premium is 7 percent per
annum for all countries, and 5 percent per annum for developed countries when I use
the first-stage GMM and the FMB procedure. The results remain largely unaf-
fected when using the second-stage GMM, with only a small shift downwards in the
point estimate of the factor risk price for all countries (6 percent per annum). For
this set of currencies, however, the RMSE increases from 187 to 197 basis points
when moving from GMM1 to GMM2. A positive estimate of the factor price of risk
implies higher risk premia for currency portfolios whose returns comove positively
with the global imbalance factor, and lower risk premia for currency portfolios ex-
hibiting a negative covariance with the global imbalance factor. The standard errors
of the risk prices are approximately equal to 2 percent for all estimation methods.
Overall, the risk price is more than two standard deviations from zero, and thus
highly statistically significant. I also uncover strong cross-sectional fit with R2s of
more than 80 percent for the full sample of countries, and 90 percent for the subset
of developed countries. Further support in favor of these results comes from the fact
that I are unable to reject the null hypotheses that the cross-sectional pricing errors
are jointly equal to zero and that the HJ distance is equal to zero. The p-values of
the χ2 test statistics and HJ distance are large for both samples of countries.
The DOL factor has a risk price of 1 percent per annum, in line with the
findings of Lustig et al. (2011). Since all currency portfolios have a time-series
βDOL close to one, this factor does not have power in explaining the cross-sectional
variation in currency excess returns. Indeed, I record a standard error approximately
twice as large as the estimated price of risk. Although the DOL factor does not
explain any of the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns, it is important
for the level of average returns: there is no need to add a constant in the cross-
sectional regression as the DOL factor serves as the constant. Therefore, the strong
explanatory power is delivered entirely by HMLNA.
18
Time-Series Regressions. In Panel B of Table 3.3, I report the least squares
estimates obtained from running time-series regressions of currency excess returns
on a constant and risk factors for each of the five currency portfolios (for j = 1, . . . , 5)
RXjFX,t+1 = α
j + βjDOLDOLt+1 + β
j
NAHMLNA,t+1 + ε
j
t+1.
18Appendix Figure B.3 shows graphically the fit of the model. I plot the actual average excess
returns along the vertical axis and the fitted average excess returns implied by the model along the
horizontal axis. The model-predicted excess returns lie very close to the 45 degree line, suggesting
that global imbalance risk explains the spread in average carry trade returns reasonably well, both
for all countries (left panel) and developed countries (right panel).
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This exercise allows me to clearly identify which of the currency portfolios provide
a hedge against global imbalance risk. The estimate of the betas for the DOL
factor are essentially all equal to one as this factor does not capture any of the
dispersion in average excess returns across currency portfolios. The estimates of the
betas for the global imbalance risk factor βNA, are positive for currencies with a
high forward premium (high interest rate differential), and negative for currencies
with a low forward premium (low interest rate differential). These betas increase
monotonically for all countries from −0.32 for the first portfolio to 0.45 for the
last portfolio. Results for developed countries are largely comparable. Finally, the
last column reports the time-series R2s, which range from 71 to 84 percent for all
countries, and from 75 to 86 percent for developed countries.
I also investigate whether the unconditional betas in Panel B are determined
by the covariance between spot exchange rate returns and risk factors, or between
interest rate differentials and risk factors. This is important because the conditional
covariance between the currency excess returns and the global imbalance risk fac-
tor is only driven by the exchange rate return as Covt[RX
j
FX,t+1, HMLNA,t+1] =
−Covt[(St+1 − St) /St, HMLNA,t+1]. Hence, I also regress discrete exchange rate
returns on DOL and HMLNA for each portfolio, and find that the estimates of
these betas are largely comparable to the betas (when multiplied by minus one)
reported in Panel B. These estimates of betas (times minus one) move from −0.31
(Portfolio 1) to 0.43 (Portfolio 5) for the full sample of countries, and from −0.50
(Portfolio 1) to 0.55 (Portfolio 5) for the subsample of developed countries.
Overall, investors demand a premium for holding high-yielding currencies
(high forward premia) because these currencies are associated with large global
imbalance risk, whereas they accept a low return for holding low-yielding currencies
as these currencies provide a hedge against global imbalance risk.19
Carry Trade versus External Imbalances Portfolios. I now present further
evidence on the relationship between carry trade and external imbalances portfolios
by running the following time-series regressions
RXjFX,t+1 = α
j + βRXjNA,t+1 + ε
j
t+1
where RXjFX denotes the excess return of the j-th carry trade portfolio (i.e., FX
portfolios), and RXjNA is the excess return of the j-th external imbalances portfolio
(i.e., NA portfolios). Table 3.4 reports the least squares estimates of these regres-
19In Appendix Table B.1, I present the analogous results when the excess returns to the test
assets exclude transaction costs. While in Appendix Table B.2, I replace the test assets with the
five external imbalance portfolios.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 HML P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 HML
All Countries Developed Countries
α −1.51 −2.10 1.76 0.41 2.20 3.68 −1.27 −0.09 −0.15 0.25 1.53 2.50
(0.80) (0.80) (1.06) (1.18) (1.19) (1.42) (1.06) (0.98) (1.06) (1.06) (1.21) (1.68)
β 0.89 0.75 0.93 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.84 0.77 0.86 0.85 0.92 1.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.10)
R2 0.77 0.74 0.60 0.54 0.60 0.29 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.38
LM3 5.39 3.30 6.10 2.17 3.51 2.62 1.23 3.20 13.49 1.93 3.78 2.98
[0.15] [0.35] [0.11] [0.54] [0.32] [0.45] [0.75] [0.36] [0.00] [0.59] [0.29] [0.40]
ρ83−11 0.88 0.86 0.77 0.74 0.78 0.54 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.62
ρ83−97 0.89 0.87 0.65 0.59 0.70 0.44 0.87 0.89 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.54
ρ98−11 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.66 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.71
Table 3.4: Carry Trade versus External Imbalances Portfolios. The table presents least squares estimates of regressing FX portfolios’ excess returns on NA
portfolios’ excess returns. The FX portfolios are obtained by grouping currencies into five portfolios using the one-month forward premia at time t − 1. The NA
portfolios are obtained by sorting currencies into five groups using countries’ external imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in
domestic currency at time t−1. LMp, indicates the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to p lags. ρ denotes the
sample correlation. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses, and p-values in brackets. Excess
returns are expressed in percentage per annum, and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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sions for j = 1, 2, . . . , 5, and suggests that carry trade returns are systematically
related to the external imbalances portfolios. Carry trade funding currencies are
associated with net creditor nations whereas carry trade investment currencies are
linked to net debtor nations. Estimates of β are all statistically different from zero
and are in the range between 0.75 and 0.93 for all countries, and 0.77 and 1.05
for developed countries. I also report estimates of α in percent per annum. For
developed countries, estimates of α are always statistically insignificant, suggesting
that risk exposure to external imbalances fully explains the time-series variation in
currency portfolio returns. For all countries, I find that 4 out of 5 estimates of α are
statistically insignificant. These results are corroborated by the R2, which ranges
from 54 to 77 percent for all countries, and from 66 to 72 percent for developed
countries. In addition to the R2, I also report the correlation for the full sample
and two subsamples. I find that the relationship between carry trade portfolios
and the external imbalances portfolios has improved, especially for all countries,
over time. This higher degree of comovement between the two sets of portfolios in
the second half of the sample is not surprising as it reflects less stringent capital
controls as well as an increase in trading activity for some of the emerging market
currencies. In short, all five FX and NA portfolio returns tend to move together.20
From the perspective of HML factors, I find a strong positive correlation between
HMLNA and HMLFX ranging from 54 percent for all countries to 62 percent for
developed countries, suggesting that the strength of the asset pricing results is not
artificially driven by the underlying factor structure of currency returns. Lewellen
et al. (2010) show that a strong factor structure in test asset returns can give rise
to misleading results in empirical work. If the risk factor has a small (but non-zero)
correlation with the ‘true’ factor, the cross-sectional R2 could still be high suggesting
an impressive model fit. Here, I show that the correlation between the factor and
HMLFX is indeed reasonably high and has improved over the last decade.
Portfolios based on HMLNA Betas. I provide evidence of the explanatory
power of the global imbalance risk factor for currency excess returns from a dif-
ferent viewpoint. I form portfolios based on an individual currency’s exposure to
global imbalance risk, and investigate whether these portfolios have similar return
distributions to portfolios sorted on forward premia. If global imbalance risk is a
priced factor, then currencies sorted according to their exposure to global imbalance
20Appendix Table B.4 reports the portfolio composition of FX and NA, portfolios. Panel A
(Panel B) reports the top six currencies for each of the FX (NA) portfolios. Panel C reports the
probability that a given currency enters simultaneously in the same FX and NA portfolio. For
corner portfolios, this probability ranges from 45 to 36 percent for all countries and from 44 to 35
percent for developed countries.
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risk should yield a cross section of portfolios with a significant spread in average cur-
rency returns. Currencies that hedge global imbalance risk should trade at a forward
discount, whereas currencies that provide exposure to global imbalance risk should
trade at a forward premium.
I regress individual currency excess returns at time t on a constant and the
global imbalance risk factor using a 36-month rolling window that ends in period
t − 1, and denote this slope coefficient as βiNA,t. This exercise provides currency i
exposure to HMLNA only using information available at time t. I then rank cur-
rencies according to βiNA,t and allocate them to five portfolios at time t. Portfolio
1 contains the currencies with the largest negative exposure to the global imbal-
ance factor (lowest betas), while Portfolio 5 contains the most positively exposed
currencies (highest betas). Table 3.5 summarizes the descriptive statistics for these
portfolios. I find that buying currencies with a low beta (i.e., insurance against
global imbalance risk) yields a significantly lower return than currencies with a high
beta (i.e., high exposure to global imbalance risk). The spread between the last
portfolio and the first portfolio is around 3 percent per annum for all countries
and 5 percent per annum for developed countries. Average excess returns generally
increase, albeit not always monotonically, when moving from the first to the last
portfolio. I also find that beta-sorted portfolios have a skewness pattern similar to
the currency portfolios in Table 3.2. High beta currencies show a greater propensity
to experience large return drawdowns than low beta currencies. Moreover, I also
find a clear monotonic increase in both average pre-formation and post-formation
betas when moving from Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 5: they line up perfectly well with
the cross-section of average excess returns in Table 3.2. Average pre-formation be-
tas vary from −0.32 to 1.19 for all countries, and from −1.04 to 0.62 for developed
countries. Post-formation betas are calculated by regressing realized excess returns
of beta-sorted portfolio j on DOL and HMLNA. These figures range from −0.36
to 0.26 for all countries, and from −0.58 to 0.57 for developed countries. Overall,
these results confirm that global imbalance risk is important for understanding the
cross-section of currency excess returns.
The Relation between HMLNA, HMLFX and V OLFX . Lustig et al. (2011)
contribute to the literature in two respects. First, they show that currency excess
returns are not a free lunch but can be understood as compensation for time-varying
risk. Second, they find that the cross-sectional dispersion in currency excess returns
can be explained by one global risk factor. In a similar vein, Menkhoff et al. (2012)
use volatility innovations and construct a volatility factor V OLFX to price the
cross-section of currency excess returns. In a horse race analysis, they conclude that
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML
All Countries Developed Countries
Mean −0.56 2.07 2.17 1.92 2.27 1.57 2.84 −0.21 2.37 1.00 1.69 4.52 1.87 4.73
Med 0.07 2.34 3.81 2.39 3.94 3.09 4.78 −0.10 3.55 3.36 3.51 6.25 3.42 5.32
Sdev 7.29 7.99 8.63 9.46 9.46 7.15 9.76 9.89 10.25 10.02 9.15 10.04 8.51 10.94
Skew −0.88 −0.26 −0.84 −0.59 −0.99 −0.61 −0.43 −0.20 −0.39 −0.31 −0.82 −0.83 −0.40 −0.23
Kurt 8.73 4.91 5.38 4.82 6.79 4.76 5.66 3.77 3.92 3.93 5.08 7.75 4.04 4.25
AC1 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11
SR −0.08 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.29 −0.02 0.23 0.10 0.18 0.45 0.22 0.43
MDD −52.8 −28.7 −22.9 −33.8 −36.7 −31.3 −27.7 −55.4 −42.8 −42.3 −36.2 −36.0 −36.2 −37.5
pre-fp −0.74 0.90 2.01 2.34 4.08 −1.40 0.08 1.17 1.52 2.83
post-fp −0.73 0.89 1.99 2.37 3.99 −1.37 0.06 1.19 1.50 2.76
pre-β −0.32 0.03 0.45 0.72 1.19 −1.04 −0.62 −0.36 0.00 0.62
[0.44] [0.55] [0.72] [0.79] [0.79] [0.98] [0.94] [0.86] [0.67] [0.59]
post-β −0.36 −0.31 −0.03 0.03 0.26 −0.58 −0.14 0.04 0.17 0.57
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Freq 8.0 11.3 16.0 18.9 9.0 8.1 14.6 15.8 11.5 4.3
Table 3.5: Portfolios Sorted on Betas. The table presents descriptive statistics of β-sorted currency portfolios. Each β is obtained by regressing individual
currency excess returns on the global imbalance risk factor (HMLNA) using a 36-month moving window that ends in period t − 1. Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the top
20% of all currencies with the lowest betas whereas Portfolio 5 (P5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with the highest betas. DOL denotes the average return
of the five currency portfolios. HML denotes a long-short strategy that buys P5 and sells P1. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum. The table also
reports the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC1), the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR), the maximum drawdown (MDD) in percent, the pre- and post-formation
βs, and the pre- and post-formation forward premia (fp), and the frequency of portfolio switches (Freq). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and standard
deviations in brackets. The sample runs from October 1983 to December 2011, and comprises 338 observations.
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HMLFX and V OLFX are equally powerful at pricing the cross-section of currency
portfolios, confirming that carry trade returns are compensation for time-varying
risk and there exists only one global risk factor. In this section I compare the global
imbalance risk factor to HMLFX and V OLFX , ultimately to show that the global
imbalance risk is able to replicate their information content for the purpose of pricing
carry trade returns.
I first consider horse races between the global imbalance risk factor and the
HMLFX of Lustig et al. (2011) using three different specifications: i) I include
DOL, HMLNA, and HMLFX jointly in the pricing kernel, ii) I include all three
factors but orthogonalize HMLFX with respect to HMLNA (i.e., HML
⊥
FX), and
iii) I include all three factors but orthogonalize HMLNA with respect to HMLFX
(i.e., HML⊥NA). In the first specification, the global imbalance factor and the slope
factor are correlated. In this case, I examine, as suggested by Cochrane (2005), the
statistical significance of the factor loadings bs rather than the statistical significance
of the factor risk premia λs, to test whether a factor is marginally useful in pricing
assets given the presence of another factor. However, as shown in Panel A of Table
3.6, I find that the SDF slopes (bNA and bFX) of both factors turn insignificant, and
neither factor is able to drive out the other. This result is confirmed for both sets of
countries. In the second and third specifications I acknowledge that HMLFX and
HMLNA are correlated and attempt to mitigate the effect of multicollinearity by
simply orthogonalizing one factor against the other. The goal of these exercises is to
test whether the orthogonal components of either factor is priced, while avoiding the
statistical inference problem that multicollinearity may cause. Moving along Panel
A, it can be seen that neither HML⊥FX nor HML
⊥
NA is priced in the cross-section
of carry trade returns, thus suggesting that HMLNA replicates HMLFX reason-
ably well and there is no additional information in HMLFX that is not captured
by HMLNA. In Panel B of Table 3.6, I present comparisons between the global
imbalance risk factor HMLNA, and the V OLFX factor of Menkhoff et al. (2012).
I find that HMLNA is largely comparable to V OLFX as HMLNA reproduces the
pricing information content of V OLFX . In essence, the discussion of the results in
Panel A applies also to the results in Panel B.
Yearly Rebalanced Portfolios. In Table 3.7 I present cross-sectional asset pric-
ing tests for the full sample of countries when portfolio returns and risk factors are
rebalanced at the end of each year. In Panel A, the test assets are five currency port-
folios sorted on the one-year forward premia while DOL and HMLNA act as risk
factors. I replace HMLNA with HMLFX in Panel B, and HMLNA with V OLFX
in Panel C. The market price of global imbalance risk λNA is equal to 5 percent
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Panel A: HMLNA vs. HMLFX
DOL HMLNA HMLFX R
2 HJ DOL HMLNA HML
⊥
FX R
2 HJ DOL HML⊥NA HMLFX R
2 HJ
All Countries
b −0.04 0.54 0.42 0.87 0.14 −0.04 1.33 1.89 0.87 0.14 −0.04 0.70 0.71 0.87 0.14
(0.39) (1.40) (0.54) [0.08] (0.39) (0.64) (2.44) [0.08] (0.39) (1.80) (0.34) [0.08]
λ 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Developed Countries
b 0.07 0.18 0.29 0.94 0.06 0.07 0.83 1.73 0.94 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.37 0.94 0.06
(0.23) (2.35) (0.89) [0.70] (0.23) (0.60) (5.27) [0.70] (0.23) (2.83) (0.27) [0.70]
λ 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02)
Panel B: HMLNA vs. V OLFX
DOL HMLNA V OLFX R
2 HJ DOL HMLNA V OL
⊥
FX R
2 HJ DOL HML⊥NA V OLFX R
2 HJ
All Countries
b −0.09 2.54 1.14 0.87 0.14 −0.09 1.99 1.40 0.87 0.14 −0.09 1.12 −1.19 0.87 0.14
(0.35) (1.70) (1.71) [0.23] (0.35) (0.99) (2.11) [0.23] (0.35) (0.75) (0.59) [0.23]
λ 0.01 0.10 −0.02 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.12 −0.07
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03)
Developed Countries
b 0.16 1.68 0.87 0.99 0.03 0.16 1.28 1.05 0.99 0.03 0.16 0.79 −0.80 0.99 0.03
(0.25) (0.95) (1.04) [0.93] (0.25) (0.61) (1.27) [0.93] (0.25) (0.45) (0.38) [0.93]
λ 0.01 0.07 −0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.08 −0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
Table 3.6: Asset Pricing: HMLNA, HMLFX , and V OLFX . Panel A presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for the linear factor model based on the dollar
(DOL), the global imbalance (HMLNA), and the slope (HMLFX) risk factor. HML
⊥
NA (HML
⊥
FX) denotes a factor orthogonalized with the respect to HMLFX
(HMLNA). In Panel B, I replace HMLFX with the global volatility (V OLFX) risk factor. The test assets are excess returns to five currency (FX) portfolios sorted
on the one-month forward premia. The table reports first-stage estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses. χ2 denotes the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the
null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with simulated p-value in parentheses) for the null
hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced
monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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Panel A: Global Imbalance Factor (HMLNA)
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
GMM1 −1.83 9.10 0.01 0.05 0.71 1.85 1.04 0.28
(2.04) (4.77) (0.02) (0.02) [0.79] [0.82]
GMM2 −2.05 9.94 0.01 0.05 0.69 1.90 0.99
(2.01) (4.28) (0.02) (0.02) [0.80]
FMB −1.76 8.78 0.01 0.05 0.71 1.85 1.10
(2.19) (3.88) (0.02) (0.02) [0.78]
[2.38] [4.48] [0.02] [0.02]
Panel B: Slope Factor (HMLFX)
bDOL bFX λDOL λFX R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
GMM1 0.37 1.04 0.01 0.03 0.55 2.29 3.86 0.47
(2.13) (1.56) (0.02) (0.04) [0.28] [0.43]
GMM2 0.37 1.96 0.02 0.07 −0.22 3.96 3.43
(2.09) (1.45) (0.02) (0.04) [0.33]
FMB 0.36 1.01 0.01 0.03 0.55 2.29 3.91
(1.98) (1.40) (0.02) (0.04) [0.27]
[2.05] [1.26] [0.02] [0.03]
Panel C: Global Volatility Factor (V OLFX)
bDOL bV OL λDOL λV OL R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
GMM1 −0.91 −6.12 0.01 −0.04 0.71 1.85 3.62 0.45
(2.83) (7.41) (0.02) (0.03) [0.31] [0.54]
GMM2 −1.59 −7.64 0.01 −0.04 0.70 1.86 3.48
(2.29) (4.48) (0.02) (0.03) [0.32]
FMB −0.88 −5.90 0.01 −0.04 0.71 1.85 3.66
(2.22) (4.02) (0.02) (0.03) [0.30]
[2.55] [5.58] [0.02] [0.04]
Table 3.7: Asset Pricing: Yearly Rebalanced Portfolios. The table presents cross-sectional asset
pricing results when currency portfolios are rebalanced yearly. The test assets are excess returns to five
currency (FX) portfolios sorted on the one-year forward premia. In Panel A, the linear factor model
comprises the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. HMLNA is replaced by the
slope (HMLFX) risk factor in Panel B, and by the global volatility (V OLFX) risk factor in Panel C. The
table reports GMM (first and second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB) estimates of the factor loadings
b, the market price of risk λ, and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with
Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard errors
are reported in brackets. χ2 denotes the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis
that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with
simulated p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Excess returns
are expressed in percentage per annum and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced
yearly from December 1983 to December 2011, and are based on currencies from all countries.
per annum and is statistically significant. The result is invariant to the estimation
technique, and is further confirmed by a cross-sectional R2 revolving around 70
percent. In contrast, the market price of risk attached to the slope factor λFX and
the global volatility factor λV OL are both statistically insignificant. In terms of
economic significance, I find that HJ distances – the maximum mispricing possible
per unit of standard deviation – of HMLFX (47%) and V OLFX (45%) are larger
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than the HJ distance of HMLNA (28%). Thus, global imbalance risk seems to
outperform both the slope factor and the global volatility factor in terms of smaller
pricing errors.21 Overall, these results suggest that HMLNA has a strong ability
to price carry trade portfolios across rebalancing frequencies. This is more than
a trivial mechanical statement, as manifested by the weak pricing performance of
HMLFX and V OLFX at this lower frequency.
3.6 Further Analysis
In this section, I present a battery of additional exercises that support the risk-based
interpretation of currency excess returns proposed in the previous section.
Removing Illiquid Currencies. Table 3.8 displays the cross-sectional asset pric-
ing results when currencies with limited liquidity are removed from the pool of
available currencies. Using the latest Bank for International Settlements, I select
the top 20 most liquid currencies and name this sample ‘developed and emerging
countries’.22 I hypothesize that while forward rates may be available for a large
number of currencies, there would have been low liquidity in many of them. Ad-
ditionally, the imposition of capital controls in a number of the emerging market
nations would have made it almost impossible to engage in a carry trade strategy in
the FX market. If this is the case, I would anticipate that the asset pricing results
for a limited subset of the most liquid currencies would show an improvement over
and above the full sample. In addition I would expect the link between HMLNA
and HMLFX to grow stronger once I exclude the most illiquid currencies. The
economic intuition is that while on paper higher interest rates are exploitable, the
market reality may be very different and could result in a situation of observed high
interest rates but no significant movement in net foreign assets. In Panel A I re-
port cross-sectional asset pricing results. I find a market price of risk for HMLNA
equal to approximately 6 percent per annum, in line with the earlier results for all
countries and developed countries. Moreover, the standard error remains around 2
percent per annum, resulting in λNA being highly statistically significant. Again I
find a DOL price of risk of around 1 percent per annum but, as before, this risk
21Note that the HJ distance - the least-square distance between a given pricing kernel and
the closest point in the set of the pricing kernels that can price the base assets correctly - is
estimated using the standard GMM procedure where the weighting matrix is simply the inverse
of the covariance matrix of the asset returns. I cannot use the optimal weighting matrix for model
comparisons as the weights are specific to each model. In contrast, the inverse of the covariance
matrix of asset returns is invariant across models, so that the HJ distance offers a uniform measure
across different models.
22This is the set of currencies employed by Deutsche Bank for its global carry trade (Global
Currency Harvest) strategy. Appendix Table B.5 reports the descriptive statistics for this set of
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
GMM1 −0.03 0.91 0.01 0.06 0.80 1.94 3.33 0.12
(0.25) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02) [0.34] [0.48]
GMM2 0.07 1.15 0.01 0.06 0.79 1.98 2.83
(0.23) (0.44) (0.02) (0.02) [0.42]
FMB −0.03 0.91 0.01 0.06 0.80 1.94 3.33
(0.21) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) [0.34]
[0.20] [0.37] [0.02] [0.02]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 0.01 0.95 −0.41 0.78
(0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
P2 −0.01 1.00 −0.15 0.83
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
P3 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.87
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
P4 −0.01 1.11 0.10 0.85
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
P5 0.02 0.96 0.45 0.70
(0.01) (0.09) (0.06)
Table 3.8: Asset Pricing: Liquid Currencies. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results
for the top 20 most liquid currencies - Developed and Emerging Countries. The linear factor model is based
on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. The test assets are excess returns to
five currency (FX) portfolios sorted on the one-month forward premia. Panel A reports GMM (first and
second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB) estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and
the cross-sectional R2. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection
are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard errors are reported in brackets. χ2 denotes
the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly
zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with simulated p-value in parentheses)
for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Panel B reports least-squares estimates of time
series regressions with Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses. Excess returns are expressed
in percentage per annum and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from
October 1983 to December 2011.
factor is not priced in the cross section. I find high p-values for the χ2 test statistic
suggesting that I cannot reject the null of zero pricing errors. In addition, I also
fail to reject the null that the HJ distance is equal to zero. In Panel B I find
similar results to the core results of Table 3.3: βDOL is approximately equal to one
for all portfolios and I see a monotonic increase in βNA from −0.41 in Portfolio 1
to 0.45 in Portfolio 5. The R2 statistics are all high, ranging from 70 percent to
87 percent. In Figure 3.3 I present the rolling one-year Sharpe ratio for HMLFX
and HMLNA based on developed and emerging countries. Strikingly, the two series
almost perfectly overlap.23
currencies.
23In a similar vein, I systematically remove from the full sample of currencies both pegged and
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Risk Reversal and Global Imbalance Risk. I also examine whether global
imbalance risk is manifested in the currency options market, i.e., debtor countries
with liabilities primarily in foreign currency are perceived to be riskier than cred-
itor countries with liabilities primarily in domestic currencies. Essentially, I take
currencies ranked by global imbalances (at time t) and document their risk-reversal
(at time t) rather than their excess returns (at time t + 1). I compute the risk re-
versal as the implied volatility of an out-of-the-money call option minus the implied
volatility of an equally out-of-the-money put option, scaled by the at-the-money
implied volatility in order to allow for a meaningful cross-currency comparison. The
risk reversal reflects the cost of a long position in a call with a short position in a
put, and it is widely used to quantify whether exchange rate returns are positively
or negatively skewed. A negative risk reversal typically suggests that the cost of
buying protection against foreign currency depreciation is more expensive than the
cost of providing insurance against foreign currency appreciation.
I use over-the-counter quotes from JP Morgan on 1-month at-the-money, 25-
delta call options and 25-delta put options from January 1996 to August 2011.24
The OTC currency option market is characterized by specific trading conventions,
and I refer to Della Corte, Sarno, and Tsiakas (2011) for a detailed description.
The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 3.4. The top panels display
the average risk-reversal of the five NA portfolios whereas the bottom panels present
the cumulative risk-reversals in the extreme NA portfolios. I find that risk reversals
follow exactly the pattern implied by global imbalances as the riskiest currency
in terms of global imbalance risk have a negative risk reversal whereas the safest
currencies in term of global imbalance risk present a positive risk reversal, thus
suggesting that the cost of insuring against foreign currency depreciation is more
expensive for the former relative to the latter.25
Real Returns. In Table 3.9, I show that the results are robust to inflation-
adjusted returns. At time t, I allocate currencies to five portfolios according to
their inflation-adjusted forward premia (Ft − St) /St −Et(pi∗t+1 − pit+1), where pi∗t+1
and pit+1 denote the one-month foreign and domestic inflation rates at time t+1,
crawling pegged currencies using the classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2009). The asset pricing results
remain qualitatively similar.
24The sample comprises 35 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Euro Area, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indone-
sia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, and United Kingdom.
25Appendix Figure B.4 reports a similar figure based on 10-delta options.
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Figure 3.3: Rolling Sharpe Ratios of Liquid Currencies. The figure presents the one-year rolling Sharpe ratios for the global imbalance
risk factor HMLNA (solid line) and the slope factor HMLFX (dashed line) when the top 20 most liquid currencies are selected (Developed and
Emerging Countries). Shaded areas are the NBER recession periods for the United States. The strategies are rebalanced monthly from October
1983 to December 2011.
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Figure 3.4: Risk Reversal and Global Imbalance Risk. The figure presents the one-
month risk reversal of the external imbalance portfolios. The risk reversal is computed as
the implied volatility of a 25-delta call minus the implied volatility of 25-delta put, scaled by
the at-the-money implied volatility. Implied volatility data are from JP Morgan and range
from January 1996 to August 2011.
respectively, and Et is the conditional expectations operator given information at
time t. This is equivalent to sorting currencies according to their real, rather than
nominal, interest rate differential. Since pi∗t+1 and pit+1 are not observed at time
t, I construct inflation forecasts by simply using current inflation, that is I set
Et(pi
∗
t+1−pit+1) = pi∗t −pit.26 Currencies with the lowest real interest rate differential
are assigned to Portfolio 1, whereas currencies with the highest real interest rate
differential are assigned to Portfolio 5. At time t + 1, for each currency portfolio
I compute either nominal excess returns (left panels) or inflation-adjusted excess
returns (right panels) using the inflation rate at time t+ 1 from the perspective of
the domestic investor. Note that I use the same DOL and HMLNA as in Table
3.3 as risk factors. Panel A reports cross-sectional results whereas Panel B displays
26While this assumption is obviously strong, it is empirically motivated since inflation is a very
persistent process and current inflation is highly correlated with future inflation at the monthly
frequency.
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
Nominal Excess Returns Real Excess Returns
GMM1 −0.27 1.86 0.01 0.08 0.95 0.69 0.80 0.04 −0.76 2.03 −0.02 0.08 0.95 0.68 0.88 0.05
(0.35) (0.90) (0.02) (0.03) [0.85] [0.93] (0.33) (0.91) (0.02) (0.03) [0.83] [0.90]
GMM2 −0.29 1.92 0.01 0.08 0.95 0.70 0.79 −0.82 2.05 −0.02 0.08 0.95 0.69 0.83
(0.34) (0.78) (0.02) (0.03) [0.85] (0.32) (0.77) (0.02) (0.03) [0.84]
FMB −0.26 1.85 0.01 0.08 0.95 0.69 0.80 −0.75 2.03 −0.02 0.08 0.95 0.68 0.88
(0.27) (0.6) (0.02) (0.03) [0.85] (0.28) (0.60) (0.02) (0.03) [0.84]
[0.26] [0.64] [0.01] [0.03] [0.26] [0.65] [0.01] [0.03]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2 α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 0.01 0.85 0.02 0.64 −0.02 0.86 0.02 0.64
(0.01) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07)
P2 −0.01 1.01 −0.22 0.86 −0.04 1.01 −0.22 0.85
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
P3 0.01 1.06 −0.09 0.85 −0.03 1.07 −0.09 0.85
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
P4 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.79 −0.03 1.01 0.06 0.79
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
P5 0.02 1.05 0.28 0.77 −0.01 1.05 0.28 0.77
(0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.08)
Table 3.9: Asset Pricing: Test Assets Sorted by Real Interest Rates. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for the linear factor model based
on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factors. The test assets are nominal excess returns (left-hand side) and real excess returns (right-hand
side) to five currency (FX) portfolios sorted on the one-month inflation-adjusted forward premia (real interest rate differentials). Panel A reports GMM (first and
second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB) estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and West (1987) standard
errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard errors are reported in brackets. χ2 denotes the test
statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with
simulated p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Panel B reports least-squares estimates of time series regressions with
Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are
rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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time-series estimates. The global imbalance risk premium remains positive and
statistically different from zero: the estimate of λNA is about 8 percent per annum
for both nominal and real returns, and strongly statistically significant. The cross-
sectional R2 remains high, at around 95 percent for both sets of test assets, and I
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the pricing errors are zero as well as the null
hypothesis that the HJ distance is zero. The DOL risk factor is still not priced in
the cross section but turns negative when pricing the real excess returns, possibly
indicating the existence of a small inflation premium within DOL. Overall, these
results are largely comparable to the core findings in Table 3.3. I confirm higher
risk premia for currency portfolios whose returns comove positively with the global
imbalance factor, and lower risk premia for currency portfolios exhibiting a negative
covariance with the global imbalance factor.
Individual Currencies. Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2010) argue that forming port-
folios may potentially destroy information by shrinking the dispersion of betas. In
Table 3.10 I deal with this concern and present cross-sectional asset pricing tests
with individual currency excess returns as test assets. As risk factors, I continue to
use the same factors employed in the core analysis. Since the set of currencies is
now unbalanced, I only report estimates of time-series betas, market prices of risk,
and factor loadings obtained via FMB regressions. Also, since country-level excess
returns, especially for currencies with limited trading activity, may be contaminated
by outliers, least square estimates can be severely distorted and fail to deliver unbi-
ased estimates. I deal with this problem by using the least absolute deviation (LAD)
estimator which is robust to thick-tailed errors and is not sensitive to atypical data
points (Bassett and Koenker, 1978; Koenker and Bassett, Jr., 1982). In short, I use
the FMB procedure with robust regressions in the first and second step to account
for outliers in individual currency excess returns. I report bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses.27
In Panel A the test assets are excess returns constructed as long positions
in foreign currencies irrespective of the level of interest rates. Note that these
individual currency excess returns are not adjusted for transaction costs as ex-ante
I ignore whether an investor should buy or sell the foreign currency. I refer to
27To calculate bootstrapped standard errors, I simulate yi,t = αi + βift + εi,t and ft = µ +∑p
i=1Aift−i + ut, where yi,t is the excess return on the i-th currency, αi is the constant, βi is
the vector of factor loadings, ft denotes the risk factors following a p-order VAR process, εi,t are
idiosyncratic residuals, and ut ∼ N(0,Σ). I estimate this system, and use the parameter estimates
to generate 1, 000 time-series by jointly resampling εi,t and ut. Since the panel is unbalanced, I
carefully resample the same dates across all individual currencies, and then remove the missing
values before running FMB regressions.
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these excess returns as unconditional excess returns. On the left-hand side, the
pricing kernel includes the DOL and HMLNA as risk factors. The market price
of global imbalance risk is positive and statistically significant: λNA ranges from 5
percent per annum for the set of developed countries to 8 percent per annum for
the full set of countries, and these figures are largely comparable to the estimates
reported in Table 3.3. The cross-sectional R2 is reasonably high, ranging from 72
percent for developed countries to 40 percent for all countries, but lower than the
R2 for portfolio returns. This is expected as individual excess returns are far more
noisy than portfolio returns. Moving along Panel A, I present results for DOL
and HMLFX as risk factors. The market price of slope risk is positive but not
always statistically significant. The point estimate of λFX ranges from 5 percent per
annum for developed countries to 9 percent per annum for developed and emerging
countries, and is statistically significant only in the latter case when I consider the
bootstrapped standard errors. On the right-hand side, the pricing kernel includes the
DOL and V OLFX as risk factors. Here, I uncover statistically significant estimates
of λV OL in two out of the three sets of countries.
In Panel B I use as test assets excess returns managed on the basis of in-
terest rate differentials: the U.S. investor buys the foreign currency and sells the
U.S. dollar when the forward premium is positive and vice versa (i.e., RXt+1 =
γ (Ft − St+1) /St, where γ = 1 when Ft > St, and γ = −1 when Ft < St). Results
remain largely comparable to the previous panel. In Figure 3.5, I present the fit of
the asset pricing model for country-level excess returns for the full set of currencies.
I plot the actual average excess returns along the vertical axis, and the average
excess returns predicted by DOL and HMLNA along the horizontal axis. On the
vertical axis, I use unconditional excess returns on the left-hand side chart, and
conditional excess returns on the right-hand side chart. The symbols refer to de-
veloped countries (solid circle), emerging countries (solid plus), and other countries
(diamond). The model-predicted excess returns lie very close to the 45 degree line,
suggesting that global imbalance risk explains the spread in average excess returns
reasonably well for most of the countries.28
Determinants of Exchange Rate Returns. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) point
out that global imbalances are a key driver of exchange rates. In Gabaix and Mag-
giori (2013), exchange rates are jointly determined by global imbalances and fi-
nanciers’ risk-bearing capacity. I empirically test these predictions in Table 3.11
where I present results of a panel regression exercise with fixed-effects. The left-
28There are of course some exceptions, such as Brazil (BRL), Slovakia (SKK), Turkey (TRY),
and Venezuela (VEF).
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Panel A: Unconditional Excess Returns
λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE λDOL λFX R
2 RMSE λDOL λV OL R
2 RMSE
All Countries
0.03 0.08 0.40 25.2 0.03 0.06 0.51 22.9 0.02 −0.12 0.46 24.0
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
Developed & Emerging Countries
0.03 0.08 0.64 11.8 0.03 0.09 0.54 13.5 0.02 −0.16 0.36 15.9
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
Developed Countries
0.02 0.05 0.72 4.8 0.02 0.05 0.32 6.7 0.02 −0.14 0.54 5.5
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08)
Panel B: Conditional Excess Returns
λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE λDOL λFX R
2 RMSE λDOL λV OL R
2 RMSE
All Countries
0.04 0.08 0.24 28.9 0.04 0.12 0.29 27.8 0.04 −0.14 0.23 29.3
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
Developed & Emerging Countries
0.04 0.10 0.37 15.3 0.04 0.13 0.18 17.6 0.04 −0.22 0.17 18.7
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10)
Developed Countries
0.03 0.06 0.46 8.0 0.04 0.13 −0.28 11.0 0.03 −0.22 0.30 11.9
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.13)
Table 3.10: Asset Pricing: Individual Currencies. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for individual currencies. The linear factor model
includes the dollar (DOL), the global imbalance (HMLNA), the slope (HMLFX), and the global volatility (V OLFX) risk factor. Panel A (Panel B) employs
unconditional (conditional) excess returns as test assets. The unconditional excess return for a given currency pair is computed as RXt+1 = (Ft − St+1) /St, where St
denotes the spot exchange rate and Ft is the one-month forward rate. The conditional excess return is calculated as RXt+1 = γ × (Ft − St+1) /St, where γ = 1 when
Ft > St (foreign interest rate is higher than U.S. interest rate) and γ = −1 when Ft < St (foreign interest rate is lower than U.S. interest rate). The table reports
estimates of the market price of risk λ, the cross-sectional R2 and the root mean squared error (RMSE) obtained via Fama-MacBeth procedure with robust regressions
in the first and second step to account for outliers in individual currency excess returns. Bootstrapped standard errors obtained via 1,000 repetitions are reported in
parentheses. The currencies are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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Figure 3.5: Pricing Errors of Individual Currencies. The figure presents cross-sectional pricing
errors for the linear factor model based on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance risk (HMLNA) factor.
The test assets are country-level unconditional (left-hand side) and conditional (right-hand side) excess
returns. The symbols denote the pricing errors of developed countries (solid circle), emerging countries
(solid plus), and other countries (diamond). Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum. The
strategies are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
hand-side variable is the monthly exchange rate return. Remember that exchange
rates are defined as units of foreign currency per unit of U.S. dollar and a posi-
tive return indicates foreign currency depreciation. As right-hand-side variables, I
employ the net foreign assets to GDP ratio lagged by 12 months and the interest
rate spread lagged by 1 month. In addition, I also allow for an interaction term
between the former variables and the change in the VIX index (column 1), and the
TED spread (column 2).29 The VIX index is often used as a proxy for global risk
appetite whereas the TED spread is frequently used to proxy funding illiquidity. In
the exercise, these measures proxy the willingness and the ability of financiers to
absorb exchange rate risk.
For All countries, the interaction term between net foreign assets and the
change in VIX (as well as the change in TED spread) is significant at the 1 percent
significance level with the correct sign. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Gabaix and Maggiori (2014), currencies depreciate
for net debtor countries especially when risk-bearing capacity is low, i.e., global
risk appetite is high and funding liquidity constraints are binding. For Developed
countries, I find that foreign assets and the change in VIX are both significant at
the 1 percent significance level with the correct sign, although the interaction term
is not significant. Overall, this exercise provides further supportive evidence that
global imbalances and risk-bearing capacity are important factors driving exchange
rate fluctuations.
29I also add a constant and the lagged exchange rate return as a control variable.
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All Countries Developed Countries
(1) (2) (1) (2)
NFA/GDP (lagged 12 months) −0.014 0.021 −0.861c −0.609c
[−0.15] [0.22] [−4.66] [−3.86]
Interest Rate Spread (lagged 1 month) 0.408c 0.257 −0.055 −0.403a
[4.02] [1.53] [−0.21] [−2.11]
Change in VIX 0.172c 0.112c
[8.23] [3.71]
NFA/GDP (lagged 12 months) × Change in VIX −0.069c −0.074
[−3.26] [−1.13]
Interest Rate Spread (lagged 1 month) × Change in VIX 0.036 0.131
[1.11] [1.09]
Change in TED Spread 0.770c 0.014
[2.89] [0.04]
NFA/GDP (lagged 12 months) × Change in TED Spread −0.907c −0.818
[−2.73] [−0.87]
Interest Rate Spread (lagged 1 month) × Change in TED Spread 0.007 2.098
[0.01] [1.17]
Additional Variables: Constant and lagged exchange rate returns Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
Observations 7045 7860 2933 3557
Table 3.11: Determinants of Exchange Rate Returns. The table presents a fixed-effects panel regression results. We regress monthly exchange rate returns
on macroeconomic and financial variables in addition to a constant and the lagged exchange rate returns. Exchange rates are from Datastream, and defined as units
of foreign currency per U.S. dollar such that a positive return denotes foreign currency depreciation. Yearly data on GDP and net foreign assets (NFA) are from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Interest rate spreads are computed via covered interest rate parity using spot and forward exchange rates. The VIX index is collected
from the Chicago Board of Options Exchange whereas the TED Spread is collected from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Data on the
VIX is available from 1990 onwards, while data on the TED Spread is available from 1986 onwards. Robust standard errors are clustered at country level. We report
t-statistics in brackets. The superscripts a, b and c denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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3.7 Conclusions
The large and sudden depreciation of high-interest currencies in the aftermath of the
Lehman Brothers’ collapse has revived interest in the risk-return profile of the carry
trade, a popular strategy that exploits interest rate differentials across countries.
If high-interest rate currencies deliver low returns when consumption is low, then
currency excess returns simply compensate investors for higher risk exposure and
carry trade returns reflect time-varying risk premia (Fama, 1984; Engel, 1996). In a
recent attempt to validate this risk-based explanation, Lustig et al. (2011) propose a
return-based factor that helps explain the difference in the average returns between
baskets of high and low interest rate currencies. While this approach establishes that
there is systematic risk in carry trades, it is silent about the economic determinants
underlying currency premia. Related work has posited the existence of a ‘crash’
premium to compensate investors for large and sudden drawdowns in carry trades.
But again, this explanation provides limited intuition surrounding the economic
rationale for why a currency depreciation is required.
This essay tackles exactly this issue by shedding empirical light on the
macroeconomic forces driving currency premia and crashes in the currency mar-
ket. Motivated by the models of Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Gourinchas (2008),
and Gabaix and Maggiori (2014), I construct a risk factor that captures exposure to
global imbalances and the currency denomination of external liabilities, and show
that it explains the bulk of excess returns in a standard asset pricing model. The
economic intuition for the factor is as follows: debtor countries offer a currency risk
premium to compensate investors willing to finance negative external imbalances.
Following an external shock, debtor nations experience a sharp currency depreci-
ation to restore balance in their net foreign asset position - a depreciation that is
amplified in countries with predominantly foreign currency denominated liabilities.
This finding suggests that carry trade investors can be viewed as taking on global
imbalance risk.
Overall, I provide empirical support for the existence of a meaningful link
between exchange rate returns and macroeconomic fluctuations. The global risk
factors previously identified in the currency market can be viewed as global imbal-
ance risk: a fundamental and theoretically motivated source of risk driving currency
returns.
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Chapter 4
The Mystery of Currency Betas
4.1 Introduction
An investor who simultaneously lends in high-interest-rate currencies and borrows
in low-interest-rate currencies will, on average, make a profit. This is perhaps the
most widely cited puzzle in international finance and a result often attributed as
compensation for bearing risk (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980; Fama, 1984; Lustig and
Verdelhan, 2007; Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan, 2011).1 Yet the finding raises
a fundamental question: why are high-interest-rate currencies more likely to depre-
ciate during ‘bad times’, and thus expected to earn a higher rate of return than
low-interest-rate currencies?
Understanding the source of heterogeneous exposure to currency risk is im-
portant. It is well known to currency and risk managers that high-yielding curren-
cies have the highest expected return (the highest beta).2 Yet the underpinning
macroeconomic explanation for why this is the case goes unresolved. If the fun-
damental source of exposure to risk is relatively stable compared to interest rates,
then a strategy which loads positively on the exposure could generate higher returns,
lower volatility and reduced transaction costs relative to a standard ‘carry-trade’.
1Other early work in this area includes Tryon (1979) and Bilson (1981). Useful surveys of the
literature include Froot and Thaler (1990), Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996), while Koijen, Moskowitz,
Pedersen, and Vrugt (2013) provide recent empirical evidence across assets. Other explanations
exist in the literature for why high-interest-rate currencies earn a high expected return – the so called
“forward-premium puzzle.” These include, among others, ‘peso’ problems (Burnside, Eichenbaum,
Kleshchelski, and Rebelo, 2011a), funding liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen,
2008; Gabaix and Maggiori, 2014), overconfidence (Burnside, Han, Hirshleifer, and Wang, 2011b)
and adverse selection problems within the foreign exchange market (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo, 2009).
2In fact, the carry-trade – investing in high-yielding currencies while funding the position by
borrowing in low-yielding currencies – is the most popular quantitative strategy in the foreign
exchange market (Galati, Heath, and McGuire, 2007; Rime and Schrimpf, 2013).
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Furthermore, changes in exposure to risk may be relatively easier to forecast than
interest rates, alerting currency managers to changes in the underlying riskiness of
a portfolio in a more timely and efficient manner. Moreover, if we can develop a
firm understanding of why some currencies are more (or less) exposed to risk – why
betas differ across currencies – it could feedback to provide richer insights into the
fundamental source of macroeconomic risk itself.
Most empirical attempts to understand currency premia largely ignore beta
and, instead, approach the topic by investigating the nature of risk. Usually this
involves the construction of a risk factor, to which currencies are shown to exhibit
heterogeneous exposure. In particular, following the path breaking work of Lustig,
Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011), who demonstrate that a single ‘global’ risk factor
(Slope risk) can explain the cross section of currency excess returns, a number of
alternative factors have been proposed– replacing Slope risk – which are shown to
perform equally well in explaining currency portfolio returns. These alternative
risks include: innovations in currency volatility (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and
Schrimpf, 2012), skewness Rafferty (2012) and correlation (Mueller, Stathopoulos,
and Vedolin, 2013), as well as ‘downside’ market risk (Dobrynskaya, 2013; Galsband
and Nitschka, 2013; Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber, 2013).
Three concerns arise from this approach. First, the factors tell us noth-
ing about why currencies exhibit heterogeneous exposure to risk – beta remains a
mystery. Next, the factors tend to be at arms-length from fundamental macroeco-
nomic considerations. That a high-interest-rate currency, for example, depreciates
in months when currency volatility, skewness or correlations rise, or when the U.S.
stock market falls, tells us little about whether consumption growth shocks (tradi-
tionalist), animal spirits (behaviorist), or some other fundamental explanation for
asset price movements, is at play. Finally, the surge in newly proposed currency
factors echoes developments in the maturer equity market literature that is charac-
terized by an ever expanding set of new ‘risk factors’ (Harvey, Liu, and Zhu, 2013).
In fact, this phenomenon has generated a growing literature critiquing empirical
asset pricing, by showing that many equity factors may only have a spurious rela-
tionship with equity portfolio returns (Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken, 2010; Kan,
Robotti, and Shanken, 2013) and indeed, have little correlation with other proposed
factors (Daniel and Titman, 2012).
It seems therefore, that the possibility of witnessing a factor proliferation
in the currency literature, similar to that already observed for the equity market,
should perhaps be met with lukewarm enthusiasm. This is particularly the case
if factors are not supported by a strong theoretical basis, leading to concerns over
potential ‘fishing’ within the data for new factors, which then provide limited eco-
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nomic insight for why currencies exhibit heterogeneous betas. These factors may
have no intrinsic relationship with the ‘true’ risk factor but, due to statistical biases,
are supported in standard empirical asset pricing tests.
In this chapter, I investigate currency betas. In doing so, I attempt to alle-
viate the three concerns raised above by (i) exploring why certain currencies have
higher betas than others, (ii) linking the source of beta with fundamental macroeco-
nomic explanations, underpinned by leading theoretical models of currency premia,
and (iii) showing that by investigating currency beta, standard empirical asset pric-
ing techniques can filter out spurious currency risk factors.
A natural starting point in investigating currency betas and to avoid ‘data
snooping’ criticisms, is the theoretical literature on currency premia. Theoretical
models of currency premia provide a precise link between a currency’s beta and an
underlying macroeconomic state variable or ‘characteristic’. In this regard, we have
been fortunate to have witnessed a recent surge in new theoretical developments in
currency research. In particular, recent consumption-based models in international
finance, which have made considerable progress in explaining various currency mar-
ket puzzles,3 provide a rich variety of explanations for the fundamental source of
heterogenous risk exposure.4 But these theoretical predictions are rarely discussed
and have not been empirically scrutinized in the literature.
I begin by investigating the predictions made by these leading consumption-
based models. To do so, I construct ‘characteristic’ factors from currency portfolios,
which are sorted on the basis of the ‘characteristic’ predicted to explain currency be-
tas. If the predictions are accurate, then the factors should perform well in explain-
ing the cross-section of currency portfolio returns. High-interest-rate (high-beta)
currencies should load positively on the factor, while low-interest-rate (low-beta)
currencies should load negatively. I focus on the external-habit model of Verdelhan
(2010), the long-run risks model of Colacito and Croce (2013) and the variable rare
disasters models of Farhi and Gabaix (2013). The test group of models reflect the
main three branches, or variations, of the consumption-based model in use today and
represent the analogous group of models to those investigated in an equity market
setting by Van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012).5
3Including, for example, the Backus and Smith (1993) puzzle as to why the correlation between
consumption and real exchange rates is approximately zero.
4Lustig et al. (2011) find that the ‘unconditional’ carry-trade accounts for almost half of total
carry-trade returns. That is, investing in currencies which, on average, have high interest rates
generates a sizeable spread in currency returns. Ready, Roussanov, and Ward (2013) show, in
a model of currency premia, that a country’s exports of primary commodities can help explain
unconditional carry-trade returns. The models examined in this chapter, however, seek to explain
conditional currency betas.
5In their paper, the authors focus on the habit preferences model of Campbell and Cochrane
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I find that the theoretically grounded factors cannot price any of the cross-
section of currency portfolio returns. In fact, within a standard two-pass asset
pricing test, I find that each theoretically motivated model generates a negative
cross-sectional R2, large pricing errors and a large root-mean-squared error. Addi-
tionally, I find the factor itself has a zero or negative correlation with the Slope risk
factor of Lustig et al. (2011) and, in only one instance, does the factor have a positive
t-statistic exceeding 2.0. In fact, for the case of the long-run risks model of Colacito
and Croce (2013), the factor price of risk is significant but negative, indicating that
the model’s prediction regarding currency betas are diametrically opposed to the
empirical reality. These findings overall are particularly surprising, given that the
test assets are characterized by a strong factor structure, which has been shown by
Lewellen et al. (2010) to make empirical asset pricing a less burdensome task.
Given the inability of leading theoretical models to explain currency betas,
I ask the question: can any fundamentally based factor explain why currencies ex-
hibit heterogenous exposure to risk? To answer the question I perform a ‘fishing’
exercise, by investigating alternative characteristic factors which lack a theoretical
basis. Specifically, using data from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group, I con-
struct 25 alternative characteristic factors based on country-level macroeconomic,
financial and political risks. In contrast to the theoretically grounded factors, these
alternative characteristic based factors are found to be overwhelmingly successful
in explaining currency portfolio returns and thus in offering explanations for het-
erogenous betas across currencies. In fact, I find that 20 of the 25 factors have a
t-statistic exceeding 2.0, while all macroeconomic-based factors are ‘priced’, with a
t-statistic in excess of 3.0 and a cross-sectional R2 of between 60 and 80 percent.
Some of the alternative factors even exhibit comparable pricing performance to the
benchmark Slope factor of Lustig et al. (2011).
In light of this finding, a question arises as to whether assessing a model’s
ability to predict currency betas by constructing a factor to explain currency port-
folio returns is, in fact, a sufficiently high benchmark. Despite the fact that none of
the leading theoretical models assessed in this chapter were able to pass the test, it
is possible to imagine a future scenario where competing theories meet this baseline
threshold. To address this concern, I perform a simple secondary test, to determine
if the non-theoretical characteristic factors can also explain the returns to a natural
alternative set of currency portfolios.
The alternative set of test assets are currency portfolios, formed by sorting
currencies on the same characteristic as the factor itself. As an example, if currency
(1999), the long-run risks model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and the variable rare disaster model
of Gabaix (2012) which is based on the earlier work of Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006).
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betas are determined by a country’s size (GDP), then the factor reflecting GDP
should explain returns to (i) currency portfolios sorted by interest rates (the stan-
dard set of currency test assets), and (ii) currency portfolios sorted by GDP, since
these portfolios should also generate a sizeable cross-sectional spread in returns.
When I subject the 25 alternative factors to this second test, I find that none of
the factors generate a t-statistic exceeding 2.0, while this time, 20 of the 25 models
generate a negative cross-sectional R2 in a standard empirical asset pricing test.
To explore the issue further, I randomly generate 20,000 sets of test asset
portfolios by arbitrarily sorting currencies and, from these test portfolios, construct
20,000 ‘useless’ factors. That is, each randomly generated set of test assets is asso-
ciated with a randomly generated factor. I use these ‘useless’ factors, which contain
no economic content, in standard asset pricing tests to explain (i) currency portfo-
lios sorted by interest rates and (ii) currency portfolios sorted by the same criteria
(the random ‘characteristic’) as the factor.
When pricing interest-rate-sorted portfolios, these ‘useless’ factors perform
well, supporting the critique of Lewellen et al. (2010). In fact, I find that 36 percent
have a t-statistic over 2.0, while 20 percent of factors help generate a cross-sectional
R2 over 70 percent.6 However, when the ‘useless’ factors price the portfolios from
which they were created – an exercise equivalent to pricing currency portfolios sorted
by the same characteristic as the factor – less than 5 percent are significant, while
only 3 percent of models generate a cross-sectional R2 over 70 percent. In fact, less
than 1.5 percent of all ‘useless’ factors can explain both interest-rate-sorted portfolios
and randomly sorted portfolios from which the factor was constructed.
Overall, this essay calls for a stricter empirical benchmark for judging all new
theories of currency risk premia. A theoretical model of currency premia should pro-
vide a precise and fundamental explanation for variation in currency betas. These
predictions should naturally lead to the construction of a characteristic factor that
is capable of pricing currency portfolios sorted by (i) interest rates and (ii) the
proposed characteristic. Any theoretical model found to pass both tests could be
considered a strong candidate explanation for understanding the fundamental source
of heterogeneous risk exposure in the currency market and hence a credible theo-
retical explanation of currency premia. Moreover, the essay offers support that, in
spite of the recent criticism, when investigating currency betas, standard empirical
asset pricing techniques can filter out around 99 percent of spurious currency risk
6I find that a t-statistic of around 2.7 is required for significance at the 95% confidence level.
Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2013) also find that a high t-statistic – much larger than 2.0 and probably
greater than 3.0 – is required to deem a candidate factor as exhibiting pricing power within the
equity market.
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factors.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2, I describe
the empirical methodology. I provide details of the data and portfolio construction
in Section 4.3. I present results in Section 4.4 and investigate the impact of changing
the test asset portfolios in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, I run a simulation exercise
to investigate ‘useless’ factors. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in Section 4.7. In
Appendix C, I provide further robustness tests and additional supporting analyses.
4.2 Empirical Methods
In this section, I outline the background to investigating the leading theoretical
models of currency premia, provide details of each model’s predictions regarding
heterogenous exposure to currency risk and describe the theoretical framework for
the empirical analysis. Finally, I describe the observations we would expect to
witness if the predictions of the models regarding currency betas are consistent with
the data.
4.2.1 Background
Lustig et al. (2011) construct a set of currency portfolios, sorted by interest rates
and find that a single ‘global’ risk factor can explain the portfolio returns.7 The
portfolios themselves are found to exhibit a strong factor structure, with two prin-
cipal components explaining around 90 percent of variation in returns. The authors
use this finding to construct two risk factors which correlate highly with the first
two principal components, in an application of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross
(1976).
The first risk factor is constructed as an equally weighted average of currency
portfolio returns and is denoted Dollar risk (DOL).8 The second risk factor, con-
structed as the difference between returns on the highest- and lowest-interest-rate-
sorted portfolios, is denoted Slope risk. Slope risk explains all of the heterogeneity
in currency risk exposure, with high-interest-rate currencies found to be the most
exposed to this risk. In fact, Slope risk correlates almost perfectly with the second
7Strictly, the authors sort by forward premia but, under no-arbitrage conditions, sorting on
forward premia is equivalent to sorting on interest rates, and hence the portfolios range from the
lowest to the highest-interest-rate currencies. The construction of currency portfolios sorted by
forward premia was pioneered by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007). The portfolios are rebalanced
monthly and all currencies are quoted relative to the U.S. dollar.
8The factor works as a constant in the model and has no pricing power of its own although
some recent papers, including Verdelhan (1979) and Maggiori (2013), have given more weight to
DOL risk being an economically important, and priced, risk factor.
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principal component, and thus could be viewed as a proxy for the ‘true’ underlying
risk factor.9
The methodology adopted by Lustig et al. (2011) provides an ideal tool for
testing theoretical models which provide a fundamental explanation for why high-
interest-rate currencies are the riskiest. That is, why they exhibit heterogeneous
exposure to the ‘global’ risk factor. Therefore, if currencies are sorted into portfolios
on the basis of the predicted source of exposure, these new portfolios should take
on the appearance of currency portfolios sorted by interest rates, since the models
themselves attempt to capture the fundamental rationale for why beta varies across
currencies.
To test these theoretical predictions, I sort currencies into five portfolios on
the basis of the characteristic which captures each model’s rationale for exposure to
risk. The safest currencies according to the model are assigned to Portfolio 1, while
the riskiest are assigned to Portfolio 5. ‘Characteristic’ factors with a theoretical
foundation can then be formed, by taking the difference in returns between the
‘riskiest’ and ‘safest’ portfolios, forming a ‘high-minus-low’ factor, which can be
introduced into a standard linear asset pricing model to replace Slope risk and yet
theoretically, perform equally well within empirical asset pricing tests.
4.2.2 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I describe the leading theoretical models of currency premia which
I investigate in this essay. I explain each model’s predictions for the source of
heterogeneous currency betas and provide details of how I capture this exposure to
risk, within an empirical context.
Verdelhan (2010). The author constructs a model centered around habit-based
preferences. Countries with low interest rates are shown to be experiencing ‘bad
times’, in that the representative investor’s aggregate level of consumption is near the
subsistence, or ‘habit’, level. Investors in low-interest rate economies are shown to be
the most risk averse, and hence require the highest expected return from investing in
foreign currency bonds. One method widely used for measuring whether a country
is currently experiencing an economic downturn, or ‘bad time’, is its output gap. In
this context, the output gap, measured as the ‘difference between the actual output
of an economy and its potential output’ (IMF, 2013), can be viewed as a proxy
9Similarly, Lewellen et al. (2010) suggest the HML and SMB risk factors proposed by Fama
and French (1993) are good proxies for the ‘true’ risk factors for Book-to-Market-and-Size-sorted
portfolios, because of their high correlation with the underlying principal components.
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for the difference between the representative agent’s level of consumption (actual
output) and the ‘habit’ level (potential output).10
To reflect the model, I sort currencies into portfolios on the basis of a coun-
try’s output gap. The currencies of countries with the lowest (most negative) output
gap are placed in Portfolio 1 (the safest). Countries with the largest output gap
have their currencies placed into Portfolio 5 (the riskiest).
Colacito and Croce (2013). The authors construct a recursive preferences model
of currency premia, considering situations with and without long-run risks. A coun-
try’s share of world consumption explains a currency’s exposure to risk. In a mean-
variance trade-off, investors prefer higher consumption but dislike volatility in their
future consumption stream. Countries with the highest share of world consumption
are most exposed to aggregate consumption shocks since they are more constrained
in sharing risk internationally. In fact, the authors demonstrate that a positive re-
lationship exists between a country’s share of world consumption and the variance
of its representative investor’s continuation utility.
To reflect the model, I sort currencies into portfolios on the basis of a coun-
try’s aggregate household consumption. The currencies of countries with low relative
consumption are placed in Portfolio 1 (the safest). Countries with high consumption
have their currencies placed into Portfolio 5 (the riskiest).
Farhi and Gabaix (2013). The authors construct a variable rare disasters model
in which the ‘resilience’ of a country explains its exposure to common shocks. Re-
silience is measured by how well productivity is insulated from world disasters. In the
model, less resilient countries have the highest interest rates and most depreciated
exchange rate and hence, issue currencies with the highest expected excess return.
The extent to which a country is insulated from a global disaster can be empirically
proxied by its economic openness. In fact, a recent United Nations (2011) report
notes that “[i]t is widely acknowledged that an economy’s vulnerability to exoge-
nous economic shocks is largely determined by its degree of exposure to the global
economy.”11 The report goes on to state that economies which are highly dependent
on exports are extremely vulnerable and that “a country’s exposure to external eco-
10In the habit model, the difference between actual consumption and habit consumption is never
less than zero. But the same principal applies here. Over time the habit level changes (potential
output changes) and utility of consumption is always measured relative to the habit level (actual
output is measured relative to an economy’s potential output).
11In the popular press, Singapore “is often seen as a barometer of world demand because its
economy...is one of the most export-reliant in Asia” (Alex Kennedy, ‘Singapore Sees Economy
Growing 15 percent in 2010’, Bloomberg Businessweek, July 14, 2010).
100
nomic shocks generally depends on its reliance on exports because export earnings
finance imports and also contribute directly to investment and growth.”12
To reflect the model, I sort currencies into portfolios on the basis of a coun-
try’s ratio of total exports to GDP. The currencies of countries with low ratios
are placed in Portfolio 1 (the safest). Countries with high export ratios have their
currencies placed into Portfolio 5 (the riskiest).
4.2.3 Two-Stage Empirical Asset Pricing
In this section, I briefly outline the theoretical framework and empirical methodology
used to test these theoretically motivated factors.
Methods. I follow standard notation and denote the discrete excess return on
currency portfolio j in period t as RXjt . In the absence of arbitrage opportunities,
risk-adjusted excess returns have a price of zero and satisfy the following Euler
equation:
Et[Mt+1RX
j
t+1] = 0 (4.1)
with a Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) Mt+1, linear in the pricing factors ft+1,
given by
Mt+1 = 1− b′ (ft+1 − µ) (4.2)
where b is the vector of factor loadings, and µ denotes the factor means. This spec-
ification implies a beta pricing model where the expected excess return on portfolio
j is equal to the factor price or risk λ, times the quantity of risk βj , such that
E[RXj ] = λ′βj (4.3)
where the market price of risk λ = Σfb can be obtained via the factor loadings b.
13
Σf = E
[
(ft − µ) (ft − µ)′
]
is the variance-covariance matrix of the risk factors, and
βj are the regression coefficients of each portfolio’s excess return RXjt+1 on the risk
factors ft+1.
Testing theoretically motivated factors. To test the theoretically motivated
factors, the excess returns to interest-rate-sorted currency portfolios RXjFX , for
j = 1, . . . , 5, are used as test assets, while the dollar factorDOL and the theoretically
motivated factor HMLTM enter as risk factors. The SDF is thus defined as
12Emphasis added. Further evidence on the importance of economic openness and, in particular,
the role of exports can be found in Briguglio, Cordina, Farrugia, and Vella (2009); Foxley (2009);
World Bank (2010).
13See Cochrane (2005) pp. 100-101, for full details.
101
Mt+1 = 1− bDOL (DOLt+1 − µDOL)− bTM (HMLTM,t+1 − µTM )
where µDOL and µTM denote the factor means.
The estimation of the currency betas βj and factor prices of risk λ in equation
(4.3) is undertaken using a two-step ordinary least squares regression, following
Fama and MacBeth (FMB, 1973).14 In the first step, portfolio excess returns are
regressed against a constant, DOL risk, and the characteristic-based risk factor for
each of the five interest-rate-sorted portfolios (for j = 1, . . . , 5)
RXjFX,t+1 = α
j + βjDOLDOLt+1 + β
j
TMHMLTM,t+1 + ε
j
t+1.
In the second step, a series of cross-sectional regressions are estimated in
which portfolio returns, at each point in time, are regressed on the currency betas
estimated in the first-stage time series regressions. The factor prices of risk λ, are
then calculated by taking the average across all the estimated slope coefficients.15
Standard errors are corrected according to Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length
set according to Newey and West (1987).
4.2.4 Hypotheses
If a theoretical model of currency premia can accurately explain currency betas, we
would expect to make two observations in the empirical results:
1. The excess return to Portfolio 5 should be greater than to Portfolio 1. In fact,
returns should increase monotonically between Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 5.
2. A return-based risk factor, constructed as the difference in returns between
Portfolio 5 and Portfolio 1, should price interest-rate-sorted currency portfo-
lios.
The first observation simply means that riskier assets should command higher
returns. The second observation relates to the empirical finding by Lustig et al.
14It is possible to estimate b via Hansen’s (1982) generalized methods of moments technique.
Previous work in the literature has demonstrated, however, that both methods result in almost
identical parameter point estimates and standard errors (Lustig et al., 2011; Menkhoff et al., 2012;
Della Corte et al., 2014).
15Note that no constant is included in the second stage of the FMB regressions. The results
would remain virtually identical however, if the DOL factor was replaced with a constant, since
the DOL factor has no cross-sectional relationship with currency returns, and therefore effectively
substitutes into the model as a common mispricing term.
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(2011), that Slope risk can price interest-rate-sorted currency portfolios. High-
interest-rate currencies are shown to be positively exposed to Slope risk, while low-
interest-rate currencies are negatively exposed. If a theoretical model of currency
premia is able to capture a currency’s fundamental exposure to risk, then it follows
that the difference in returns between Portfolio 5 and Portfolio 1 should be highly
correlated with Slope risk and, therefore, also perform well in explaining currency
portfolio returns.16
4.3 Data and Portfolio Construction
4.3.1 Foreign Exchange Rates and Currency Portfolios
To test the theoretically motivated factors, I use foreign exchange rate data and
currency-sorted portfolios from Chapter 3 (Della Corte, Riddiough, and Sarno,
2014).
Foreign exchange data. The dataset includes monthly forward and spot ex-
change rates for 55 currencies collected from Barclays and Reuters via Datastream.
All exchange rates are quoted against the U.S. dollar (USD) and the sample period is
from October 1983 to December 2011. The countries include: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Euro Area, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, and Venezuela. I refer to this sample as All Countries.
As a robustness check, I also examine a smaller Developed Countries sample
within the dataset. The sample comprises the most liquidly traded currencies in
the market, including: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Euro Area, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom. After the introduction of the euro in January 1999, the
Eurozone countries are replaced with the euro.
16In Chapter 3, I show that sorting currencies on the basis of a country’s net foreign assets can
generate a currency sort similar to one based on interest rates. Their proposed factor – global
imbalance risk – also constructed as a high-minus-low factor, is then able to price the cross-section
of currency portfolio returns sorted on the basis of forward premia, providing supporting evidence
for alternative (non-consumption based) theories of currency premia (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007;
Gourinchas, 2008; Gabaix and Maggiori, 2014).
103
Computing Currency Excess Returns. I denote time-t, spot and forward ex-
change rates as St and Ft, respectively. Exchange rates are defined in units of foreign
currency per U.S. dollar such that an increase in St is an appreciation of the dollar.
The excess return on buying a foreign currency in the forward market at time t and
then selling it in the spot market at time t+ 1 is computed as
RXt+1 = (Ft − St+1) /St,
which is equivalent to the forward premium minus the spot exchange rate return
RXt+1 = (Ft − St) /St − (St+1 − St) /St. According to the CIP condition, the for-
ward premium approximately equals the interest rate differential (Ft − St) /St '
i∗t − it, where it and i∗t represent the domestic and foreign riskless rates over the
maturity of the forward contract. Since CIP holds closely in the data at daily and
lower frequencies (Akram, Rime, and Sarno, 2008), the currency excess return is
approximately equal to the interest rate differential minus the exchange rate return
RXt+1 ' i∗t − it − (St+1 − St) /St.
Currency portfolios. The dataset contains two sets of currency portfolios. The
first set includes five currency portfolios sorted by interest rates, in which the under-
lying currencies are the 55 currencies from the All Countries sample. The highest
interest rate currencies are sorted into portfolio 5, while the lowest interest rate
currencies are sorted into Portfolio 1. The second set, again, includes five currency
portfolios, but this time the underlying currencies are from the smaller subset of
Developed Countries. The returns to the portfolios are adjusted for transaction
costs. Full details on the formation of currency portfolios can be found in Chapter
3 (Della Corte et al., 2014).
4.3.2 Theoretical Factors
Factor Construction
In this section, I describe how I empirically capture the ‘beta predictions’ of the
theoretical models of currency premia, by sorting currencies into portfolios and
forming ‘characteristic’ factors to be used in empirical asset pricing tests. I then
provide details of the data employed for sorting currencies.
Verdelhan (2010). I use quarterly data on real GDP across the 55 countries
in the sample to calculate the output gap of countries. To do so, I estimate the
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trend in output for each country, using a standard Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
filter and measure the output gap as deviations from trend. Countries with the
most positive output gap are placed into Portfolio 5 (the riskiest portfolio), while
countries experiencing ‘bad times’, with current output well below trend, are placed
into Portfolio 1 (the safest portfolio).
The factor is constructed by taking the difference in returns on the fifth
and first portfolios. To enable asset pricing tests to be implemented at a monthly
frequency, I hold constant a country’s output gap for an entire quarter and therefore
avoid any ‘look ahead’ bias. The construction of a Developed Countries factor is
then implemented in exactly the same manner.
Colacito and Croce (2013). I use yearly data on household final consumption
across the 55 countries in the sample in order to sort currencies, such that coun-
tries with the highest household consumption expenditure are placed into Portfolio
5 (the riskiest portfolio), while countries with the lowest household consumption
expenditure are placed into Portfolio 1 (the safest portfolio).
Once again, the factor is constructed by taking the difference in returns on
the fifth and first portfolios. To enable asset pricing tests to be implemented at a
monthly frequency, I hold constant a country’s total household consumption for an
entire year.
Farhi and Gabaix (2013). I use quarterly data on exports and GDP across
52 countries in the sample to calculate each country’s ratio of exports to GDP.
Countries most exposed to global shocks and hence, exhibiting the highest ratio of
exports to GDP, are placed into Portfolio 5 (the riskiest portfolio), while countries
with less exposure to the global economy are placed into Portfolio 1 (the safest
portfolio).
As before, the factor is constructed by taking the difference in returns on
the fifth and first portfolios while, in order to enable asset pricing tests to be im-
plemented at a monthly frequency, I hold constant a country’s ratio of exports to
GDP for an entire quarter.
Macroeconomic Data
I collect data on ‘household final consumption expenditure’ (denominated in U.S.
dollars), between 1982 and 2010 from the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) database. Data on exports, GDP and real GDP are collected from the
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database at a quarterly interval be-
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tween 1983 and the end of 2011. All data are seasonally adjusted and denominated
in U.S. dollars or, when not available, are converted using the end of period exchange
rate and seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau’s seasonal adjustment
methodology (X-12-ARIMA).17
4.3.3 Alternative Non-Theoretical Characteristic Factors
I construct alternative characteristic factors using the Political Risk Services (PRS)
Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. The data is comprised
of three composite indices as well as 22 sub-indices for each of the 55 countries in the
sample, and spans macroeconomic, financial and political risks. The sub-indices are
split across the three risk categories: 12 for political risk including: (i) government
stability, (ii) socioeconomic conditions, (iii) investment profile, (iv) internal conflict,
(v) external conflict, (vi) corruption, (vii) military in politics, (viii) religious ten-
sions, (ix) law and order, (x) ethnic tensions, (xi) democratic accountability and
(xii) bureaucracy quality; 5 for macroeconomic risk including: (i) GDP per capita,
(ii) real GDP growth rate, (iii) annual inflation rate, (iv) budget balance as a per-
centage of GDP and (v) current account as a percentage of GDP; and finally 5 for
financial risk including: (i) foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, (ii) foreign debt
service as a percentage of exports of goods and services, (iii) current account as
a percentage of exports of goods and services, (iv) net international liquidity as
months of import cover and (v) exchange rate stability.
Each country is assigned a score for each risk category, whereby lower scores
represent higher overall risk. In the composite indices, political risk is scored out
of 100, while economic and financial risk are both scored out of 50, due to being
comprised of less sub-indices. The data are collected monthly between January 1984
and July 2011.18
To construct the alternative non-theoretical characteristic factors, I again
begin by sorting currencies into one of five portfolios, based on each underlying
risk metric or ‘characteristic’. The riskiest countries for each category have their
currencies sorted into Portfolio 5, while the safest countries’ currencies are sorted
into Portfolio 1. I take the difference in returns between Portfolio 5 and Portfolio
1 each month to form the non-theoretical factor (denoted HMLalt) and hence, in
total, construct 25 alternative candidate factors.
17Data on exports are unavailable for Kuwait, Tunisia and Taiwan.
18A complete series of definitions of how each risk category is measured can be found at http:
//www.prsgroup.com
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4.4 Results
In this section, I describe summary statistics for the five interest-rate-sorted test
portfolios, and for the characteristic-sorted portfolios reflecting the theoretical mod-
els of currency premia. I then present the asset-pricing results.
4.4.1 Test Portfolios and Characteristic-Based Risk Factors
Expected excess returns of the five test portfolios, as well as portfolios sorted to re-
flect the predictions of the theoretical models, are presented in Table 4.1. Currencies
with a high interest rate earn, on average, a higher return than low interest rate cur-
rencies (4.56% compared to −0.93%). This same pattern is found among Developed
Countries. We would anticipate that the portfolios sorted to reflect the theoreti-
cal models of currency premia would generate a similar (and preferably monotonic)
pattern in average excess returns. But the results are far less clear.
First, the portfolios sorted by the output gap, reflecting the habit-based
model of Verdelhan (2010, V), do display the predicted pattern in average excess
returns. In fact, in both samples a clear monotonic pattern emerges. Countries with
a higher output gap (Portfolio 5) offer higher currency premia relative to countries
experiencing ‘bad times’ in their domestic economy (Portfolio 1). Specifically, Port-
folio 5 yields an excess return of 4.14% per annum compared to 0.70% for Portfolio
1 in the All Countries sample, and 3.73% compared to -0.91% in the Developed
Countries subsample.
Next, however, I find that sorting currencies on the basis of total household
consumption generates a set of approximately equal portfolio returns (CC, Panel A),
while in the Developed Countries sample, the ordering goes in the opposite direction
to that predicted. The ‘riskiest’ portfolio generates a return of 0.93%, on aver-
age each year, compared to 3.44% for the ‘safest’ (lowest household consumption)
portfolio.
Finally, the portfolios sorted by the ratio of exports to GDP (FG) also display
little obvious pattern in average excess returns. This finding applies across the All
Countries sample (Panel A) and the Developed Countries subsample (Panel B). In
both cases, the difference in returns between Portfolio 5 and Portfolio 1 are not
statistically different from zero. In fact, the return on Portfolio 2 (the second lowest
risk portfolio) is as high, or higher, than the average return on Portfolio 5 (the
‘riskiest’ portfolio).
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Panel A Panel B
All Countries Developed Countries
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 HML Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 HML
FP mean -0.93 -1.40 1.67 1.16 4.56 5.49 FP mean -0.82 0.13 0.95 1.50 4.47 5.29
std 7.85 7.94 8.19 8.94 9.73 8.85 std 10.1 9.82 9.42 9.79 11.4 11.0
CC mean 2.29 1.32 1.61 2.46 2.04 -0.24 CC mean 3.44 1.78 0.96 2.15 0.93 -2.51
std 7.53 8.38 8.62 8.40 8.55 7.34 std 10.1 11.2 8.97 9.44 9.63 8.04
FG mean 1.96 2.73 1.75 1.77 2.82 0.86 FG mean 0.76 2.71 2.25 1.31 2.26 1.50
std 8.78 8.84 8.87 9.43 10.1 8.74 std 8.83 10.3 9.03 10.3 10.9 8.67
V mean 0.70 1.13 1.93 3.10 4.14 3.44 V mean -0.91 1.48 1.77 2.55 3.73 4.64
std 8.98 8.87 8.79 9.08 8.42 7.92 std 10.9 9.57 9.84 9.41 9.81 8.26
Table 4.1: Currency Portfolio Returns. The table presents average excess returns to five currency portfolios for All Countries in the sample (Panel A) and a
Developed Countries subsample (Panel B). Currencies are sorted into portfolios on the basis of forward premia (FP), aggregate household consumption expenditure
(CC), the ratio of exports to GDP (FG), and the output gap (V). HML represents a portfolio constructed by taking the difference in returns between Portfolio 5 and
Portfolio 1. The units for all values are percent per annum. Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample
period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Cross-sectional asset pricing results. In Table 4.2, I present the cross-sectional
asset pricing results from the FMB procedure. Results are presented for All Coun-
tries in Panel A and for Developed Countries in Panel B. To provide a benchmark,
I also include results for the Slope factor of Lustig et al. (2011). The results for the
factors based on the theoretical models, are far from successful. In the All Countries
sample, none of the factors can explain any of the cross-section of currency portfolio
returns. In fact, each model has a negative R2, pricing errors significantly different
from zero and root-mean-squared error (RMSE ) over twice that observed for Slope
risk. Surprisingly, all the risk factors also have a low correlation with the second
principal component of the test assets.
On the surface, the factor constructed to reflect the long-run risks model
of Colacito and Croce (CC, 2013) shows the most promising evidence of pricing
capabilities, with the factor generating comparable pricing performance to Slope
risk in the Developed Countries sample. But on closer inspection it is found that
the pricing goes in the opposite direction to that predicted by the model, and hence
a negative factor price of risk is generated. This finding implies that currencies with
the largest share of world consumption are in fact the safest, offering the lowest
average returns, not the highest.19
In fact, only the factor reflecting the external habit model of Verdelhan
(2010) offers any support in favor of the underlying model. The factor price of risk
λ, is high and statistically significant for All Countries, however the price of risk
(12.99%) is considerably higher than the average excess return on the factor itself
(3.44%) when, in fact, they should be equal. Moreover, the factor price of risk is
not statistically different from zero in the Developed Countries sample, while the R2
is −46% and −63% in the All Countries and Developed Countries samples, respec-
tively. Moreover, the factor has almost zero correlation with the second principal
component across the two samples (5% and 7%). Finally, the risk factor based on
the ratio of exports-to-GDP, reflecting the variable rare disasters model of Farhi
and Gabaix (FG, 2013), is never statistically different from zero, while the model
generates the largest RMSE and lowest R2 statistics.
Pricing error plots are presented in Figure 4.1. The average returns to the
five interest-rate-sorted test assets are plotted on the vertical axis, while the model
19It should be noted that while the factor cannot explain the currency portfolio returns for the
All Countries sample, the strength of the results for Developed Countries is, however, favorable
for theoretical work, which implies that a country’s size is important. Hassan (2013) and Martin
(2013) both find that larger countries should offer lower currency premia. In an additional exercise,
I examine this proposition by sorting currencies on the basis of nominal GDP, and find almost
identical results (quantitatively and qualitatively) to those for aggregate household consumption
(once the factor is multiplied by −1). However, in Section 4.5, I show that even this promising
development can be dismissed once the factor is exposed to a simple second test.
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Panel A
All Countries
LRV (2011) CC (2013) FG (2013) V (2010)
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.02 5.93 1.12 -10.37 1.23 -5.35 1.13 12.99
t-stat (0.73) (3.37) (0.81) (-2.45) (0.80) (-0.60) (0.77) (2.36)
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 73.6% -22.2% -88.2% -45.9%
χ2 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01
RMSE 1.73 3.72 4.62 4.07
ρ 95.2% -20.9% -5.3% 5.1%
Panel B
Developed Countries
LRV (2011) CC (2013) FG (2013) V (2010)
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.22 5.38 1.22 -5.15 1.34 -4.05 1.30 8.00
t-stat (0.75) (2.53) (0.73) (-2.53) (0.82) (-1.05) (0.78) (1.46)
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 88.9% 88.1% -73.8% -63.2%
χ2 0.80 0.78 0.08 0.04
RMSE 0.94 0.98 3.74 3.62
ρ 97.1% -73.2% -3.7% 7.6%
Table 4.2: Asset Pricing Tests: Theoretical Factors (Cross Section). The table presents second stage cross-sectional results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
procedure. The test assets are five portfolios sorted on the basis of forward premia. Each regression contains two risk factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic
based risk factor constructed on the basis of (a) forward premia (LRV, 2011), (b) aggregate household consumption (CC, 2013), (c) the ratio of exports to GDP (FG,
2013) and (d) the output gap (V, 2010). Standard errors are corrected according to Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). Panel
A contains results for All Countries in the sample, while Panel B contains results for Developed Countries. Additional regression statistics are reported, including the
adjusted R2, a chi-squared test that all pricing errors are jointly equal to zero (χ2, a value less than 0.05 indicates large pricing errors), the square root of the average
mispricing ( RMSE) and the correlation of the second risk factor with the second principal component of the test assets (ρ). Data on test portfolios and currencies are
taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Colacito and Croce (2013)
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Farhi and Gabaix (2013)
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45o Pricing Line Developed Countries All Countries
Figure 4.1: Pricing Errors. The figure presents pricing errors associated with the alternative, characteristic-based, linear factor pricing models. The pricing
errors are calculated by comparing predicted average returns from Fama-MacBeth asset pricing regressions (x-axes) with the actual average returns to the five forward-
premia-sorted currency portfolios (y-axes). In the top-left corner are the benchmark pricing errors for the Slope risk factor of Lustig et al. (2011). The other three
plots relate to the three consumption-based models: recursive preferences and long-run risks (Colacito and Croce, 2013), rare-disasters (Farhi and Gabaix, 2013) and
the external habits model (Verdelhan, 2010). Pricing errors are plotted for All countries (solid circles) and the Developed countries subsample (crosses). Data on test
portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data
are provided in Section 4.3.
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predicted excess returns are plotted on the horizontal axis. The plot provides a
visual confirmation that only the factor constructed based on the long-run risks
models of Colacito and Croce (2013) performs well when pricing the cross-section of
forward-premia-sorted portfolios (albeit counter to the theoretical prediction). All
other plots show large pricing errors for at least one portfolio across both the All
Countries and Developed Countries samples.
Time-series results. In Table 4.3, I present results from the first-stage time-
series regressions of the FMB procedure. Within the table, I report the estimated
beta coefficients and t-statistics for the five test portfolios when regressed on each
characteristic factor. High-interest-rate currencies (Portfolio 5) should load posi-
tively on the risk factor and vice-versa for low-interest-rate currencies (Portfolio 1).
As expected, the Slope risk factor (LRV) exhibits this characteristic for both sam-
ples; however, none of the characteristic-based factors demonstrate this relationship
with the test assets and, in general, the factors exhibit no clear relationship with
forward-premia-sorted portfolios. In fact, the factor loadings on the highest- and
lowest-interest-rate-sorted portfolios are not significant in either the All Countries
or Developed Countries samples, for either the factor reflecting the external habit
model of Verdelhan (2010) or for the factor reflecting the variable rare disasters
model of Farhi and Gabaix (2013).
4.4.2 Alternative Non-Theoretical Characteristic Factors
In this subsection, I perform a ‘fishing’ exercise to determine if any arbitrarily
chosen, and fundamental, ‘characteristic’ factor, can explain the cross-section of
currency portfolio returns and, hence, offer a candidate explanation for why high-
interest-rate currencies earn the highest expected return (i.e. exhibit the highest
currency betas).
The results of the second-stage cross-sectional regressions are presented in
Table 4.4 (composite indices) and Table 4.5 (sub-indices). The composite macroe-
conomic and financial indices both perform well. The factor prices of risk are both
highly significant (t-statistics over 3.0), while the correlations with Slope risk are
also high (66.2% and 53.4% respectively). Unlike the factors reflecting the leading
theoretical models of currency premia, which all generate negative R2 statistics, the
composite factors generate positive R2s of up to 60% for All Countries and up to
95% for Developed Countries.
In Table 4.5, I present the All Countries cross-sectional asset-pricing results
for each of the sub-indices which make up the macroeconomic (Panel A) and financial
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Panel A Panel B
All Countries Developed Countries
Portfolio LRV CC FG V Portfolio LRV CC FG V
1 (Low IR) -0.38 0.22 0.00 -0.05 1 (Low IR) -0.49 0.49 -0.12 -0.01
(-17.7) (4.26) (0.08) (-0.88) (-15.62) (9.12) (-1.90) (0.19)
2 -0.18 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 2 -0.13 0.12 0.09 -0.15
(-6.78) (-0.80) (-0.61) (-2.97) (-3.48) (3.19) (2.16) (-3.06)
3 -0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 3 -0.00 0.02 0.16 0.03
(-2.66) (1.39) (1.11) (1.83) (-0.17) (0.90) (4.60) (0.83)
4 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.09 4 0.10 -0.14 0.02 0.08
(0.29) (-0.98) (1.51) (2.24) (2.63) (-3.46) (0.36) (2.49)
5 (High IR) 0.61 -0.13 -0.05 0.01 5 (High IR) 0.51 -0.53 -0.11 0.03
(28.5) (-1.60) (-0.63) (-0.09) (16.46) (-9.36) (-1.22) (0.49)
Table 4.3: Asset Pricing Tests: Theoretical Factors (Time Series). The table presents estimated time-series regression coefficients and t-statistics from the
first stage of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The returns to the five test-asset portfolios, sorted on the basis of interest rates are regressed on a constant
and two risk factors: (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic based risk factor constructed on the basis of (a) interest rates (LRV), (b) aggregate household consumption
(CC), (c) the ratio of exports to GDP (FG) and (d) the output gap (V). The β coefficient on the second risk factor is presented for each portfolio. Standard errors
are corrected according to Newey and West (1987). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is
from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Panel A
All Countries
Political Risk Economic Risk Financial Risk
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.97 9.47 1.85 7.49 1.91 11.24
t-stat [1.41] [2.53] [1.31] [3.07] [1.36] [3.14]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 24.4% 42.5% 58.6%
χ2 0.00 0.01 0.01
RMSE 3.03 2.64 2.24
ρ 42.3% 66.2% 53.4%
Panel B
Developed Countries
Political Risk Economic Risk Financial Risk
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.85 -15.55 1.91 6.95 1.87 6.74
t-stat [1.10] [-1.75] [1.15] [2.41] [1.12] [2.50]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 -1.8% 94.7% 90.2%
χ2 0.02 0.88 0.82
RMSE 2.95 0.67 0.92
ρ -9.8% 53.5% 69.4%
Table 4.4: Asset Pricing Tests: Non-Theoretical Factors (Composite). The table presents second stage cross-sectional results from the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) procedure. The test assets are five portfolios sorted on the basis of forward premia. Each regression contains two risk factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic
based risk factor constructed on the basis of data from the PRS Group on country-level macroeconomic, financial and political risks. Standard errors are corrected
according to Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). Panel A contains results for All Countries in the sample, while Panel B
contains results for Developed Countries. Additional regression statistics are reported, including the adjusted R2, a chi-squared test that all pricing errors are jointly
equal to zero (χ2, a value less than 0.05 indicates large pricing errors), the square root of the average mispricing ( RMSE) and the correlation of the second risk factor
with the second principal component of the test assets (ρ). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample
period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Panel A
GDP
per Capita
GDP
Growth Rate
Inflation
Yearly Rate
Budget
Balance
Current
Account
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.68 10.22 1.70 13.64 1.80 9.53 1.65 13.40 1.68 10.28
t-stat [1.23] [3.05] [1.22] [3.00] [1.28] [3.17] [1.19] [3.09] [1.22] [3.13]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 78.4% 63.5% 61.4% 73.9% 63.2%
χ2 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.02
RMSE 1.62 2.10 2.16 1.78 2.11
ρ 40.4% 32.6% 58.0% 31.1% 44.5%
Panel B
Exchange Rate
Stability
International
Liquidity
Current
Account
Debt Service (%
Exports)
Foreign Debt (%
GDP)
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 2.02 19.24 1.80 28.18 1.62 9.74 1.88 19.44 1.72 10.40
t-stat [1.43] [2.58] [1.30] [2.15] [1.18] [2.72] [1.37] [2.72] [1.23] [2.46]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 51.3% 27.9% 18.0% 79.0% -6.5%
χ2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00
RMSE 2.43 2.96 3.15 1.60 3.59
ρ 21.7% 9.5% 41.4% 20.2% 24.1%
Table 4.5: Asset Pricing Tests: Non-Theoretical Factors (Sub-Indices). The table presents second stage cross-sectional results from the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) procedure. The test assets are five portfolios sorted on the basis of forward premia. Each regression contains two risk factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic
based risk factor constructed on the basis of data from the PRS Group on country-level macroeconomic and financial risks. Standard errors are corrected according to
Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). Panel A contains results for All Countries in the sample, while Panel B contains results
for Developed Countries. Additional regression statistics are reported, including the adjusted R2, a chi-squared test that all pricing errors are jointly equal to zero (χ2,
a value less than 0.05 indicates large pricing errors), the square root of the average mispricing ( RMSE) and the correlation of the second risk factor with the second
principal component of the test assets (ρ). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from
October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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(Panel B) composite indices.20 The pricing performance is especially strong for
the macroeconomic characteristic factors. Each factor has a significant factor price
of risk, with associated t-statistics of 3.0 or higher, while the cross-sectional R2
statistic never falls below 60%. The financial characteristic factors also perform
well, with each factor exhibiting a t-statistics in excess of 2.0. In fact, the factor
constructed on the basis of a country’s ratio of debt-service-payments to exports,
shows a particularly strong pricing performance, with a higher R2, lower RMSE and
smaller pricing errors than Slope risk.
4.5 Pricing Characteristic-Sorted Portfolios
In light of the finding that arbitrarily chosen macroeconomic and financial charac-
teristic factors perform overwhelming well in pricing currency portfolio returns, I
turn to a second test of their pricing performance.
One additional test for assessing a candidate factor’s pricing capabilities is to
test if the factor can price an alternative set of currency portfolios. Those sorted by
the characteristic of interest are natural candidates for the alternative portfolios. For
example, if a country’s debt-service ratio really is important for explaining currency
premia, then a factor which captures a country’s debt-service ratio should price
interest-rate-sorted portfolios and currency portfolios sorted by the debt-service
ratio itself. To capture this approach, I construct sets of five currency portfolios
sorted on the characteristics of interest. Specifically, this involves the creation of
six sets of ‘theoretical’ test portfolios – three each for All Countries and Developed
Countries – which are sorted by consumption, output gaps and export ratios. I then
construct 50 sets of ‘non-theoretical’ test portfolios – 25 each for All Countries and
Developed Countries – sorted based on the composite and sub-indices of the PRS
data.
In Table 4.6, I record the t-statistic and associated R2 statistic from the
second-step of the FMB procedure. I do this for each theoretical characteristic
factor and the 25 non-theoretical characteristic factors when the test assets are the
currency portfolios sorted by the same characteristic as the factor itself. I find that
none of the 25 HMLalt factors are statistically significant when tested, with many of
the models now generating negative R2 statistics. I find comparable results across
Developed Countries, where all 25 factors are found to be insignificant.21 Of the
20In Appendix Table C.2, I document the performance of factors constructed based on the sub-
indices of political risk. The equivalent results for Developed Countries are provided in Appendix
Table C.3.
21The results for the Developed Countries sample are reported in Appendix Table C.4.
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Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
‘Slope’ Risk (LRV) 4.73 85.1% ‘Global Imbalances’ (DCRS) 3.65 84.8%
Theoretically Motivated Characteristic Factors
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Colacito and Croce 0.38 -84.1% Verdelhan 2.32 50.0%
Farhi and Gabaix 0.53 -54.9%
Financial Characteristic Factors
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Aggregate Financial 0.64 -127% Current Account 0.06 -96.0%
Exchange Rate Stability 0.90 -61.8% Debt Service 0.55 -24.6%
International Liquidity 0.04 -78.1% Foreign Debt 0.52 -123%
Macroeconomic Characteristic Factors
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Aggregate Economic 1.37 56.7% Inflation 0.44 -115%
GDP per Capita 0.47 -110% Budget Balance 0.69 -15.8%
GDP Growth Rate 0.03 -116% Current Account 0.37 -50.0%
Political Characteristic Factors
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Aggregate Political Risk 1.35 -19.6% Military in Politics 0.52 -70.6%
Government Stability 0.78 -99.4% Religious Tensions 1.44 -0.24%
Socioeconomic Conditions 0.44 -50.5% Law and Order 1.68 51.0%
Investment Profile 1.27 26.5% Ethnic Tensions 0.32 -26.7%
Internal Conflict 1.18 1.23% Democratic Accountability 0.67 9.18%
External Conflict 0.74 -60.4% Bureaucracy Quality 1.51 -29.7%
Corruption 0.38 -51.0%
Table 4.6: Asset Pricing Tests: Characteristic-Sorted Portfolios. The table presents second stage
cross-sectional adjusted R2 and t-statistics from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The test assets
are five currency portfolios sorted on the same basis as the factor itself. Each regression contains two risk
factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic based risk factor. Standard errors are corrected according to
Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). The sample period is from
October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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theoretical factors, only the factor reflecting the external habit model of Verdelhan
(2010) is significant. Both the factors reflecting the long-run risks model of Colacito
and Croce (2013) and the variable rare disasters model of Farhi and Gabaix (2013)
are associated with insignificant factor prices of risk and negative R2 statistics. In
contrast, I also provide the results for an alternative characteristic factor suggested
by Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). This fundamental factor, sorted based on
the mixture of a country’s net foreign asset position and currency denomination
of foreign debt, is termed the ‘Global Imbalance Factor’. Chapter 3 (Della Corte
et al., 2014) demonstrate that the factor can explain the returns of interest-rate-
sorted currency portfolios. In Table 4.6, we find this is the only fundamental factor
which also prices the set of test-asset portfolios sorted by its own characteristic.
I provide a visual comparison of each factors’ performance, when pricing
interest-rate-sorted and characteristic-sorted portfolios in Figure 4.2.22 As previ-
ously documented, all but 5 of the non-theoretical factors (all sub-indices of political
risk) are significant when the test assets are sorted by interest rates. In contrast,
when pricing portfolios sorted by the same characteristic as the risk factor, all the t-
statistics fall below 2.0, while 20 of the 25 models generate a negative cross-sectional
R2 statistic. The same information is plotted in the right-hand panel of Figure 4.2
for the theoretical characteristic factors.
A reason for the drop in pricing performance of the HMLalt factors is pro-
vided in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 4.3, I plot the average returns to the 25 HMLalt
factors, conditional on the distribution of returns to Slope risk (horizontal axes). For
a significant number of factors, a monotonic pattern emerges. High Slope risk (carry
trade) returns are often associated with high returns to the HMLalt factor. Yet,
in Figure 4.4, we find that almost none of the characteristics provide a monotonic
pattern in currency excess returns when currencies are sorted into one of five port-
folios based on macroeconomic, financial or political risks.23 This finding suggests
that many of the characteristics, while associated with variation in currency betas
are all, in fact, by-products of some other underlying driving force.
4.6 Simulation of ‘Useless’ Factors
In this section, I explore the issue of pricing interest-rate-sorted and characteristic-
sorted portfolios more deeply, by constructing randomly generated ‘useless’ factors
which lack any economic content.
22The equivalent figure for Developed Countries is presented in Appendix Figure C.1.
23The equivalent figures for Developed Countries are presented in Appendix Figures C.2 and
C.3.
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Figure 4.2: Pricing Alternative Test Assets. The figure presents adjusted-R2 and t-statistics from Fama-MacBeth asset pricing regressions. In the left-hand
chart are the cross-sectional asset pricing statistics for the 25 characteristic-based risk factors constructed using data from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group
on underlying economic, financial and political risks. The t-statistics are calculated using Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors with optimal lag length chosen
according to Newey and West (1987). The adjusted-R2 is taken from the second stage cross-sectional regression of the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Results are reported
for two sets of test assets: (i) the forward-premia-sorted currency portfolios (solid circles), and (ii) the randomly sorted portfolios from which the risk factors are
constructed (crosses). In the right-hand chart the results are reported for the characteristic-based risk factors designed to capture consumption-based models of currency
premia as well as for the Slope risk factor of Lustig et al. (2011). Horizontal lines are included at 1.96 (the standard 5% critical threshold) and 2.69 (the simulated
5% critical threshold when the test assets are forward-premia-sorted currency portfolios). The abbreviations are: LRV: Lustig et al. (2011); CC: Colacito and Croce
(2013); FG: Farhi and Gabaix (2013); V: Verdelhan (2010). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample
period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Conditional Excess Currency Returns of Non-Theoretical Factors. The figure presents the average excess return to each of the 25 characteristic-
sorted currency factors generated using data on underlying economic, financial and political risks from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group, conditional on the
distribution of the Slope risk factor of Lustig et al. (2011). The Slope risk factor is constructed using data from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). Data on test
portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data
are provided in Section 4.3.
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Figure 4.4: Expected Excess Returns to Characteristic-Sorted Portfolios. The figure presents the expected excess returns to each of the five currency portfolios,
sorted according to the 25 country characteristics which span data on economic, financial and political risks from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. Data on
test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other
data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Constructing ‘useless’ factors. To construct the randomly generated ‘useless’
factors, I arbitrarily allocate currencies to one of five currency portfolios each month.
In total, I simulate 20,000 sets of five currency portfolios. From these currency
portfolios, I construct the ‘useless’ factor by taking the difference in returns between
Portfolio 5 and Portfolio 1. Hence, I generate 20,000 factors, with the construction
of the factors mimicking the construction of the theoretical and non-theoretical
‘characteristic’ factors. I denote the randomly-generated factors HMLrnd.
Tests. I assess the pricing performance of the factors, once combined with Dollar
risk, using the FMB procedure, to explain two sets of currency portfolio returns.
The first set of portfolios are the standard set of interest-rate-sorted test assets used
throughout this chapter. Each of the 20,000 ‘useless’ factors is, therefore, tested
based on the same set of test assets. I then test if each of the 20,000 factors can
price their associated, randomly generated, test portfolios. In this case, each factor
prices its own unique set of test assets. The two tests replicate the testing of the
theoretical and non-theoretical factors, whereby each factor is asked to also price
currency portfolios sorted by the same characteristic as the factor itself.
Results. In Table 4.7, I present statistics from the second-step cross-sectional
regression of the FMB procedure for interest-rate-sorted test portfolios (Panel A)
and randomly generated test portfolios (Panel B). When pricing interest-rate-sorted
portfolios, the HMLrnd factors have, on average, low correlations ρ with Slope
risk. Over 40% of the factors have a correlation of less than 0.05, while only 1.8%
have a correlation over 0.2. The proportions are almost identical for the Developed
Countries sample.24 Asymptotically, we would expect 5% of the randomly-generated
HMLrnd factors to exhibit a t-statistic over 1.96. I find, however, that 38% of the
randomly-generated ‘useless’ factors exceed this threshold. A t-statistic of around
2.7 is required before significance is achieved at the 95% confidence level. The cross-
sectional goodness of fit is also strong for the randomly-generated factors. In the
all countries sample, over 35% of models generate a cross-sectional R2 over 50%.
One-in-five models has an R2 exceeding 70%. The values are similar, albeit even
higher for the Developed Countries sample. Nearly half of the models generate an
R2 of 50% or more, while over one-in-four exceeds 70%.
When I rerun the exercise by changing the test assets to the five randomly
generated test portfolios, a noticeable distinction arises. This time only 4.7% of
HMLrnd factors have a t-statistic exceeding 1.96, while only 3.1% of all models have
a cross-sectional R2 exceeding 70%. In Figure 4.5, I plot histograms of the simulated
24The results for Developed Countries are reported in Appendix Table C.5.
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Panel A
Interest-Rate-Sorted Test Assets
Relationship between ‘useless’ factors and the ‘true’ factor
Correlation (ρ) 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.80 0.90 1.0
Proportion >ρ 57.3% 24.9% 1.79% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Factor price of risk
t-stat (absolute value) 0.67 1.65 1.96 2.33 2.58 2.81 3.29
Proportion >t-stat (theory) 50.0% 10.0% 5.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.1%
Proportion >t-stat (actual) 90.1% 56.0% 38.0% 18.1% 8.0% 2.5% 0.0%
Model fit
R2 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 99%
Proportion >R2 37.5% 28.6% 19.9% 11.3% 4.1% 1.4% 0.1%
Pricing errors
χ2 p-value 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.95
Proportion <p-value 88.2% 91.8% 96.6% 98.4% 99.3% 99.8% 99.9%
Panel B
Randomly-Sorted Test Assets
Relationship between ‘useless’ factors and the ‘true’ factor
Correlation (ρ) 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.80 0.90 1.0
Proportion >ρ 57.3% 24.9% 1.79% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Factor price of risk
t-stat (absolute value) 0.67 1.65 1.96 2.33 2.58 2.81 3.29
Proportion >t-stat (theory) 50.0% 10.0% 5.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.1%
Proportion >t-stat (actual) 50.1% 9.7% 4.7% 1.7% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0%
Model fit
R2 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 99%
Proportion >R2 6.8% 4.9% 3.1% 1.7% 0.6% 1.4% 0.1%
Pricing errors
χ2 p-value 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.95
Proportion <p-value 6.7% 12.6% 34.0% 54.1% 73.5% 91.4% 95.6%
Table 4.7: Asset Pricing Tests: ‘Useless’ Factors. The table presents the estimated distributions
of statistics collected from Fama and MacBeth (1973) asset pricing tests using simulated risk factors.
Two currency ‘risk factors’ are randomly generated by arbitrarily reassigning currencies to one of five
portfolios each month. The test assets are interest-rate-sorted portfolios (Panel A) and randomly sorted
currency portfolios (Panel B). The first risk factor is calculated as an equally weighted average of all five
portfolio returns. The second risk factor is calculated as the difference between the returns on the 1st and
5th portfolios. The correlation is between the second simulated risk factor and the Slope factor from Lustig
et al. (2011). The t-statistics are reported for the second risk factor. Standard errors are adjusted according
to Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). The adjusted R2 is from
the second-stage cross-sectional regression in the Fama-MacBeth approach. The χ2 p-value is greater than
0.05 if pricing errors are small. In total 20,000 pairs of risk factors are simulated. Data on currencies
are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December
2011.
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Figure 4.5: Histograms of Simulated t-statistics. This figure presents the histograms of t-statistics estimated from Fama-MacBeth asset pricing regressions.
Risk-factors are artificially generated by randomly sorting currencies into one of five portfolios each month. In total 20,000 pairs of ‘risk factors’ are created. The
first risk factor is calculated as an equally weighted average of all five portfolio returns. The second risk factor is calculated as the difference between the returns on
portfolios 5 and 1. I plot the t-statistic for the second risk factor. The t-statistics are calculated using Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors with optimal lag
length chosen according to Newey and West (1987). In the left-hand panel the t-statistics are calculated for when pricing the five randomly sorted currency portfolios.
In the right-hand panel the t-statistics are calculated for when pricing five forward-premia-sorted portfolios. The exercise is run for All countries (top panel) and the
Developed countries subsample (bottom panel). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from
October 1983 to December 2011.
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t-statistics for each of the HMLrnd factors when pricing randomly-sorted test port-
folios (left-hand panel) and interest-rate-sorted portfolios (right-hand panel). A
normal density plot is overlaid. Histograms associated with the randomly-generated
test portfolios are approximately normally distributed, but the histograms associ-
ated with interest-rate-sorted test portfolios display a highly non-normal, bi-modal
distribution. The finding supports the conclusions of Lewellen et al. (2010), that
an arbitrary factor could, by chance, explain currency portfolios sorted by interest
rates. However, I find the factor would have a more challenging task in pricing port-
folios sorted by the characteristic itself, which corroborates the earlier finding that
none of the 25 non-theoretical characteristic factors could beat this benchmark. In
fact, I find that less than 1.5% of all randomly-generated ‘useless’ factors are statis-
tically significant when pricing interest-rate-sorted portfolios and when pricing the
portfolios from which the ‘useless’ factors are generated. Hence, any characteristic
factor shown to pass both tests is overcoming a non-trivial empirical exercise and,
therefore, is indicative of strong pricing performance.
4.7 Conclusions
The recent literature on currency premia – both empirical and theoretical – has made
great strides. A new wave of ‘risk factors’ have been shown empirically to explain
the returns to currency portfolios sorted by interest rates, while the expanding suite
of theoretical currency models provide compelling explanations for various puzzles
in international finance. Both developments are encouraging signs of the progress
researchers are making in understanding this important, and often overlooked, asset
class.
But a nagging doubt clouds the research. If we want to understand currency
premia – or, in fact, the returns to any asset class – it is important to have an
explanation for why certain currencies (assets) are riskier than others. It is widely
acknowledged that high-interest-rate currencies earn a higher rate of return, but
the fundamental source of this additional exposure to risk – the currency beta –
remains a mystery. Empirical work overwhelmingly focusses on currency risk by
demonstrating that high-interest-rate currencies are more exposed to some ‘risk
factor’. Yet, the reasons for why this is the case are rarely discussed. Moreover,
recent criticism by Lewellen et al. (2010) suggests that finding new risk factors
should be relatively straight forward, given the strong factor structure of currency
portfolio returns (sorted by interest rates).
In this essay, therefore, I propose taking a side-step. Rather than focus on
currency ‘risk’, instead I choose to investigate the fundamental source of exposure
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to risk, and hence learn about currency betas themselves. Using the techniques of
empirical asset pricing, I turn to recent leading theoretical contributions in interna-
tional finance, which all provide precise predictions on the fundamental nature of
currency betas. If the models’ predictions are accurate, then sorting on the basis of
the ‘characteristic’, argued to drive currency betas, should result in a set of portfolios
equivalent to the standard set of interest-rate-sorted currency portfolios. A factor
constructed from these portfolios should then exhibit similar pricing performance to
the Slope factor of Lustig et al. (2011) and, pertinently, also provide a fundamental
and theoretically rooted explanation for why high interest rate currencies are the
riskiest.
Unfortunately, none of the theoretically grounded factors prove successful in
this endeavor. All give rise to negative cross-sectional R2 statistics and large pric-
ing errors while, in general, the factors are either not priced or the pricing goes in
the opposite direction to that predicted by the model. Beta continues to remain a
mystery. Despite this performance, I find that alternative, non-theoretical, macroe-
conomic and financial characteristics are almost overwhelmingly good at explaining
the returns to currency portfolios. In fact, t-statistics over 3.0 and R2 statistics
over 60 percent are the norm, not the exception. Suddenly we are overwhelmed by
an embarrassment of riches for explaining currency betas. The critique of Lewellen
et al. (2010) rears up again, while a future scenario in which all theoretical models
beat this benchmark seems a distinct possibility.
Focussing on currency betas, however, allows researchers to overcome this
concern by providing a natural alternative set of test assets. By sorting currencies on
the basis of the ‘beta characteristic’ of interest, I find that all non-theoretical factors,
which had initially exhibited strong pricing performance, are no longer significant.
Moreover, when exploring the issue in more depth with a simulation exercise, I find
that only around 1.5% of return-based currency risk factors can pass both tests,
making it a significant benchmark and helping to mitigate the recent criticism of
empirical asset pricing techniques, which emphasize the relative ease of pricing test
assets that exhibit a strong factor structure.
Overall, this essay calls for a stricter empirical benchmark for assessing all
new theoretical models of currency premia. These models should provide precise
predictions for why betas (risk exposures) vary across currencies. The predictions
should naturally give rise to characteristic factors which can price the economically
important interest-rate-sorted currency portfolios and, pertinently, also explain the
returns of own-characteristic-sorted portfolios. Any theoretical model which passes
both tests could be considered consistent with the data and hence a candidate
explanation for why we witness heterogeneous exposure to risk in the currency
market.
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Supporting Documentation:
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Table A.1 presents a fixed-effects panel regression equivalent to the baseline spec-
ification originally presented in Table 2.3. This time, the dependent variable is the
aggregate cross-border bank flow (summation of quarterly interbank and intragroup
flows) as a proportion of the previous quarter stock of total cross-border bank-to-
bank funding. The results confirm the main findings of Bruno and Shin (2014). One
discrepancy is the ∆VIX coefficient, which I find to be consistently insignificant for
aggregate flows. This finding is likely due to sample differences, as I am confined to
investigating 25 banking systems which report both interbank and intragroup flows
to the BIS. The additional banking systems analyzed by Bruno and Shin (2014) are
primarily emerging market economies and, as I demonstrate in the main results,
emerging economy banking systems have a higher propensity to lose funding given
an increase in the VIX index.
Table A.2 presents a fixed-effects panel regression equivalent to the augmented
specification presented in Table 2.6. This time, the dependent variables are the
cross-border interbank flows to parent and foreign affiliate banks as a proportion of
the previous quarter stock of total interbank cross-border bank-to-bank funding of
either parent or foreign affiliates (see equation 2.5 for full details). Interbank funding
to both parent and foreign affiliate banks is found to be vulnerable to periods of
heightened global risk.
Table A.3 presents correlations across the main dependent and independent vari-
ables. The correlation between interbank and intragroup funding is negative and
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statistically different from zero. The correlations across independent variables are
low, mitigating any concerns over multicollinearity.
Table A.4 presents descriptive statistics for the five alternative measures of global
risk: the VXO index, Credit Suisse Global Risk Appetite Index, the corporate bond
spread between AAA and BAA rated securities provided by Moody’s, the TED
spread, and the global imbalance risk factor from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al.,
2014).
Table A.5 presents the correlations between the five alternative measures of global
risk: the VXO index, Credit Suisse Global Risk Appetite Index, the corporate bond
spread between AAA and BAA rated securities provided by Moody’s, the TED
spread, and the global imbalance risk factor from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al.,
2014). The correlations are not, on average, particularly high. This finding indicates
that a ‘common’ source of global risk is driving cross-border bank-to-bank funding.
Table A.6 presents an example calculation from the scenario analysis described
in section 2.5.2. The significant coefficients on the VIX and ∆VIX from Table 2.3
are used in a scenario in which the VIX rises from a value of 20 in one quarter
to an average of 45 in the subsequent quarter. The VIX then remains at 45 for
two quarters. The scenario replicates the actual movements in the VIX betweeen
2008Q4 and 2009Q2, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
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(1) (2) (3)
Interbank and Intragroup
VIX -2.62*** -2.39*** -1.50*
(0.77) (0.85) (0.83)
VIX*EME -6.37***
(1.89)
VIX+VIX*EME -7.87***
p-value 0.0001
∆ VIX -0.25 -0.53 0.24
(1.40) (1.43) (1.59)
∆ VIX*EME -5.68**
(2.60)
∆VIX+∆VIX*EME -5.44**
p-value 0.0139
ROE 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
ROE*EME -0.33*
(0.16)
ROE+ROE*EME -0.19
p-value 0.2357
FX Return -12.32*** -11.94*** -6.89*
(4.32) (3.73) (3.57)
FX Return*EME -18.73*
(9.81)
FX Return+FX Return*EME -25.62***
p-value 0.0069
∆ IR Spread 0.51 0.24 0.70
(0.40) (0.42) (0.50)
∆ IR Spread*EME -0.43
(0.59)
∆IR Spread+∆IR Spread*EME 0.27
p-value 0.4424
Controls N Y Y
Observations 1,142 1,088 1,088
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.12
Countries 25 25 25
Table A.1: Aggregate Cross-Border Bank-to-Bank Funding. The table presents the estimated param-
eter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change
in aggregate cross-border bank-to-bank funding. EME is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the banking
system is in an emerging market economy and zero otherwise. V IX is the quarterly average of the log
VIX index, while ∆VIX is the quarterly change in the average of the log VIX index. The control variables
are discussed in 2.4.1 with summary statistics provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered at country
level, are reported in brackets. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
I include F-tests to determine if the effect of a variable on emerging economies is significant. Data on
banking flows are collected from the Bank for International Settlements’s International Financial Statistics
database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents Foreign Affiliates
VIX -3.96*** -3.24** -7.32*** -6.45***
(1.33) (1.34) (1.75) (1.73)
VIX*EME -5.20 -9.96
(3.68) (6.36)
VIX+VIX*EME -8.44** -16.40**
p-value 0.0243 0.0190
∆ VIX -5.08* -5.03* -1.56 -0.04
(2.44) (2.73) (3.14) (3.30)
∆ VIX*EME -0.88 -13.85
(3.64) (9.95)
∆VIX+∆VIX*EME -5.91** -13.89
p-value 0.0298 0.1530
ROE 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.02 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
ROE*EME -0.15 -0.26
(0.18) (0.33)
ROE+ROE*EME -0.01 -0.20
p-value 0.9559 0.5483
FX Return -13.55** -8.25 -1.86 3.60
(5.35) (5.27) (7.54) (8.61)
FX Return*EME -22.20* -15.03
(11.78) (13.87)
FX Return+FX Return*EME -30.45*** -11.43
p-value 0.0067 0.2737
∆ IR Spread 0.78 1.26 -0.55 3.42**
(0.85) (1.49) (1.34) (1.47)
∆ IR Spread*EME -0.50 -6.01***
(1.75) (1.56)
∆IR Spread+∆IR Spread*EME 0.76 -2.59***
p-value 0.4191 0.0006
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 919 919 922 922
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07
Countries 20 20 20 20
Table A.2: Interbank Funding: Flows to Parent and Foreign Affiliate Banks. The table presents
the estimated parameter values from fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly
percentage change in interbank funding to either parent or foreign affiliate banks. In columns (1) and (2), I
report results for parents banks, while in columns (3) and (4), I do the same for foreign affiliates. EME is a
dummy variable which equals 1 if the banking system is in an emerging market economy and zero otherwise.
VIX is the quarterly average of the log VIX index, while ∆VIX is the quarterly change in the average level
of the log VIX index. The control variables are discussed in 2.4.1, with summary statistics presented in
Table 2.1. Standard errors, clustered at country level, are reported in brackets. *** is significant at the 1%
level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. I include F-tests to determine if the effect of a variable
on emerging economies is significant. Data on banking flows are collected from the Bank for International
Settlements’s International Financial Statistics database. The sample period is from 1998Q1 to 2011Q4.
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Variables Inter Fund Intra Fund. VIX VIX Change ROE ER Dep. ∆IR Spread Inflation Growth Public Debt Stock Vol.
Interbank Funding 1.000
Intragroup Funding -0.071 1.000
(0.015)
VIX -0.172 -0.059 1.000
∆VIX -0.020 0.044 -0.320 1.000
Return on Equity 0.166 0.135 -0.313 -0.037 1.000
FX Return -0.090 -0.084 0.143 0.068 -0.098 1.000
∆IR Spread -0.001 -0.032 0.122 0.022 -0.065 0.060 1.000
Inflation 0.010 0.020 0.109 -0.053 0.027 0.100 -0.235 1.000
GDP Growth 0.162 0.009 -0.243 0.029 0.175 -0.078 -0.067 0.072 1.000
∆Public Debt -0.096 -0.056 0.138 -0.137 -0.272 0.007 -0.039 -0.202 -0.125 1.000
Stock Volatility -0.049 -0.028 0.265 -0.112 -0.164 0.091 -0.179 0.359 0.044 0.349 1.000
Table A.3: Correlations: Dependent and Independent Variables. The table presents correlations across dependent and independent variables used in the panel
regression analysis. The p-value on the correlation between interbank and intragroup funding is reported in parentheses.
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Variable Mean Std.dev. Min Max Obs.
VXO 3.09 0.37 2.36 4.12 1,400
CS Global Risk Appetite Index -0.33 2.70 -6.31 4.69 1,400
Moody’s Spread -0.01 0.34 -0.53 1.11 1,400
global imbalance risk factor -0.26 1.32 -3.06 3.84 1,400
TED Spread 3.74 0.71 2.52 5.57 1,400
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics: Alternative Measures of Global Risk. The table presents de-
scriptive statistics for the alternative measures of global risk. Moody’s Spread refers to the spread between
AAA and BAA rated securities. The global imbalance risk factor is taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte
et al., 2014). Data on the TED Spread is collected from Bloomberg. See Section 2.6.2 for further details.
Variable VIX VXO CS Moody’s GI Risk TED
VIX 1.000
VXO 0.989 1.000
CS Global Risk Appetite Index 0.692 0.701 1.000
Moody’s Spread 0.562 0.522 0.376 1.000
global imbalance risk factor 0.264 0.239 0.083 0.115 1.000
TED Spread 0.292 0.258 0.171 0.201 0.267 1.000
Table A.5: Correlations: Alternative Measures of Global Risk. The table presents correlations
across the alternative measures of global risk. Moody’s Spread refers to the spread between AAA and BAA
rated securities. The global imbalance risk factor is taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). Data
on the TED Spread is collected from Bloomberg. See Section 2.6.2 for further details.
Banking System A Banking System C
Quarter Interbank Intragroup Total Interbank Intragroup Total
2008 Q3 80 20 100 20 80 100
2008 Q4 62.3 20.5 82.7 15.6 81.9 97.5
2009 Q1 49.9 20.5 70.4 12.5 81.9 94.4
2009 Q2 40.1 20.5 60.5 10 81.9 91.9
Table A.6: Example Calculation (Section 2.5.2). The table presents an example calculation from
the scenario analysis in Section 2.5.2 in which the VIX rises from 25 to 45 and remains at that level for
two quarters. Based on the significant coefficients in Table 2.4, the change in total bank-to-bank funding
in 2008Q4 for an advanced economy that has a pre-crisis stock of interbank funding of 80 is calculated as:
80 × [1 + (−0.0520 × log(45) + −0.0404 × log(45/25)] + 20 × [1 + (0.0409 × log(45/25))] = 82.7. Then for
2009Q1: 62.3× [1 + (−0.0520× log(45))] + 20.5 = 70.4.
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Table B.1 presents cross-sectional asset pricing results as in Table 3.3. The differ-
ence here is that excess returns to the test assets exclude bid-ask spread transaction
costs. I find global imbalance risk is still priced in the cross-section for All Countries
and Developed Countries, albeit with slightly higher factor risk prices.
Table B.2 presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for the linear factor model
based on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. In
contrast to Table B.1, the test assets employed here are the external imbalances
(NA) portfolios sorted on the basis of the net foreign assets to GDP ratio and the
share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. I find the global imbalance risk
factor (HMLNA) is able to price the NA portfolios, reemphasizing its claim to be
a currency risk factor.
Table B.3 shows the probability of a currency moving from one portfolio to another
in a transition matrix. The FX portfolios in the top panels are the monthly carry
trade portfolios formed using the forward premia at time t−1. The NA portfolios in
the bottom panels are the monthly external imbalances portfolios sorted on the net
foreign assets to GDP ratio and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency
at time t − 1. The NA portfolios show a slightly higher level of persistence due to
the lower frequency of the net foreign asset data compared to interest rate data.
The steady-state transition probabilities in the last row of each panel, however, are
very similar. This implies that the performance of the strategies cannot simply be
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attributed to long-lived positions in particular currencies, but rather to a similar
currency rotation across quintile portfolios.
Table B.4 presents the currency composition of both FX and NA portfolios. I
report the breakdown of the currencies most frequently found in each of the five FX
portfolios in Panel A, and in each of the five NA portfolios in Panel B. In Panel C, I
compute the joint probability that the same currency will simultaneously enter the
same FX and NA portfolio. The figures reveal that approximately 45 (44) percent
of the time, a currency in the first FX portfolio will also be in the first NA portfolio
for All Countries (Developed Countries). I also calculate the joint probability for
Portfolio 1 combined with Portfolio 2, and Portfolio 4 combined with Portfolio 5.
The joint probabilities suggest that approximately 60 percent of the time a currency
in the first (last) two FX portfolios will also be in the first (last) two NA portfolios,
thus suggesting a very similar pattern for both FX and NA portfolios.
Table B.5 presents descriptive statistics for the 20 most liquidly traded currencies
for both FX portfolios (top panels) and NA Portfolios (bottom panels). As with
the All Countries sample, I find a monotonic pattern in average excess returns,
portfolio skewness and portfolio Sharpe Ratios. I find the Sharpe ratio attached to
the HMLNA risk factor is higher than for HMLFX no matter whether rebalancing
takes place at monthly or yearly frequency.
Table B.6 employs alternative base currencies as an additional robustness check,
taking the perspective of a Swiss, Euro-based, British and Japanese investor. Panel
A presents cross-sectional regressions while Panel B reports time-series regressions
for All Countries. The estimates of λ and b remain statistically different from zero
and largely comparable to the core results. The cross-sectional fit remains high as
the R2 goes from 60 percent to 74 percent, and I cannot reject the null hypotheses
of zero pricing errors and zero HJ distance. Overall, the results appear to be robust
to this additional check.
Table B.7 presents descriptive statistics for the external imbalances portfolios
sorted only on the basis of the net foreign assets to GDP ratio, i.e. I do not re-sort
currencies on the countries’ share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. Here,
the monotonic pattern for average excess returns, portfolio skewness and portfolio
Sharpe ratios is not observed. More importantly, the average excess return on the
HMLNA risk factor is indistinguishable from zero for All Countries, compared to
nearly 5 percent in the sequentially sorted case. The Sharpe ratio for HMLNA is
also much lower in the single-sort exercise. These results suggest the importance of
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conditioning on the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency as suggested by
Gourinchas (2008).
Figure B.1 presents a visual depiction of countries’ external accounts around the
world. Traditional carry trade investment currencies, such as the Australian and
New Zealand dollars, are found to be issued by countries with large external deficits.
In contrast, traditional funding currencies, such as the Japanese yen and Swiss franc,
are shown to be issued by large creditor nations. The same is true in emerging mar-
kets, where carry-trade investment currencies, including the Brazilian real, Turkish
lira, South African rand and Indian rupee, are all issued by countries with large
external deficit positions.
Figure B.2 presents the average share of foreign liabilities held in domestic currency
across Developed Countries and Non-Developed Countries. The data is collected
from Lane and Shambaugh (2010). Between 1990 and 2004 the average share of
debt issued in domestic currency has been on the rise, reaching a level above 50
percent, on average, in both samples.
Figure B.3 presents pricing errors of the test asset portfolios sorted by the one-
month forward premia (nominal interest rate differentials). The model fit for both
samples is found to be strong, with all points lying either on or close to the 45o line.
The figure supports the findings in Table 3.3, that pricing errors are not jointly
different from zero for either the All Countries or Developed Countries samples.
Figure B.4 presents the equivalent information to that displayed in Figure 3.4
but for 10-delta risk reversals (the implied volatility of a 10-delta call minus the
implied volatility of a 10-delta put). On average, Portfolio 5 is found to have the
most negatively skewed distribution, implying it has the largest expected future
depreciation. In the time series, Portfolio 5 is found to have a consistently negative
risk reversal, while the opposite is true for Portfolio 1.
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
All Countries Developed Countries
GMM1 −0.23 2.24 0.02 0.10 0.92 1.90 5.53 0.26 0.11 1.26 0.02 0.06 0.99 0.61 0.36 0.04
(0.34) (0.67) (0.02) (0.02) [0.14] [0.16] (0.25) (0.56) (0.02) (0.02) [0.95] [0.96]
GMM2 −0.17 2.37 0.02 0.08 0.89 2.20 5.45 0.10 1.27 0.02 0.06 0.97 1.01 0.36
(0.34) (0.66) (0.02) (0.02) [0.14] (0.23) (0.53) (0.02) (0.02) [0.95]
FMB −0.23 2.24 0.02 0.10 0.92 1.90 5.53 0.11 1.26 0.02 0.06 0.99 0.61 0.36
(0.26) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) [0.14] (0.20) (0.41) (0.02) (0.02) [0.95]
[0.24] [0.50] [0.01] [0.02] [0.18] [0.40] [0.02] [0.02]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2 α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 −0.02 0.98 −0.32 0.79 −0.01 0.95 −0.51 0.75
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07)
P2 −0.02 0.99 −0.21 0.79 0.01 1.01 −0.18 0.82
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
P3 0.01 1.03 −0.07 0.84 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.86
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
P4 0.01 1.07 0.14 0.84 0.00 0.99 0.16 0.83
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
P5 0.03 0.94 0.46 0.71 0.02 1.05 0.53 0.79
(0.01) (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Table B.1: Asset Pricing: Global Imbalance Risk. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for the linear factor model based on the dollar (DOL)
and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. The test assets are excess returns to five currency (FX) portfolios sorted on the one-month forward premia. Panel A
reports GMM (first and second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB) estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard errors are reported in brackets.
χ2 denotes the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan
(1997) distance (with simulated p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Panel B reports least-squares estimates of time
series regressions with Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum. The portfolios are rebalanced
monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
All Countries Developed Countries
GMM1 0.07 0.93 0.02 0.04 0.92 0.98 1.71 0.08 0.15 0.74 0.02 0.04 0.86 1.14 1.82 0.08
(0.28) (0.33) (0.02) (0.01) [0.64] [0.67] (0.22) (0.39) (0.02) (0.01) [0.61] [0.66]
GMM2 0.09 1.05 0.02 0.05 0.90 1.15 1.55 0.17 0.86 0.01 0.02 0.73 1.83 1.66
(0.27) (0.3) (0.02) (0.01) [0.67] (0.22) (0.32) (0.02) (0.01) [0.65]
FMB 0.07 0.93 0.02 0.04 0.92 0.98 1.71 0.15 0.74 0.02 0.04 0.86 1.14 1.82
(0.25) (0.29) (0.02) (0.01) [0.64] (0.2) (0.26) (0.02) (0.01) [0.61]
(0.22) [0.27] [0.01] [0.01] [0.18] [0.27] [0.02] [0.01]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2 α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 0.01 1.03 −0.41 0.88 0.01 1.02 −0.62 0.91
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
P2 0.01 1.19 −0.20 0.86 −0.01 1.14 −0.12 0.89
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
P3 −0.01 0.78 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.92 0.11 0.82
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
P4 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.90 0.25 0.77
(0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
P5 0.01 1.03 0.59 0.92 0.01 1.02 0.38 0.91
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Table B.2: External Imbalances Portfolios as Test Assets. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results when the test assets are excess returns to five
currency (NA) portfolios sorted on time t−1 external imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. The linear
factor model is based on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. Panel A reports GMM (first and second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB)
estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag
selection are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard errors are reported in brackets. χ2 denotes the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for
the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with simulated p-value in parentheses) for the
null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Panel B reports least-squares estimates of time series regressions with Newey and West (1987) standard errors
in parentheses. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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Panel A: FX Portfolios
pit→t+1 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
All Countries Developed Countries
PL 0.81 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.88 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00
P2 0.13 0.71 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.74 0.15 0.03 0.01
P3 0.02 0.14 0.68 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.69 0.13 0.01
P4 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.67 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.75 0.08
PS 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.86
pi 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.16
Panel A: NA Portfolios
pit→t+1 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
All Countries Developed Countries
PL 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
P2 0.02 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.00
P3 0.01 0.02 0.97 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01
P4 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.97 0.01
PS 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
pi 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.15
Table B.3: Transition Matrix. The table presents the transition matrix of currency portfolios formed using time t−1 information. pit→t+1 denotes the probability
of moving from one portfolio to another between time t and time t+ 1 (read by row). The FX portfolios are sorted on time t− 1 one-month forward premia. The NA
portfolios are sorted on time t − 1 external imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. The portfolios are
rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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Panel A: FX Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
All Countries Developed Countries
Top 1 JPY [0.18] DKK [0.08] GBP [0.08] AUD [0.09] ZAR [0.14] JPY [0.43] NLG [0.15] DKK [0.22] GBP [0.18] NZD [0.34]
Top 2 CHF [0.17] CAD [0.07] NOK [0.06] NZD [0.07] TRY [0.10] CHF [0.42] EUR [0.11] CAD [0.14] AUD [0.15] AUD [0.23]
Top 3 SGD [0.13] EUR [0.06] DKK [0.06] GBP [0.06] MXN [0.06] DEM [0.07] CAD [0.11] GBP [0.11] SEK [0.14] ITL [0.13]
Top 4 HKD [0.08] SGD [0.05] CAD [0.06] INR [0.05] NZD [0.06] CAD [0.03] DEM [0.11] NOK [0.11] NOK [0.13] NOK [0.11]
Top 5 CNY [0.06] HKD [0.05] HKD [0.05] PHP [0.05] HUF [0.05] NLG [0.02] SEK [0.08] SEK [0.10] CAD [0.11] GBP [0.09]
Top 6 SEK [0.04] NLG [0.05] SEK [0.05] NOK [0.05] BRL [0.05] SEK [0.01] FRF [0.08] FRF [0.08] DKK [0.08] SEK [0.06]
Panel B: NA Portfolios
Top 1 SGD [0.15] GBP [0.13] AUD [0.15] NZD [0.15] DKK [0.11] CHF [0.23] CHF [0.22] AUD [0.29] CAD [0.25] DKK [0.35]
Top 2 CHF [0.11] CHF [0.09] NOK [0.11] HUF [0.10] TRY [0.10] JPY [0.22] GBP [0.20] NOK [0.27] NZD [0.24] NZD [0.18]
Top 3 JPY [0.10] NLG [0.08] MYR [0.09] CAD [0.09] PHP [0.09] DEM [0.20] NLG [0.17] JPY [0.13] SEK [0.22] SEK [0.18]
Top 4 EUR [0.09] JPY [0.07] HKD [0.08] ZAR [0.08] SEK [0.09] EUR [0.13] FRF [0.13] ITL [0.11] NOK [0.10] GBP [0.17]
Top 5 HKD [0.09] CAD [0.06] DKK [0.07] PLN [0.07] IDR [0.09] CAD [0.11] DKK [0.09] EUR [0.09] AUD [0.10] ITL [0.07]
Top 6 DEM [0.09] FRF [0.06] ITL [0.05] MXN [0.06] HRK [0.06] FRF [0.09] JPY [0.08] GBP [0.04] ITL [0.04] CAD [0.05]
Panel B: Joint Probability
[0.45] [0.24] [0.22] [0.23] [0.36] [0.44] [0.25] [0.18] [0.26] [0.35]
[0.62] [0.60] [0.67] [0.57]
Table B.4: Portfolio Composition. The table presents a break-down of the FX and NA portfolios. Panel A (Panel B) reports the top six currencies (with
probabilities in parentheses) entering each of the five FX (NA) portfolios. Panel C presents the probability that the same currency simultaneously enters the same FX
and NA portfolio. The FX portfolios are sorted on time t− 1 one-month forward premia. The NA portfolios are sorted on time t− 1 external imbalances (net foreign
assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011. Exchange
rates are from Datastream. Yearly data on GDP, foreign assets and liabilities are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Yearly data on the share of foreign liabilities
in domestic currency are from Lane and Shambaugh (2010). Monthly observations are retrieved by keeping end-of-period data constant until a new observation becomes
available.
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Panel A: Monthly Rebalancing Panel B: Yearly Rebalancing
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ
FX Portfolios FX Portfolios
Mean −1.22 0.41 2.78 2.12 6.66 2.15 7.88 1.07 5.25 −0.05 0.80 0.12 1.96 5.46 1.66 5.51 1.39 4.78
Med −2.08 3.39 4.34 6.19 11.10 4.23 11.15 3.08 9.24 2.93 1.47 2.72 3.45 8.38 2.48 5.84 2.03 5.21
Sdev. 9.13 9.31 9.05 10.58 11.54 8.64 11.03 8.64 11.01 10.43 11.19 12.90 12.54 17.98 10.81 17.34 10.77 17.18
Skew 0.10 −0.45 −0.31 −1.18 −1.62 −0.67 −1.44 −0.68 −1.46 −0.54 −0.17 −1.53 −0.03 −1.59 −0.58 −0.62 −0.58 −0.65
Kurt 3.84 4.12 4.37 7.57 10.57 4.81 7.21 4.81 7.23 2.47 1.93 5.47 1.98 6.45 2.91 3.05 2.91 3.06
AC1 −0.01 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.23 −0.02 0.29 −0.02 0.28
SR −0.13 0.04 0.31 0.20 0.58 0.25 0.71 0.12 0.48 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.30 0.15 0.32 0.13 0.28
MDD −0.53 −0.44 −0.35 −0.38 −0.44 −0.29 −0.32 −0.30 −0.38 −0.44 −0.37 −0.60 −0.47 −0.62 −0.30 −0.51 −0.32 −0.52
Freq 14.0 26.8 29.0 25.7 13.1 21.7 27.1 21.7 27.1 25.0 52.7 56.3 52.7 32.7 43.9 57.7 43.9 57.7
NA Portfolios NA Portfolios
Mean 0.19 1.25 1.23 1.96 7.05 2.33 6.85 1.28 4.72 −0.36 1.54 1.69 0.37 4.98 1.64 5.34 1.38 4.78
Med 1.48 0.99 3.06 3.99 9.68 4.09 8.67 3.27 7.22 2.03 0.97 3.02 1.19 6.70 2.46 6.46 2.01 6.16
Sdev. 8.99 9.95 8.81 9.63 10.63 8.57 7.56 8.57 7.53 10.96 11.12 11.02 14.41 15.48 10.81 11.23 10.76 11.03
Skew −0.09 −0.31 −0.63 −1.16 −1.05 −0.63 −0.94 −0.64 −0.97 −0.77 −0.28 −0.47 −2.21 −0.43 −0.53 −0.50 −0.53 −0.58
Kurt 3.19 4.18 5.20 8.07 5.95 4.73 7.92 4.73 7.92 2.58 2.53 2.77 10.16 3.32 2.79 4.20 2.79 4.24
AC1 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.25 0.14 −0.03 −0.07 0.20 −0.11 −0.02 0.15 −0.02 0.14
SR 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.66 0.27 0.91 0.15 0.63 −0.03 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.32 0.15 0.48 0.13 0.43
MDD −0.54 −0.42 −0.31 −0.35 −0.36 −0.27 −0.32 −0.30 −0.36 −0.56 −0.33 −0.25 −0.61 −0.35 −0.31 −0.30 −0.32 −0.31
Freq 2.6 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.9 5.3 2.9 5.3 25.6 34.2 30.4 26.2 26.8 28.6 52.4 28.6 52.4
Table B.5: Descriptive Statistics: Liquid Currencies. The table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on time t − 1 information for the
top 20 most liquid currencies - Developed and Emerging Countries. The FX portfolios are sorted on forward premia. Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the top 20% of all
currencies with the lowest forward premia whereas Portfolio 5 (P5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with the highest forward premia. The NA portfolios are
sorted on external imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the top 20% of all
currencies with positive external imbalances (creditor nations) and the highest share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency whereas Portfolio 5 (P5) contains the
top 20% of all currencies with negative external imbalances (debtor nations) and the lowest share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency. DOL denotes the average
return of the five currency portfolios. HML denotes a long-short strategy that buys P5 and sells P1. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum, and τ
denotes excess returns adjusted for transaction costs. The table also reports the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC1), the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR), the
maximum drawdown in percent (MDD), and the frequency of portfolio switches (Freq) in percent. Panel A (Panel B) presents portfolios rebalanced at the end of
each month (year) using one-month (one-year) forward premia. The sample runs from October 1983 to December 2011, and comprises 338 (28) observations for the
monthly (yearly) exercise. Exchange rates are from Datastream. Yearly data on GDP, foreign assets and liabilities are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) whereas
yearly data on the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency are from Lane and Shambaugh (2010). Monthly observations are retrieved by keeping end-of-period
data constant until a new observation becomes available.
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
CHF DEM/EUR
GMM1 −0.32 1.59 0.01 0.07 0.68 2.11 5.33 0.15 −0.29 1.59 −0.01 0.07 0.67 2.43 5.98 0.16
(0.25) (0.78) (0.01) (0.03) [0.15] [0.15] (0.30) (0.71) (0.01) (0.02) [0.11] [0.07]
GMM2 −0.29 1.30 0.01 0.05 0.60 2.36 5.18 −0.40 1.59 −0.01 0.05 0.61 2.66 5.84
(0.24) (0.77) (0.01) (0.03) [0.16] (0.30) (0.71) (0.01) (0.02) [0.12]
FMB −0.32 1.59 0.01 0.07 0.68 2.11 5.33 −0.28 1.58 −0.01 0.07 0.67 2.43 5.99
(0.22) (0.58) (0.01) (0.03) [0.15] (0.29) (0.54) (0.01) (0.02) [0.11]
[0.23] [0.61] [0.01] [0.03] [0.28] [0.53] [0.01] [0.02]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2 α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 −0.01 0.93 −0.29 0.76 0.01 0.91 −0.35 0.69
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05)
P2 −0.01 0.97 −0.16 0.77 −0.02 0.95 −0.18 0.66
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05)
P3 0.01 0.88 −0.04 0.78 0.01 0.79 −0.03 0.66
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
P4 0.01 0.96 0.16 0.78 0.01 0.88 0.20 0.64
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
P5 0.04 1.29 0.29 0.75 0.04 1.51 0.31 0.72
(0.01) (0.07) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.10)
Continued
Table B.6: Asset Pricing: Other Base Currencies. The table presents cross-sectional asset pricing results for other base currencies. The linear factor model is
based on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance (HMLNA) risk factor. The test assets are excess returns to five currency (FX) portfolios sorted on the one-month
forward premia. Panel A reports GMM (first and second-stage) and Fama-MacBeth (FMB) estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk λ, and the
cross-sectional R2. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses whereas Shanken (1992) standard
errors are reported in brackets. χ2 denotes the test statistics (with p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that all pricing errors are jointly zero. HJ refers to
the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with simulated p-value in parentheses) for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to zero. Panel B reports
least-squares estimates of time series regressions with Newey and West (1987) standard errors in parentheses. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum
and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from October 1983 to December 2011.
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Panel A: Factor Prices
bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ bDOL bNA λDOL λNA R
2 RMSE χ2 HJ
CHF DEM/EUR
GMM1 −0.32 1.59 0.01 0.07 0.68 2.11 5.33 0.15 −0.29 1.59 −0.01 0.07 0.67 2.43 5.98 0.16
(0.25) (0.78) (0.01) (0.03) [0.15] [0.15] (0.30) (0.71) (0.01) (0.02) [0.11] [0.07]
GMM2 −0.29 1.30 0.01 0.05 0.60 2.36 5.18 −0.40 1.59 −0.01 0.05 0.61 2.66 5.84
(0.24) (0.77) (0.01) (0.03) [0.16] (0.30) (0.71) (0.01) (0.02) [0.12]
FMB −0.32 1.59 0.01 0.07 0.68 2.11 5.33 −0.28 1.58 −0.01 0.07 0.67 2.43 5.99
(0.22) (0.58) (0.01) (0.03) [0.15] (0.29) (0.54) (0.01) (0.02) [0.11]
[0.23] [0.61] [0.01] [0.03] [0.28] [0.53] [0.01] [0.02]
Panel B: Factor Betas
α βDOL βNA R
2 α βDOL βNA R
2
P1 −0.01 0.93 −0.29 0.76 0.01 0.91 −0.35 0.69
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05)
P2 −0.01 0.97 −0.16 0.77 −0.02 0.95 −0.18 0.66
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05)
P3 0.01 0.88 −0.04 0.78 0.01 0.79 −0.03 0.66
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03)
P4 0.01 0.96 0.16 0.78 0.01 0.88 0.20 0.64
(0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
P5 0.04 1.29 0.29 0.75 0.04 1.51 0.31 0.72
(0.01) (0.07) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.10)
Continued
Asset Pricing: Other Base Currencies (cont.)
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Panel A: Monthly Rebalancing Panel B: Yearly Rebalancing
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 DOL HML DOL
τ HMLτ
All Countries All Countries
Mean 1.23 0.85 2.66 2.57 1.95 1.85 0.72 0.72 −1.67 0.69 0.67 3.06 2.07 0.18 1.34 −0.52 1.02 −1.20
Med 1.17 1.26 4.66 4.96 4.52 3.46 4.97 2.59 2.44 0.26 2.45 3.81 4.01 4.33 2.57 2.42 2.21 1.52
Sdev 6.35 9.00 8.73 7.63 9.86 7.22 8.34 7.22 8.35 6.06 9.82 10.49 10.39 16.99 9.32 15.12 9.31 15.16
Skew −0.89 −0.42 −0.57 −0.88 −0.71 −0.57 −0.72 −0.58 −0.77 0.49 −0.35 −0.82 −0.35 −1.96 −0.70 −2.46 −0.70 −2.49
Kurt 9.58 4.36 4.81 6.36 6.08 4.49 7.08 4.48 7.09 2.58 2.62 3.73 2.20 6.93 3.08 9.52 3.08 9.69
AC1 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.17 −0.11 −0.10 0.06 −0.15 −0.05 −0.10 −0.05 −0.08
SR 0.19 0.09 0.31 0.34 0.20 0.26 0.09 0.10 −0.20 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.20 0.01 0.14 −0.03 0.11 −0.08
MDD −0.30 −0.44 −0.27 −0.28 −0.33 −0.24 −0.31 −0.29 −0.48 −0.22 −0.36 −0.24 −0.25 −0.61 −0.25 −0.66 −0.26 −0.69
Freq 2.0 3.4 3.9 4.1 2.6 3.2 5.2 3.2 5.2 16.8 35.1 35.6 34.3 24.2 29.2 46.0 29.2 46.0
Developed Countries Developed Countries
Mean 0.81 0.64 2.51 0.92 4.56 1.89 3.75 1.11 1.87 0.24 0.80 2.07 1.60 3.04 1.55 2.80 1.38 2.40
Med 0.99 1.96 3.55 3.56 6.30 3.47 5.79 2.75 3.91 2.17 3.52 1.90 2.72 2.37 1.24 3.23 1.08 2.99
Sdev 11.30 9.45 9.66 8.76 10.94 8.78 10.43 8.78 10.43 12.27 11.67 9.80 12.96 13.01 10.42 13.81 10.41 13.87
Skew −0.22 −0.11 −0.41 −0.57 −0.59 −0.33 −0.31 −0.34 −0.31 −0.41 −0.21 −0.02 −0.79 −0.06 −0.15 −0.72 −0.15 −0.72
Kurt 3.33 3.31 4.44 4.46 5.86 3.79 3.84 3.78 3.84 2.14 1.82 2.19 3.41 2.79 2.11 4.09 2.11 4.04
AC1 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 −0.02 0.03 0.06 −0.05 0.05 −0.05
SR 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.42 0.21 0.36 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.13 0.17
MDD −0.50 −0.49 −0.31 −0.33 −0.42 −0.37 −0.30 −0.40 −0.36 −0.47 −0.46 −0.30 −0.33 −0.34 −0.34 −0.37 −0.34 −0.37
Freq 2.2 3.1 3.6 3.2 1.6 2.7 4.9 2.7 4.9 25.0 30.4 35.1 29.8 13.7 26.8 51.8 26.8 51.8
Table B.7: Descriptive Statistics: Single-Sorted External Imbalances Portfolios. The table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted external
imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) at time t− 1. Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the top 20% of all currencies with positive external imbalances (creditor nations)
whereas Portfolio 5 (P5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with negative external imbalances (debtor nations). DOL denotes the average return of the five currency
portfolios. HML denotes the global imbalance factor and is equivalent to a long-short strategy that buys P5 and sells P1. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per
annum, and τ denotes excess returns adjusted for transaction costs. The table also reports the first order autocorrelation coefficient (AC1), the annualized Sharpe ratio
(SR), the maximum drawdown in percent (MDD), and the frequency of portfolio switches (Freq) in percent. Panel A (Panel B) presents portfolios rebalanced at the
end of each month (year). The sample runs from October 1983 to December 2011, and comprises 338 (28) observations for the monthly (yearly) exercise. Exchange
rates are from Datastream. Yearly data on GDP, foreign assets and liabilities are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Monthly observations are retrieved by keeping
end-of-period data constant until a new observation becomes available.
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Figure B.1: The World Distribution of External Imbalances. The figure presents the net foreign asset position relative to gross domestic product of All Countries
included in the sample. I report the distribution of external imbalances as of December 2011 using data from the International Financial Statistics database. I build
the map using P&P World Map (http: // edit. freemap. jp/ en/ ).
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Figure B.2: Share of Foreign Liabilities in Domestic Currency. The figure presents the average share of foreign liabilities issued in domestic currency (solid
line) and the 90th and 10th percentile (dashed line). The dataset is from Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and comprises yearly estimates from 1990 through 2004.
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Figure B.3: Pricing Errors. The figure presents cross-sectional pricing errors for the linear factor model based on the dollar (DOL) and the global imbalance risk
(HMLNA) factor. The test assets are excess returns to currency (FX) portfolios obtained by sorting currencies into five groups using the one-month forward premia
(nominal interest rate differentials). Portfolio 1 contains currencies with the lowest forward premia (funding currencies) whereas Portfolio 5 contains currencies with
the highest forward premia (investment currencies). Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly from October 1983
to December 2011.
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Figure B.4: Risk Reversal and Global Imbalance Risk. The figure presents the one-month risk reversal of the external imbalance portfolios. The risk reversal
is computed as the implied volatility of a 10-delta call minus the implied volatility of 10-delta put, scaled by the at-the-money implied volatility. Implied volatility data
are from JP Morgan and range from January 1996 to August 2011.
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Table C.1 presents the loadings of the five currency portfolios, sorted by interest
rates, on the five principal components which underlie the returns. The first two
principal components explain around 90 percent of total variation in returns. The
majority of the variation is accounted for by the first principal component, which
acts a ‘level’ factor. The second principal component explains the heterogeneity in
currency excess returns. High-interest-rate currencies (Portfolio 5) load positively
on the principal component, while low-interest-rate currencies (Portfolio 1) load
negatively.
Table C.2 presents the cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) results for non-
theoretical characteristic factors. The factors are sorted on the basis of the sub-
indices of political risk, taken from the Political Risk Service Group’s International
Country Risk Guide database. The table augments the results presented in Table
4.5. Eight of the twelve factors are found to be statistically significant. The pricing,
however, measured by other criteria including R2 and RMSE statistics is, overall,
less supportive for the models than for the macroeconomic and financial factors.
Table C.3 presents the cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) results for non-
theoretical characteristic factors. The factors are sorted on the basis of the sub-
indices of macroeconomic, financial and political risk, taken from the Political Risk
Service Group’s International Country Risk Guide database. The table provides
the equivalent Developed Countries results to those presented for All Countries in
Tables 4.5 and C.2. I find that 17 of the 22 characteristic factors are significant.
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The results are found to be particular strong for the factors sorted on the basis of
financial risks.
Table C.4 presents the cross-sectional R2 and t-statistic from the second-stage of
the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The test assets are five portfolios sorted
on the same basis as the factor itself. The table provides the equivalent Developed
Countries results to those presented for All Countries in Table 4.6. The results
largely overlap with the findings for All Countries. Again, I find that none of the
25 non-theoretical factors are statistically priced.
Table C.5 presents simulation results from the second step of the Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973) procedure. A set of 20,000 ‘useless’ factors are generated to price
currency portfolios sorted by interest rates (Panel A) and sorted randomly (Panel
B). The table provides the equivalent Developed Countries results to those presented
for All Countries in Table 4.7. The pricing of interest-rate-sorted portfolios is again
found to generate biased results, supporting the findings of Lewellen, Nagel, and
Shanken (2010). The bias, however, disappears once the ‘useless’ factors are asked
to price the associated, and randomly-generated, currency portfolios.
Figure C.1 presents a visual depiction of the results in Table C.4 for Developed
Countries. The majority of non-theoretical factors are suggestive of strong pricing
capabilities when pricing currency portfolios sorted by interest rates. When the test
assets are changed to currency portfolios sorted by the characteristic of interest,
none of the factors are significant.
Figure C.2 presents the conditional excess returns to the 25 non-theoretical factors
for the Developed Countries sample. Conditional on carry trade returns, the ma-
jority of characteristic factors display a monotonic pattern of returns. The finding
suggests a common source of variation which drives macroeconomic, financial and
political risks.
Figure C.3 presents the average excess returns to the five currency portfolios sorted
by each of the macroeconomic, financial and political characteristics for Developed
Countries. If the characteristics could accurately explain currency exposure to risk,
we would observe a monotonic pattern in excess currency returns. In the majority of
instances, however, the factors are unable to generate monotonic patterns in returns,
which helps to explain why the non-theoretical factors are unable to explain their
respective set of currency portfolios.
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Panel A Panel B
All Countries Developed Countries
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5
P1 0.39 -0.42 -0.46 -0.64 -0.21 P1 0.40 -0.67 0.57 -0.24 -0.08
P2 0.42 -0.34 -0.38 0.75 -0.01 P2 0.45 -0.28 -0.37 0.72 -0.27
P3 0.45 -0.15 0.34 -0.13 0.80 P3 0.44 -0.03 -0.28 -0.11 0.84
P4 0.49 -0.02 0.66 0.04 -0.56 P4 0.45 0.17 -0.43 -0.61 -0.46
P5 0.47 0.83 -0.30 -0.04 0.02 P5 0.49 0.67 0.52 0.21 -0.03
Cum. % Var 75.3% 87.8% 93.4% 96.9% 100% Cum. % Var 76.0% 88.5% 93.5% 97.1% 100%
Table C.1: PCA Analysis: Interest-Rate-Sorted Currency Portfolios. The table presents the loadings of the five interest-rate-sorted test asset portfolios on
the 5 principal components. I also report the cumulative proportion of return variation explained by the five principal components. The test-assets are collected from
Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). Panel A contains principal component loadings for All Countries, while Panel B contains principal component loadings for
Developed Countries.
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Government
Stability
Socioeconomic
Conditions
Investment
Profile
Internal
Conflict
External
Conflict
Corruption
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.77 19.60 1.54 13.61 1.66 11.62 1.67 13.62 1.52 11.46 1.63 -10.95
t-stat [1.28] [1.91] [1.11] [3.04] [1.20] [2.98] [1.20] [2.07] [1.10] [3.28] [1.18] [-2.24]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 -37.3% 71.3% 71.1% -62.0% 85.7% -25.2%
χ2 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.30 0.00
RMSE 4.08 1.86 1.87 4.43 1.32 3.90
ρ 7.9% 32.3% 36.5% 0.9% 31.5% -17.3%
Military in
Politics
Religious
Tensions
Law and Order Ethnic Tensions Democratic
Accountability
Bureaucracy
Quality
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.62 -17.70 1.67 -5.08 1.54 13.05 1.27 33.85 1.81 -8.81 1.60 4.25
t-stat [1.17] [-2.75] [1.20] [-1.28] [1.11] [2.54] [0.92] [1.76] [1.34] [-1.87] [1.18] [1.31]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 50.0% -74.0% -49.6% -21.9% -60.7% -80.7%
χ2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
RMSE 2.46 4.59 4.26 3.85 4.42 4.68
ρ -26.8% -14.3% 4.2% 3.7% -13.6% 2.2%
Table C.2: Asset Pricing Tests: Non-Theoretical Factors (Political Risk). The table presents second stage cross-sectional results from the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) procedure. The test assets are five portfolios sorted on the basis of forward premia. Each regression contains two risk factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic
based risk factor constructed on the basis of data from the PRS Group on country-level political risks. Standard errors are corrected according to Shanken (1992) with
optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). Panel A contains results for All Countries in the sample, while Panel B contains results for Developed
Countries. Additional regression statistics are reported, including the adjusted R2, a chi-squared test that all pricing errors are jointly equal to zero (χ2, a value less
than 0.05 indicates large pricing errors), the square root of the average mispricing (RMSE) and the correlation of the second risk factor with the second principal
component of the test assets (ρ). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983
to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Panel A
GDP
per Capita
GDP
Growth Rate
Inflation
Yearly Rate
Budget
Balance
Current
Account
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.85 12.48 1.91 -1.35 1.85 6.52 1.89 4.48 1.83 7.45
t-stat [1.12] [2.42] [1.15] [-0.21] [1.12] [2.55] [1.14] [0.94] [1.10] [2.49]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 63.3% -85.4% 76.5% -73.9% 93.8%
χ2 0.40 0.05 0.54 0.09 0.86
RMSE 1.77 3.99 1.42 3.86 0.73
ρ 20.1% -3.6% 62.5% 1.6% 56.3%
Panel B
Exchange Rate
Stability
International
Liquidity
Current
Account
Debt Service (%
Exports)
Foreign Debt (%
GDP)
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.80 9.40 1.89 8.69 1.86 8.02 1.84 10.66 1.85 8.10
t-stat [1.09] [2.51] [1.14] [2.12] [1.13] [2.48] [1.11] [2.33] [1.10] [2.46]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 88.1% 34.2% 91.5% 67.7% 95.6%
χ2 0.67 0.10 0.84 0.28 0.91
RMSE 1.01 2.37 0.85 1.66 0.62
ρ 40.8% 29.0% 64.7% 29.1% 0.45%
See next page for caption...
152
Panel C
Government
Stability
Socioeconomic
Conditions
Investment
Profile
Internal
Conflict
External
Conflict
Corruption
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 1.98 -19.2 1.64 18.19 1.83 15.70 2.01 -12.94 1.44 42.80 1.81 -14.30
t-stat [1.18] [-1.59] [0.99] [2.05] [1.11] [1.77] [1.23] [-2.19] [0.87] [1.19] [1.09] [-2.24]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 -16.4% 88.3% -27.3% 5.3% 1.2% 77.9%
χ2 0.02 0.79 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.48
RMSE 3.16 1.00 3.30 2.85 2.91 1.37
ρ -8.2% 14.7% 5.7% -11.0% 1.7% -21.2%
Military in
Politics
Religious
Tensions
Law and Order Ethnic Tensions Democratic
Accountability
Bureaucracy
Quality
DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK DOL RISK
Parameter 2.04 -9.71 1.90 -9.75 1.91 -7.84 1.83 6.26 1.94 -7.35 1.96 -13.30
t-stat [1.26] [-2.11] [1.15] [-2.27] [1.18] [-2.11] [1.10] [2.35] [1.20] [-2.25] [1.21] [-2.04]
Cross-sectional regression statistics
R2 71.0% 69.4% 78.5% 79.8% 88.8% 71.5%
χ2 0.38 0.35 0.55 0.60 0.78 0.44
RMSE 1.58 1.62 1.36 1.32 0.98 1.56
ρ -30.0% -37.2% -43.0% 53.3% -52.3% -24.0%
Table C.3: Asset Pricing Tests: Non-Theoretical Factors (Developed Countries). The table presents second stage cross-sectional results from the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure. The test assets are five portfolios sorted on the basis of forward premia. Each regression contains two risk factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a
characteristic based risk factor constructed on the basis of data from the PRS Group on country-level macroeconomic, financial and political risks. Standard errors are
corrected according to Shanken (1992), with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). Panel A contains results for All Countries in the sample, while
Panel B contains results for Developed Countries. Additional regression statistics are reported, including the adjusted R2, a chi-squared test that all pricing errors are
jointly equal to zero (χ2, a value less than 0.05 indicates large pricing errors), the square root of the average mispricing (RMSE) and the correlation of the second
risk factor with the second principal component of the test assets (ρ). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The
sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Panel A
Statistical Risk Macroeconomic Risk
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
‘Slope’ Risk (LRV) 3.34 98.9% ‘Global Imbalance’ (DCRS) 2.75 72.5%
Theoretically Motivated Risk Characteristic
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Colacito and Croce 1.21 -0.5% Verdelhan 2.97 92.8%
Farhi and Gabaix 0.98 -4.2%
Financial Risk Characteristics
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Aggregate Financial 1.28 80.7% Current Account 1.02 -30.8%
Exchange Rate Stability 1.37 31.0% Debt Service 0.42 -101%
International Liquidity 0.72 -4.5% Foreign Debt 1.43 2.4%
Economic Risk Characteristics
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Aggregate Economic 0.46 -111% Inflation 0.81 -91.3%
GDP per Capita 1.05 -20.5% Budget Balance 1.08 8.5%
GDP Growth Rate 0.39 -95.2% Current Account 1.14 5.6%
Political Risk Characteristics
Variable t-stat R2 Variable t-stat R2
Aggregate Political Risk 0.93 -40.5% Military in Politics 0.17 -154%
Government Stability 0.22 -81.8% Religious Tensions 0.54 -117%
Socioeconomic Conditions 0.00 -102% Law and Order 0.88 -2.3%
Investment Profile 0.07 -112% Ethnic Tensions 1.43 41.3%
Internal Conflict 0.30 -105% Democratic Accountability 0.13 -78.1%
External Conflict 0.06 -46.2% Bureaucracy Quality 0.29 -106%
Corruption 0.73 1.1%
Table C.4: Asset Pricing Tests: Characteristic-Sorted Portfolios (Developed Countries). The
table presents second stage cross-sectional adjusted R2 and t-statistics from the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
procedure. The test assets are five currency portfolios sorted on the same basis as the factor itself. Each
regression contains two risk factors (i) DOL risk and (ii) a characteristic based risk factor. Standard errors
are corrected according to Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987).
The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section
4.3.
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Panel A
Interest-Rate-Sorted Test Assets
Relationship between ‘useless’ factors and the ‘true’ factor
Correlation (ρ) 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.80 0.90 1.0
Proportion >ρ 59.5% 28.7% 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Factor price of risk
t-stat (absolute value) 0.67 1.65 1.96 2.33 2.58 2.81 3.29
Proportion >t-stat (theory) 50.0% 10.0% 5.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.1%
Proportion >t-stat (actual) 88.3% 34.2% 10.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Model fit
R2 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 99%
Proportion >R2 45.7% 36.7% 27.4% 17.4% 7.4% 2.8% 0.2%
Pricing errors
χ2 p-value 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.95
Proportion <p-value 29.8% 62.9% 84.2% 91.4% 95.9% 98.9% 99.6%
Panel B
Randomly-Sorted Test Assets
Relationship between ‘useless’ factors and the ‘true’ factor
Correlation (ρ) 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.80 0.90 1.0
Proportion >ρ 59.5% 28.7% 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Factor price of risk
t-stat (absolute value) 0.67 1.65 1.96 2.33 2.58 2.81 3.29
Proportion >t-stat (theory) 50.0% 10.0% 5.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.1%
Proportion >t-stat (actual) 50.0% 10.2% 4.8% 1.8% 0.9% 0.4% 0.1%
Model fit
R2 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 99%
Proportion >R2 7.1% 4.9% 3.1% 1.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0%
Pricing errors
χ2 p-value 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.95
Proportion <p-value 5.9% 11.6% 32.5% 52.3% 72.1% 90.7% 95.6%
Table C.5: Asset Pricing Tests: ‘Useless’ Factors (Developed Countries). The table presents the
estimated distributions of statistics collected from Fama and MacBeth (1973) asset pricing tests using sim-
ulated risk factors. Two currency ‘risk factors’ are randomly generated by arbitrarily reassigning currencies
to one of five portfolios each month. The test assets are interest-rate-sorted portfolios (Panel A) and ran-
domly sorted currency portfolios (Panel B). The first risk factor is calculated as an equally weighted average
of all five portfolio returns. The second risk factor is calculated as the difference between the returns on the
1st and 5th portfolios. The correlation is between the second simulated risk factor and the Slope factor from
Lustig et al. (2011). The t-statistics are reported for the second risk factor. Standard errors are adjusted
according to Shanken (1992) with optimal lag length according to Newey and West (1987). The adjusted
R2 is from the second-stage cross-sectional regression in the Fama-MacBeth approach. The χ2 p-value is
greater than 0.05 if pricing errors are small. In total 20,000 pairs of risk factors are simulated. Data on
currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983
to December 2011.
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Figure C.1: Pricing Alternative Test Assets (Developed Countries). The figure presents adjusted-R2 and t-statistics from Fama-MacBeth asset pricing
regressions. In the left-hand chart are the cross-sectional asset pricing statistics for the 25 characteristic-based risk factors constructed using data from the Political
Risk Services (PRS) Group on underlying economic, financial and political risks. The t-statistics are calculated using Shanken (1992) corrected standard errors with
optimal lag length chosen according to Newey and West (1987). The adjusted-R2 is taken from the second stage cross-sectional regression of the Fama-MacBeth
procedure. Results are reported for two sets of test assets: (i) the forward-premia-sorted currency portfolios (solid circles), and (ii) the randomly sorted portfolios
from which the risk factors are constructed (crosses). In the right-hand chart the results are reported for the characteristic-based risk factors designed to capture
consumption-based models of currency premia as well as for the Slope risk factor of Lustig et al. (2011). Horizontal lines are included at 1.96 (the standard 5%
critical threshold) and 2.69 (the simulated 5% critical threshold when the test assets are forward-premia-sorted currency portfolios). The abbreviations are: LRV: Lustig
et al. (2011); CC: Colacito and Croce (2013); FG: Farhi and Gabaix (2013); V: Verdelhan (2010). Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3
(Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Figure C.2: Conditional Excess Currency Returns of Non-Theoretical Factors (Developed Countries). The figure presents the average excess return to
each of the 25 characteristic-sorted currency factors generated using data on underlying economic, financial and political risks from the Political Risk Services (PRS)
Group, conditional on the distribution of the Slope risk factor of Lustig et al. (2011). The Slope risk factor is constructed using data from 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014).
Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011. Details of all
other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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Figure C.3: Expected Excess Returns to Characteristic-Sorted Portfolios (Developed Countries). The figure presents the expected excess returns to each of
the five currency portfolios, sorted according to the 25 country characteristics which span data on economic, financial and political risks from the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group. Data on test portfolios and currencies are taken from Chapter 3 (Della Corte et al., 2014). The sample period is from October 1983 to December 2011.
Details of all other data are provided in Section 4.3.
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